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Abstract 
Context  
During the last two decades, digital multimedia piracy has been considered a topic of concern given its 
impact on the industrial world: video piracy has cost more than one billion US Dollars to the cinema and 
television industry and because of it, sales and rentals of DVDs have declined by about 10 percent 
between 2002 and 2012 (source: Motion Picture Association of America, MPAA FiliŶg oŶ Woƌld’s Most 
Notorious Piracy Markets, 2013). 
In this context, the need for embedding digital information (watermarks) into digital video has attracted 
a great deal of interest for a large area of video applications, such as ownership protection, content 
integrity verification, piracy tracking or broadcast monitoring. 
In practice, video sequences are stored and distributed in compressed bit stream formats. Consequently, 
watermarking the compressed video would require to decode this sequence, then to insert the 
watermark and, finally, to re-encode it. Such an approach would result into a large computing time, 
mainly because of the encoding and decoding; these operations are intrinsically avoided if the 
watermark is inserted directly in the compressed video domain. 
Several research studies are conducted in this respect, with a special attention paid to the MPEG-4 
Part 10 (a.k.a. MPEG-4 AVC or, alternatively H.264) compressed stream. In order to achieve higher 
compression efficiency, MPEG-4 AVC deploys particular compression features such as variable block-size 
motion estimation, directional spatial prediction and context-adaptive video coding. Consequently, the 
existing watermarking techniques, be they devoted to the uncompressed or to earlier compressed 
domains (MPEG-2 or MPEG-4 Part 2), are likely to fail in reaching the same performances in the MPEG-4 
AVC compressed domain and specific methods should be devised in this respect.  
The present thesis addresses the MPEG-4 AVC stream watermarking and considers two theoretical and 
applicative challenges, namely ownership protection and content integrity verification. While ownership 
protection is the preponderant application of watermarking techniques aiming to prevent or deter 
unauthorized copying of digital media, content integrity verification aims to check that the video has not 
been altered by modifying its semantic content. 
Constraints  
In order to be effective, watermarking should jointly reach constraints related to data payload, 
robustness/fragility, transparency, and computational complexity. The data payload is the amount of the 
embedded information (i.e the size of the watermark). The robustness is the ability of the watermark to 
survive mundane and/or malicious attacks; conversely, the fragility is the mark vulnerability against 
attacks. The transparency refers to the human imperceptibility of the artifacts induced by the mark in 
the host signal. In order for the watermarking techniques to be easily integrated into practical 
applications, the watermark insertion/detection should be achieved at a low (non prohibitive) 
computational cost.  
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The practical trade-off among these four properties is a priori set according to the targeted application 
context and purposes, as follow. 
Concerning the data payload, the main deadlock is related to the conceptual contradiction between 
compressions and watermarking. In fact, the compression paradigm is based on eliminating the visual 
redundancy in order to achieve high rate of compression. In contrast, watermarking tends to take 
advantage of the visual redundancy so as to hide the mark. Therefore, compressed video stream leaves 
very little room to hide the watermark (e.g. serial number identifying user for ownership application, 
authentication signature for integrity verification application, etc.). Beside the mark size, some 
watermarking applications also impose constraints concerning the mark semantic. For instance, for 
ownership protections, the embedded mark may have no meaning and is randomly generated to serve 
just as an owner ID. In contrast, for video integrity verifications, the embedded mark should reflect the 
semantic for the video content so as to distinguish between content changing and content preserving 
alterations.  
Concerning the robustness, the main deadlock is to recover the mark after any malicious and mundane 
attack that a pirate may apply: noise addition, compression, frame dropping, resizing, letter-boxing, 
removal, random geometric transformations induced by in-theater camera recording, etc. While the 
previous sentence holds for ownership protection, the content integrity verification comes across with 
an additional requirement: the mark should be robust against content preserving attacks (e.g. noise 
additioŶ, tƌaŶsĐodiŶg, …Ϳ ǁhile being fragile against content alteration attacks (e.g. object deletion, 
spatio-teŵpoƌal ĐƌoppiŶg, …Ϳ.  
The transparency also sets related yet different requirements for ownership protection and content 
integrity verification. The former application assumes ideal transparency, i.e. the artifacts induced during 
the mark insertion are humanly imperceptible. The latter application accepts a weaker transparency: 
human disturbing artifacts are tolerated assuming they have no impact in object/persons/events 
identification. Regardless of the application, note that directly watermarking the compressed stream 
would result in drift artifacts: due to the stream syntax, the modification of one block would result in the 
modification of its neighbors, thus increasing the transparency constraints.  
The low computational complexity imposes the constraint that the insertion/detection should be lighter 
than the rest of video processing operations involved in the application (e.g encoding/decoding) and 
compatible with the real time. 
Challenges  
The present thesis deals with theoretical and methodological issues related to the MPEG-4 AVC 
watermarking for ownership protection and video integrity verification. These challenges have been 
identified under the framework of two collaborative R&D projects: the French MEDIEVALS 
(waterMarking et Embrouillage pour la DIffusion et les Echanges Vidéos et Audios Legalisés) project 
funded by ANR and the European SPY (Surveillance imProved sYstem) project funded by ITEA2. 
From the theoretical point of view, the thesis main challenge is to develop a unitary watermarking 
framework (insertion/detection) able to serve the two above mentioned applications. From the 
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methodological point of view, the challenge is to instantiate this theoretical framework for serving the 
targeted applications  
The ownership protection is considered under a VoD (Video on Demand) framework (cf. MEDIEVALS). 
The objective is the increase of the data payload for pre-established robustness and transparency levels. 
The robustness should be evaluated against noise addition, transcoding, and Stirmark random bending 
attacks. The transparency should correspond to the humanly imperceptible artifacts. 
The video integrity verification is considered under a mobile video surveillance system (cf. SPY). The 
challenge is to extract from the video stream an authentication signature which is subsequently inserted 
so as to ensure the video integrity. This signature should be robust to content preserving attacks and 
fragile to content alteration attacks. The accuracy of the content altered regions should be evaluated 
both spatially and temporally. 
For the two applications, the mark insertion/detection should be lighter than the MPEG-4 AVC 
encoding/decoding. 
Contributions 
The present thesis tackles the above mentioned challenges by the following theoretical and 
methodological contributions. 
Multi symbol quantization index modulation watermarking (m-QIM) 
The thesis first main contribution consists in building the theoretical framework for the multi-symbol 
watermarking based on quantization index modulation (m-QIM). The insertion rule is analytically 
designed by extending the binary QIM rule. The detection rule is optimized so as to ensure minimal 
probability of error under additive white Gaussian noise distributed attacks. It is thus demonstrated that 
the data payload can be increased by a factor of log2m, for prescribed transparency and additive 
Gaussian noise power. 
The m-QIM framework is first deployed for ensuring the VoD (Video on Demand) ownership protection. 
The main benefit is the increase of data payload by a factor of log2m for a prescribed robustness of 0.1 of 
BER (variations lower than 3% of the bit error rate after additive noise, transcoding and Stirmark random 
bending attacks) and transparency (set to average PSNR = 45dB and 65dB for SD and HD encoded 
content, respectively). Actually, the experiments considered 4 values of  , namely    ,    ,     and    ; just for illustration, for    , a data payload of 150 bits per minute, i.e. about 20 
times larger than the limit imposed by the DCI (Digital Cinema Initiatives) standard, is obtained. The 
processed corpus sums up to 1 h of video content granted by the MEDIEVALS industrial partners. 
The second m-QIM application consists in designing a semi-fragile watermarking method for video 
integrity verification in compressed stream. In this respect, the MPEG-4 AVC syntax elements which can 
optimally (in the information theory sense) serve as authentication signature are identified. This 
authentication signature is further inserted by combining the m-QIM principle to an alteration detection 
strategy. The experiments results show fragility to content replacement (with an 1/81 frame and 3 
seconds spatial and temporal accuracy, respectively) and robustness against noise addition and 
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transcoding (compression by a factor of 2). The m-QIM framework main advantage is this time a relative 
gain factor of 0.11 of PSNR for fixed robustness (against noise addition and transcoding), fragility (to 
content alteration) and the data payload. The processed corpus sums up 1h 20 minutes of 
heterogeneous video contents granted by the SPY industrial partners. 
The computational time required by each operation included in the watermarking chain is evaluated on 
the following PC configuration: a Core4 CPU at 2.8 GHz and with 12 GB of RAM and a 500 GB HDD. The 
signature generation, insertion and detection are much faster than the entropic decoding/encoding and 
the video stream read/write from the hard disk. When considering the same example as above 
(protecting 1s of video), the entropic decoding/encoding and the read/write operations are about 10 and 
8 times slower than the mark selection/insertion/detection, respectively. 
Drift-free watermarking 
The thesis second main theoretical contribution consists in specifying a preprocessing MPEG-4 AVC 
shaping operation which can eliminate the intra-frame (spatial) drift effect. The drift represents the 
distortion spread in the compressed stream related to the MPEG encoding paradigm. In this respect, the 
drift distortion propagation problem in MPEG-4 AVC is algebraically expressed and the corresponding 
equations system is solved under drift-free constraints.  
The experiments consider the same m-QIM semi-fragile watermarking method and the same corpus. For 
prescribed data payload (100 bits/s), robustness (BER < 0.1 against transcoding at 50% in stream size), 
fragility (frame modification detection with accuracies of 1/81 from the frame size and 3 seconds) and 
complexity constraints, the drift-free shaping results in gains in transparency of 2 dB in PSNR, of 0.4 in 
AAD, of 0.002 in IF, of 0.03 in SC, of 0.017 NCC and 22 in DVQ. 
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MPEG-4 AVC compressed domain watermarking: properties, constraints, and thesis contributions.  
Properties Constraints Thesis contributions 
Data payload 
Compressed domain watermarking:  Compressed video stream leaves very 
little room space to hide data. 
 
m-QIM insertion rule  Theory: Increasing the data payload by a factor of log2m.  Practice: Inserting a data payload of 150 bits per minute for 
prescribed robustness and transparency, for VoD 
ownership protection. 
Robustness 
Ownership protection:  The embedded mark should be recovered 
after additive noise, transcoding, and 
Stirmark random bending attacks. 
m-QIM optimal decision rule  Theory: Minimize probability of error under additive white 
Gaussian noise distributed attacks.  Practice: Robustness of 0.1 of BER (variations lower than 
3% of the bit error rate after additive noise, transcoding 
and Stirmark random bending attacks). 
Fragility 
Mark semantic:  The embedded mark should reflect the 
semantic for the video content so as to 
distinguish between content changing 
and content preserving alterations. 
Integrity verification:  The mark should be robust against 
content preserving attacks while being 
fragile against content alteration attacks. 
MPEG-4 AVC Syntax element based signature   Theory: Identifying the syntax elements which can 
optimally (in the information theory sense) serve as 
authentication signature   Practice: Robustness against transcoding and Fragility to 
content replacement (with an 1/81 frame and 3 seconds 
spatial and temporal accuracy, respectively). 
Transparency 
Compressed domain watermarking:  Compressed stream processing leads to 
drift distortion propagation. 
Drift-free shaping for MPEG-4 AVC compressed stream 
watermarking.  Theory: Analytically expressing the drift distortion problem 
and resolving it under drift-free constraint.  Practice: Gains in transparency of 2 dB in PSNR, of 0.4 in 
AAD, of 0.002 in IF, of 0.03 in SC, of 0.017 NCC and 22 in 
DVQ. for prescribed data payload (100 bit/s), robustness 
(BER < 0.1 against transcoding at 50% in stream size). 
Complexity 
Compressed domain watermarking:  Mark embedding should not increase the 
computational cost of the watermarking 
application. 
MPEG-4 AVC compressed domain watermarking  Practice: The mark generation, selection, insertion and 
detection for one second of video are 10 times and 8 times 
faster than the MPEG-4 AVC entropic encoding/decoding 
and the stream read/write operations, respectively. 
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Abstract 
This Introduction is structured into three chapters. First, the various watermarking fundamentals (main properties, 
applications, theoretical model) are browsed. Secondly, the states of the art related to robust and semi-fragile 
watermarking are detailed and their limitations for ownership protection and integrity verification in MPEG-4 AVC 
compressed domain are identified. Finally, the thesis objectives, contributions and structure are presented. 
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I.1. Watermarking context  
Digital watermarking can be defined as the process of embedding a pattern of information into a cover 
digital content (image, audio, video, etc.) [COX02] [MIT07], see Figure I-1. The insertion of the mark is 
always controlled by some secret information referred to as a key. While the key should be kept secret 
(i.e. known only by the owner), the embedded information and even the embedding method can be 
public. Once watermarked, the host data can be transmitted and/or stored in a hostile environment, i.e. 
in an environment where changes attempting to remove the watermark are likely to occur. 
 
Figure I-1: Watermarking flowchart. 
 
From the structural point of view, any watermarking procedure features three components: the 
watermark generation (i.e. the way in which the message to be inserted is encrypted with a secret key so 
as to obtain a watermark), the watermark embedding (i.e. the way in which the watermark is inserted in 
the host document) and the watermark detection (i.e. the way in which the watermark is recovered). 
Original 
content 
Digital 
watermark 
Watermarked content 
Watermarked content releases in several formats 
Cropping, resizing, 
compression, 
editing, … 
Recovered 
watermark 
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From the information theory point of view, the watermarking process can be considered as a 
communication system with side-information at the encoder, see Figure I-2. Using a secrete key k, the 
watermark message m is embedded into the host signal x. The watermarked signal s is then transmitted 
over the channel which can introduce a noise n resulting from the attacks. The decoder receives the 
signal r and, using the same key k, extracts the watermark message m’. 

Figure I-2: :DWHUPDUNLQJV\QRSVLVGLDJUDP
The watermarking schemas are commonly divided into two main classes, namely spread spectrum (SS) 
and side information (SI).  
The SS system have been already deployed in telecommunication applications (e.g. CDMA), by providing 
a preferment solution very low power signal transmission over noisy channel [COX95]. Consequently, an 
SS based watermarking method spreads the mark across the host signal by creating redundancy, 
requiring a much larger bandwidth than strictly necessary. In practice this approach remains robust 
against attacks, while offering limited data payload [MIT07]. 
The SI principle [SHA58], [COS83], [EGG03], [CHE98] stipulates that a given noise channel known at the 
transmitter and unknown at the receiver would not decrease the channel capacity (the maximum 
amount of information which can be theoretically transmitted). Thus, the original document should no 
longer be considered as a hindrance to the watermark detection. Consequently, the side information 
watermarking is a priori optimal from the data payload point of view (under fixed transparency and 
robustness constraints). However, in practice, the methods following this approach feature very weak 
robustness in spite of a very high quantity of embedded information. 
Generally, a noisy channel is described by expressing the probabilistic dependencies between the input 
and the output of the information sources and by evaluating the average amount of the transmitted 
information. 
A watermarking system can be model by a discrete channel, where the input ݉ represents the inserted 
mark alphabet, the output ݉Ԣ represents the detected mark alphabet, and the noise ݊ represents the 
attacks. An error means to receive a symbol that does not correspond to the inserted one. In this case 
the channel is modeled by a noise matrix expressing the conditional probabilities ݌ሺ݉ᇱȀ݉ሻ.  
 
 
 
Insertion Channel Detection P P¶
N
V U
Q N
[
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I.1.1.  Applicative panorama  
The worldwide spread of watermarking solutions is mainly and historically boosted by the impact of the 
copyright in the industry. The current estimations (in USD) of the value added for the core and non-core 
copyright U.S. industries in 2009, 2010, 2011, and 2012, are resumed in Figure I-3 (source: Motion 
Picture Association of America report [MPAA13]). Figure I-3 shows an increase from $884.81 billion in 
2009 to more than $1 trillion, in 2012. The estimated value added for the other copyright industries 
increase from $656.82 billion in 2009 to 794.53 billion in 2012 [MPAA13]. 
 
Figure I-3: Copyright industries value added (in billion USD). 
Beyond copyright solutions, watermarking systems can serve a large variety of applications, from 
property and/or integrity proof to augmented reality. 
Originally designed to track pictures and audio files piracy, watermarking now includes several 
applications [COX01] and handles many media content types ranging from still image to compressed 
video and stereoscopic content. This considerable expansion opens the door to many new applications, 
as illustrated below1. 
Digital Right Management 
Copyright protection is the main application of watermarking techniques [MEM98], [CRA98], [BAS01]: it 
aims at preventing or deterring unauthorized copying of digital media. Digital watermarks contain a set 
of copy control instructions, telling the copy devices if copies are allowed, or not.  
                                                          
 
1 In this thesis we are interested in two applications of the compressed domain watermarking: ownership protection for video 
on demand and content integrity verification for video surveillance. 
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For instance, under the VoD (Video on Demand) framework, consumers can have access to HD movies 
included in the VoD server. This represents a considerable revenue opportunity for PayTv industries. 
However, content owners must be ensured that video content piracy attacks can be deterred. Digital 
watermarking provides ownership protection solution by identifying the source of illegal distributed 
copies, see Figure I-4.  
 
Figure I-4: VoD ownership protection. 
Forensics and piracy tracking 
Forensic watermarking applications enhance the content owner's ability to detect and respond to the 
misuse of his/her assets. Digital watermarking is used not only to gather evidence for criminal acts, but 
also to enforce contractual usage agreements between a content owner and the customers. It provides 
positive, irrefutable evidence of misuse for leaked content assets [DIG03].  
Authentication and integrity 
Digital watermarks are imperceptibly embedded into all forms of media content, be they individually or 
aggregately distributed/stored. The watermark can uniquely identify each specific item or instance of 
content and carry information about its consumption chain and intended destinations. Watermarks can 
be encrypted and secured so that only authorized reading devices can detect and access the data. 
Altering a watermark is virtually impossible and the carried data can immediately indicate if the content 
is genuine or a counterfeit [SAM09], [CHA00]. 
For instance, under video surveillance integrity verification framework, recorded videos are 
watermarked and stored. Further, when these videos are solicited to help in elucidating some crime acts, 
the embedded mark is detected to verify their integrity, see Figure I-5.  
VoD server End user Watermarking 
Owner identification 
Attacks  
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
Figure I-5: Integrity verification synopsis.
Broadcast and Internet monitoring 
Over the last few years, the amount of content flowing through television/radio channels continues to 
grow exponentially. Watermarking techniques offer the best solution to automate the monitoring of 
digital content. For such an application, the mark conveys a unique identifier (owner, distributor, 
data/time information) allowing the content owners and distributors to track their media [KAL99], 
[SAM09]. 
Asset and content management 
Watermarking techniques enable effective content identification by giving a unique digital identity to any 
type of media content and by embedding this identity as additional hidden information [SAM09]. The 
watermarks must be imperceptible and have minimal or no impact on the visual quality of the original 
content. Hence they can be used as a persistent tag, acting as keys into a digital asset management 
system (DAM). Tagged content can lead back to the original content stored in the DAM system; it can 
also be linked to metadata in the DAM, such as keywords, rights and permissions. 
Filtering/classification 
Digital watermarks offer new opportunities for content owners, advertisers and more generally 
marketers searching for new ways to engage consumers in richer media experiences. In fact, the 
embedded information enables the identification, classification and filtering of multimedia content. The 
watermarking systems are able to selectively filter potential inappropriate content (e.g. parental 
control). 
Navigation between print and online 
Digital watermarks play here the role of some in-band enrichment information allowing the readers of 
printed documents to directly access hyperlinks. The readers need only to point their smart phone or 
Video integrity 
verification 
VWRUDJH
Watermarking 
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tablet at a digitally watermarked image, graphic element or text to be directly connected to related 
online experiences, see Figure I-6. This solution was advanced by Digimarc Discover platform in 2011 to 
compete QR code. According to the Digimarc traction report [DIG12], the number of digital watermarks 
placed in magazine and advertising content registers a growth of 486% from 2011 to 2012. 
 
Figure I-6: Navigation between print and online. 
Second-screen synchronization 
For such an application, the watermark is inserted in the TV content prior to its broadcasting. The user, 
watching a TV set, can take a screen snapshot with a device (smartphone, tablet) of the distributed video 
and send it to the server which extracts the embedded mark and returns the content ID. The main 
advantage of the technique is that you don’t have to be the owner of the video content to analyze it and 
it is a perfect way for building synchronized services [FIL13], see Figure I-7. 
 
Figure I-7: Second screen synchronization. 
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I.1.2.  Properties 
The applicative panorama presented in the previous section demonstrates that there are no universal 
requirements to be satisfied by all watermarking applications. Nevertheless, some general directions can 
be given for most of the applications. 
In order to be effective, the watermark should be perceptually invisible for a human observer (i.e. the 
transparency property – Section I.1.2.3) and its detection should be successful even when the 
watermarked content is attacked (i.e. the robustness property – Section I.1.2.2). Moreover, it should 
allow the insertion of the amount of information (referred to as data payload – Section I.1.2.1) required 
by the targeted application (e.g. a serial number identifying a user, a time stamp, etc.). In order for the 
watermarking techniques to be easily integrated into practical applications, the watermark 
insertion/detection should be achieved at a low computational cost (Section I.1.2.4).  
Note that robustness comes across with a related yet different property, namely the security. According 
to [MAT13] and [KAL01], the seĐuƌitǇ is ͞the inability by unauthorized users to have access to the raw 
watermarking channel͟ [KAL01]. From this point of view, the security relates to the robustness attacks, 
explicitly applied by a malicious hacker; hence, this concept is covered in the thesis by the robustness - 
Section I.2.2.2). However, as mentioned in [MAT13], ͞following a cryptographic model, security in 
watermarking is generally based on Kerckhoffs principle [KER83] and relates to the use of a secret for the 
eŵďeddiŶg aŶd the deĐodiŶg of the sequeŶĐes” [MAT13]. This latter definition of the security property is 
discussed in Section I.1.2.5. However, as from this point of view, the security of the watermarking 
solutions advanced by the present thesis was investigated by CASSIDIAN CyberSecurity, no experimental 
result will be reported in Part II. 
I.1.2.1. Data payload 
This is the total amount of information (in bits) inserted into original content. According to the targeted 
applications, the specifications on this factor may be very different, from 64 bits per sequence for the 
identification of ownership up to hundred of kilobits per frame for application of hyper-video. Different 
applications require different data payloads. For instance, for e-commerce applications, the additional 
data (the watermark) could bring information about the document buyer, vendor, date and time of 
purchase. In a right management context, the embedded watermark has to identify the content and 
specify the usage rules as well as the billing information. For authentication and integrity applications, 
the watermark identifies (spatially and temporally) the ĐoŶteŶt’s ŵaiŶ ŵodifiĐatioŶs. 
I.1.2.2. Robustness  
Robustness is the ability of the mark to survive changes undergone by the host media. These changes (be 
they intentional or unintentional) define the set of attacks. The various possible attacks against 
watermarked video can be structured into four classes [PET98], according to the way they act: removal 
attacks, geometric attacks, cryptographic attacks, and protocol attacks, Figure I-8. 
M. (asnaoui MPEG-4 AVC stream watermarking
10                                                                                                                                                              
The removal attacks try to make the watermark unreadable. This class includes attacks by noise addition, 
denoising, transcoding quantization, … 
The geometric attacks aim to destroy the synchronization of the watermark. After such an attack, the 
watermark is still present in the video, but its location is unknown at the decoder. Rotations, curvatures, 
jitter of pixels individually considered or combined into the Stirmark attacks, fall into this category 
[PET00]. 
Protocol attacks aim to make watermark unusable by creating some ambiguities concerning the mark 
usage. Attacks by inversion and copy belong to this class. The former creates a false key so that by 
applying the detection procedure, the watermark indicates a different owner for the video. 
The cryptographic attacks try to manage the watermark (detect/copy/insert a new one) without 
knowledge of the secret key. One example is represented by the brute-force search. Another example, 
known as the oracle attack, consists in creating an unmarked version of the signal by exploiting the 
response of a detector (assuming it is available). In any case, this type of attack is very restrictive in 
practice because of its complexity. 
A watermark system is fragile to an attack when the watermark cannot be detected after slightest 
modifications generated by this attack.  
A watermarking system is semi-fragile when both particular robustness and fragility properties are 
imposed to the system. Once the classes of allowed and non-allowed attacks have been defined based 
on the targeted application, the watermark must survive all manipulation belonging in the former class 
(the robustness), but it should be destroyed by the manipulations belonging to the latter (the fragility). 
 
Figure I-8: Watermark attack classification [COX08]. 
In the applicative context of this thesis the most intensively considered attacks are the noise addition, 
the transcoding and the Stirmark. These attacks will be further detailed.  
Additive Gaussian noise:  
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This type of attack has been mainly involved in communication and signal processing. It is invoked to 
model the overall behavior of different noise sources according to the Central Limit Theorem. The same 
assumption is adopted in watermarking, where several studies consider the Gaussian noise as a general 
attack model. Although it can be very effective model for some real life image/video filtering operations 
(e.g. linear filtering, JPEG coŵpƌessioŶ, …Ϳ iŶ-depth studies proved its inaccuracy for other types of 
attacks (e.g. rotations, random geometric attack, …Ϳ [MIT0ϳ]. Note that this inaccuracy involves the 
Gaussian behavior and not the additive hypothesis, which was practically each and every time validated 
by the experiments.  
This attack can be achieved by altering the host data by introducing an additive noise following a 
Gaussian distribution. 
Transcoding (lossy compression):  
Lossy compression remains the most common attack that a multimedia content is likely to undergo. In 
fact, a marked multimedia content is susceptible to undergo this attack both during its creation and 
transmission/storage.  
The transcoding attack may take place when the original encoded video according to a given encoding 
parameters/format is first decoded and further re-encoding according to some prescribed encoding 
parameters/format. For instance, the lossy compression can be achieved by performing a transcoding at 
a lower bit rate. 
Note that that there is a deep-seated conflict between watermarking and lossy compression. In order to 
be efficient, a compressor tries to get rid of all the visual redundancy existing in the original video. Thus, 
it leaves fewer room for the watermarking which exploits that redundancy in order to hide the mark.  
Stirmark: 
Stirmark is a generic tool developed for assessing the robustness of image watermarking algorithms 
[PET00].  
The Stirmark tool offers a several class of attacks such as filtering and geometric based attacks. Among 
the field of the proposed attacks, it also includes Stirmark random bending attack which is inspired from 
the jitter attack. It simulates the impact of a high quality printing followed by a low quality scanning. The 
attacked image receives minor local geometric modification as well as small amplitude additive Gaussian 
noise distortions. The obtained image retains a very high visual quality. However, the induced geometric 
distortions are often sufficient to bother the mark detection. 
Figure I-9 shows the impact of the Stirmark random bending, on both a test and a natural image. While 
the affects are directly noticeable for the test image (see Figure I-9 up left vs. right), they are 
imperceptible for the natural image (see Figure I-9 down left vs. right). 
In the present thesis, by Stirmark attack we shall denote the Stirmark geometric random bending attack. 
Moreover, this attack is applied to a video content at the frame level. Consequently, the video is first 
split into frames, then the random bending attack is applied, and the attacked frames are further re-
encoded to generate the attacked video. 
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Original image Stirmark random bending attack affects 
Figure I-9: Stirmark random bending attack impact. 
I.1.2.3. Transparency  
The notion of transparency is related to the perception (visual, auditory …) of artifacts resulted from the 
insertion process. Watermarking should be imperceptible and invisible to a human observer (i.e. the 
embedded watermark should not affect the quality of the host data).  
The visual quality assessment of the watermarked data remains an important criterion for validating the 
watermarking algorithm. However, it is a subjective concept that depends on various criteria: human 
visual system, age, experience, artistic sense, observation condition, etc. Thus, it is complicated to 
evaluate whether a watermarking method is transparent or not. Such an evaluation requires significant 
testing involving a wide observer’s panel and many visual assessments [MAN04]. Alternatively, some 
objective transparency metrics can be used. 
An objective measure is a function that takes as input some video information, calculates the distance to 
some reference information extracted from reference video and outputs a value somewhat associated to 
that differences. Based on the way they act, objective measures can be classified into three classes 
[AVC01]: 
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 Pixels difference measures are based on differences between the original and the modified 
image. The peak signal to noise ratio (PSNR), the maximum mean square error (PMSE), the image 
fidelity (IF) and the average absolute difference (AAD) are the most common, due to their easily 
use and implementation.   Correlation measures reflect the similarity between two images even in the presence of a low 
noise compared to the pixel strength; the normalized cross correlation (NCC) and the structural 
content (SC) belong to this class.  Psychovisual measures consider the human visual system as a spatio-temporal filter. For 
instance, the digital video quality (DVQ) models the human visual system according to luminance 
intensity, frequency contents and structural content. 
These measures will be considered in the sequel according to their definition presented in [ESK95] and 
[WAN04]. Be there   and    two video to be compared, each of them having    frames of    pixels. 
Be        the pixel at column   and row   of frame  .     ,    ,    and    are expressed as follow:  
                                                                         
 
 
 
                                        
                                                     
 
                                                  
 
                                                             
 
                                                                   
 
Concerning the DVQ analytic computing, we can refer to [WAN04], [BEL11]. 
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I.1.2.4. Computational complexity 
The technical cost of the algorithm is also a significant feature of any watermarking method. From this 
point of view, the complexity of the algorithm is the main criterion of practical acceptance. The 
complexity of the watermarking algorithm can be evaluated by estimating the number of operations 
required during the watermarking process. Assuming a well defined applicative framework and a prior 
established processing set-up, information in this respect can also be obtained by estimating the 
processing time. 
Commonly, watermarking a compressed video file would involve five main operations: stream reading, 
MPEG decoding, mark insertion, MPEG coding and stream writing. Just for illustration, the study in 
[BEL11] reports the following distribution of the time spent of each of these operations for HD video, 
watermarked by a binary QIM (Quantization Index Modulation) method, see Figure I-10. 
 
Figure I-10: Time consumption average for each video watermarking task [BEL11]. 
As shown in Figure I-10, about 95% of total processing time is consumed during the encoding/decoding 
process. Such an illustration brings to light that compressed domain watermarking is a promising 
solution to meet the low complexity level required by some real time applications. 
I.1.2.5. Security 
In any watermarking scheme, a secret key is used to insert and detect the mark; a security attack is a 
malicious attack allowing the hacker to estimate this key [MAT13], [KAL01] and [KER83]. Depending on 
the level of estimation, the hacker can modify, delete or copy the inserted message. The basic types of 
security attacks identified by [COX00] are: 
Active attacks:  
The hacker tries to remove the watermark or make it undetectable. This type of attack is critical for 
ownership protection and copy control. However, it is not serious problem for authentication.  
 
77% 
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1% 4% 1% 
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Passive attacks:  
In this case the hacker is not trying to remove the watermark, but he/she is simply trying to determine 
whether the mark is present. 
Collusion attacks:  
These are a special case of active attacks, in which the hacker uses several copies of one piece of original 
media, each with different mark, to construct a copy with no watermark [COX97]. 
Forgery attacks:  
Here the hacker tries to embed a valid watermark rather than to remove one. This type of attack is a 
serious concern in proof of ownership [CRA98]. 
 
The present thesis does not consider the security evaluation of the watermarking solutions advanced in 
Part II. However, such an investigation was independently performed by Cassidian CyberSecurity experts, 
as a part of the SPY European project. 
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I.1.3.  Constraints 
The previous section introduced the watermarking main properties, namely data payload, robustness, 
transparency and computational complexity. The practical trade-off among watermarking properties is a 
priori set according to the targeted application context and purposes (see Figure I-11), as follow. 
Concerning the data payload, the main deadlock is related to the conceptual contradiction between 
compressions and watermarking. In fact, the compression paradigm is based on eliminating the visual 
redundancy in order to achieve high rate of compression. In contrast, watermarking tends to take 
advantage of the visual redundancy so as to hide the mark. Therefore, compressed video stream leaves 
very little room to hide the watermark (e.g. serial number identifying user for ownership application, 
authentication signature for integrity verification application, etc.). Beside the mark size, some 
watermarking applications also impose constraints concerning the mark semantic. For instance, for 
ownership protection, the embedded mark may have no meaning and is randomly generated to serve 
just as an owner ID. In contrast, for video integrity verifications, the embedded mark should reflect the 
semantic for the video content so as to distinguish between content changing and content preserving 
alterations.  
Concerning the robustness, the main deadlock is to recover the mark after any malicious and mundane 
attack that a pirate may apply: noise addition, compression, frame dropping, resizing, letter-boxing, 
removal, random geometric transformations induced by in-theater camera recording, etc. While the 
previous sentence holds for ownership protection, the content integrity verification comes across with 
an additional requirement: the mark should be robust against content preserving attacks (e.g. noise 
additioŶ, tƌaŶsĐodiŶg, …Ϳ ǁhile ďeiŶg fƌagile agaiŶst ĐoŶteŶt alteƌatioŶ attaĐks ;e.g. object deletion, 
spatio-teŵpoƌal ĐƌoppiŶg, …Ϳ.  
The transparency also sets related yet different requirements for ownership protection and content 
integrity verification. The former application assumes ideal transparency, i.e. the artifacts induced during 
the mark insertion are humanly imperceptible. The latter application accepts a weaker transparency: 
human disturbing artifacts are tolerated assuming they have no impact in object/persons/events 
identification. Regardless of the application, note that directly watermarking the compressed stream 
would result in drift artifacts: due to the stream syntax, the modification of one block would result in the 
modification of its neighbors, thus increasing the transparency constraints. 
The low computational complexity imposes the constraint that the insertion/detection should be lighter 
than the rest of video processing operations involved in the application (e.g encoding/decoding) and 
compatible with the real time. 
The next chapter (State of the art) will investigate how these constraints are addressed by various 
research studies, devoted to both robust watermarking for ownership application and semi fragile 
watermarking for video content integrity verification. 
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
Figure I-11: Constraints synopsis. 
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I.2. State of the art  
This chapter will be structured into two parts devoted to the state of the art of the robust watermarking 
for ownership protection and the state of the art of semi-fragile watermarking for video integrity 
verification, respectively. 
I.2.1.  Robust watermarking for ownership protection 
In practice, video sequence are stored and distributed in compressed format. Traditionally, 
watermarking a video requires to decode the sequence, then to insert the watermark and, finally, to 
recode the video. Such an approach requires a large computing time (e.g. about 95% from the total time) 
to be allocated to encoding/decoding. These operations can be intrinsically avoided if the watermark 
embedding acts directly in the compressed domain. 
The first works in compressed domain were devoted to the watermarking of the MPEG-2 compressed 
video stream. Langelaar et al. [LAN 98] presented a real-time watermarking method. This method 
embedded the watermark directly by substituting the last-significant bits (LSB) of the selected suitable 
variable length codes (VLCs) by the watermark bit. In [HAA98], Haan and Beller advanced a more robust 
method consisted in inserting the watermark into selected high-frequency DCT coefficients of the 
stream. Despite their low complexity, these methods remain fragile against transcoding and geometric 
attacks.  
A special attention in watermarking is paid to the MPEG-4 Part 10 (a.k.a. MPEG-4 AVC or, alternatively 
H.264) [RIC03] compressed stream. As its ancestors, this standard contains four basic functions: 
prediction, transformation, quantization and entropic encoding, denoted in Figure I-12 by P, T, Q and E, 
respectively. In order to achieve higher compression efficiency, MPEG-4 AVC deploys particular 
compression features such as variable block-size motion estimation, directional spatial prediction, DCT 
(Discrete Cosine Transform) approximation and context-adaptive entropic encoding. Consequently, the 
watermarking techniques devoted to uncompressed or to earlier compressed domains (MPEG-2 or 
MPEG-4 Part 2) are likely to fail in reaching the same performances in the MPEG-4 AVC domain and 
specific methods should be devised in this respect, [ZOU08], [GOL07], [NOO05], [BEL10] see Table I-1. 
Figure I-12 shows the actual position, along the watermarking chain, where the insertion takes place.  
  
Figure I-12(QFRGLQJFKDLQDQGUHODWHGUREXVWZDWHUPDUNLQJVWXGLHVFODVVLILHGDFFRUGLQJWRWKHLULQVHUWLRQGRPDLQ
P T Q E 
[ZOU05] 
[BEL10] 
[NOO05] 
Compression chain Binary stream Uncompressed 
domain 
 [GOL07] 
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Table I-1: State of the art synopsis of compressed-domain watermarking. 
Method Fragility Robustness Transparency Data payload Complexity 
QIM [GOL07] Geometric 
Transcoding 
Filtering 
PSNR = 32.4 
dB 
NA 
Entropic decoding 
Dequantization 
Additive mark 
embedding  
Perceptual shaping 
[NOO05] 
Geometric Filtering NA 
800 bits per 5 
minutes 
Entropic decoding 
Dequantization 
Stream substitution 
[ZOU08] 
Geometric 
Transcoding 
Filtering 
PSNR = 32 dB NA 
Binary stream 
parsing 
QIM 
Perceptual shaping 
[BEL10] 
 
Transcoding 
Filtering 
Geometric 
PSNR = 42 dB  
NCC = 0.99 
279 bits per 5 
minutes 
Entropic decoding 
Zou et al. [ZOU08] introduce a substitution watermarking method for MPEG-4 AVC stream. This study 
proves that the stream can be changed while ensuring a very fast technique and respecting the video 
format structure. Experimental evaluations show that watermarking directly the stream is possible 
within transparency constraint, but is very limited in terms of robustness and data-payload. 
A. Golikeri, P. Nasiopoulos and Z. J. Wang [GOL07] propose an ST-QIM (Spread Transform-QIM) 
watermarking method. Although improving the performances of the traditional ST-DM, this method 
features a quite small data payload (one bit per macro-block) and has no robustness against the 
geometric attacks.  
M. Noorkami advances a correlation-watermarking method [NOO05] based on perceptual masking 
principles: the mark is a simple bipolar message inserted according to a psycho-visual cost. This method 
provides a very good transparency with a high data payload (3 times better than its predecessors). Its 
main weakness remains the robustness: even the mundane transcoding attack is able to destroy the 
mark. 
M. Belhaj et al. [BEL10] introduce a binary spread transform based QIM for MPEG-4 AVC stream 
watermarking. By combining QIM principles, spread transform, a perceptual shaping mechanism, and an 
information-theory driven selection criterion, they achieved a good transparency and robustness against 
transcoding and geometric attacks.  
Table I-1 presents a synoptic comparison among these four methods and brings to light that no 
algorithm can find an optimal trade-off amongst transparency robustness and data-payload inserted in 
the MPEG-4 AVC domain. However, note that M. Belhaj et al. [BEL10] achieved a good transparency – 
robustness equilibrium by considering a binary spread transform based QIM technique. 
In order to strength this qualitative discussion by some quantitative illustrations, we have implemented 
the methods in [BEL10] and [GOL07]. The functional evaluations are carried out on the MEDIVALS corpus 
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(cf. Appendix B) and are conducted at three levels so as to evaluate the three-folded data payload-
robustness-transparency. 
First, the data payload is estimated while keeping a fixed value of transparency (average PSNR of 45 dB 
and 65 dB, for SD and HD respectively) and robustness (maximal BER of 0.1± 0.03 against bipolar additive 
noise, transcoding and Stirmark geometric random bending attacks). The results show that:  The method in [BEL10] features a data payload of 60 bits per minute and 90 bits per minute for 
SD and HD corpus, respectively.  The method in [GOL07] cannot allow even 1 bit per minute to be inserted under the prescribed 
robustness and transparency. 
Secondly, the robustness against additive noise, transcoding and Stirmark geometric random bending 
attack is investigated at fixed data payload (150 bits per minutes) and transparency (PSNR of 45 dB and 
of 65 dB, for SD and HD respectively). The obtained results are illustrated in Figure I-13:   The method in [BEL10] ensures a robustness expressed by a BER equal to 0, 0.03 and 0.08 for SD 
corpus and equal to 0, 0.05 and 0.07 for HD corpus against additive noise, transcoding up to 50% 
from the bit stream size and Stirmark random bending, respectively.  The method in [GOL07] shows a BER of 0, 0.17 and 0.45 for SD corpus and of 0, 0.15 and 0.43 for 
HD corpus against additive noise, transcoding up to 50% from the bit stream size and Stirmark 
random bending, respectively. 
Finally, the transparency is assessed at fixed data payload (150 bits per minutes) and robustness 
(maximal BER of 0.1± 0.03 against bipolar additive noise, transcoding and Stirmark random bending 
attacks).  The method in [BEL10] features a transparency expressed PSNR of 47 dB and 65 dB for SD and 
HD corpus, respectively.  The method in [GOL07] cannot provide the prescribed data payload and robustness constraint. 
Thus, the transparency experiments cannot be performed. 
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Figure I-13: Robustness evaluations for [BEL10] and [GOL07] 
I.2.2.  Semi fragile watermarking for video integrity verification 
Figure I-5 and Figure I-11 hint to the way in which video integrity verification systems and their 
underlying block diagrams can be represented. First, the captured video is encoded. Then, an 
authentication signature is generated based on video content features. This signature is embedded in 
the video data by the means of some watermarking technique. 
In order to verify the integrity of the video, the watermark is extracted and compared to the content 
based generated signature. This chapter is structured into two subsections. First (Chapter I.2.2.1), the 
state of the art related to the signature extraction is presented. Second (Chapter I.2.2.1), the video 
integrity verification watermarking methods are analyzed. 
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I.2.2.1. Signature extraction  
Watermarking based integrity verification was already the subject of several studies [TIT99], [QUE98], 
[CHE08], [THI05], [THI06], and [ATI10], see Table I-2. Several insertion domains are considered: still 
images [TIT99], MPEG-1/2 [QUE98], [THI05], [CHE08] and MPEG-4 AVC [THI06], [ATI10]. 
Titman [TIT99] and Queue [QUE98] use image edges and corners to generate the authentication 
signature. The signature is embedded according to additional modification rules of overlaying 8x8 blocks. 
They show that these features are sensitive to content changing alteration. These advantages should be 
traded-off for the method drawbacks: fragility (against compression and scaling), large size for the 
signature, and complex generation operations (thus imposing particular constraints on the watermarking 
insertion method). 
Chen and Leung generate the signature based on a chaotic system [CHE08]. Temporal authentication 
information (frame index and GOP index) is used to compute the signature for each I (Intra) frame. The 
experiments carried out on a video sequence of 795 frames proved that this method detects temporal 
changes, but the properties of spatial detection of alterations have not been evaluated. The robustness 
to compression (up 30%) was also shown. Likewise, the signature generation requires an additional level 
of complexity.  
S. Thiemert et al. [THI05] calculate the authentication signature in the uncompressed domain, from the 
points of interest obtained through the Moravec operator [MOR77]. A binary mask is generated for each 
frame I, then embedded into the high-frequency DCT coefficients belonging to adjacent frames. The 
method detects content changing alterations (object removing/inserting) while being robust to content 
preserving manipulation (compression up to 50%, scaling). However the authentication signature 
calculation increases the method complexity. The study in [THI06] resumes and extends these principles. 
The difference relies on the use of the entropy of gray level in groups of blocks to generate the binary 
signature. The advanced method is robust against compression down to 50% and detects content 
changing alterations (object removing). Nevertheless, the signature increases the complexity of the video 
integrity verification system.  
K. Ait Saadi et al. [AIT10] consider a signature generated from low frequency quantized DCT coefficients. 
For each I frame, the low frequency DCT coefficients are collected in a buffer to be further hashed using 
an MD5 function. This results a 128 bit binary signature. The obtained signature is embedded in the P 
and B motion vectors. Experiments show that the resulting system remains fragile to all manipulations. 
Moreover the signature generation requires an MPEG-4 AVC entropic decoding. 
To conclude with, Table I-2 brings to light that the trade-off between fragility, robustness, and 
complexity is not yet reached in the compressed domain. Moreover, the signature is heuristically 
generated, without any theoretical support. 
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Table I-2: State of the art studies related to signature extraction. 
Method/domain Signature Robustness Fragility Complexity 
J. Titman et al. [TIT99] Edges based 
Fragile against 
transcoding and 
scaling  
Sensitive to 
spatial alterations 
Edge detection 
Binary edge 
pattern 
VLC encoding 
P. M. Queue [QUE98] 
MPEG-2 
Edges based 
Robust against 
MPEG-2 
compression 
Detect spatial 
alteration 
Edge detection  
MPEG decoding 
Chen and Leung [CHE08] 
MPEG-4 AVC 
Temporal 
information (GOP 
index & frame index)          
Robust against 
compression (up 
to 30%)  
Sensitive to 
temporal 
alterations 
Chaotic 
modulation  
Thiemert et al. [THI05]  
MPEG-1/2  
Points of interest Transcoding 
Sensitive to 
Spatio-temporal 
alterations 
Moravec 
operator  
MPEG-4 AVC 
decoding  
Thiemert et al. [THI06] 
MPEG-1/2  
Entropy value pixels Transcoding 
Sensitive to 
Spatio-temporal 
alterations 
Entropic 
decoding 
Entropy 
computation 
Saadi et al. [AIT10]  
MPEG-4 AVC 
MD5 of DCT residual 
coefficients 
 
Sensitive to all 
alterations 
MD5 hash 
function  
Entropic 
decoding 
 
I.2.2.2. Integrity verification watermarking techniques  
Video integrity verification by means of watermarking techniques was already the object of several 
research studies, see Table I-3. Such studies consider different signature insertion techniques and 
different insertion domains, see Figure I-14.  
D. Xu and R. Wang [XU11] perform the watermarking at the MPEG-4 AVC entropic encoding level. In this 
respect, the Exp-Golomb code elements which are eligible to be watermarked without destroying the 
stream synchronization are first detected. Then, a mapping rule between these elements and the 
watermark bits is established. The detection is performed by directly parsing the Exp-Golomb code 
words of the watermarked stream. The performance evaluations show perfect transparency (no quality 
degradation being induced) but a total fragility to transcoding. 
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Table I-3: State of the art synopsis for video integrity verification. 
Method Fragility Robustness Transparency 
Data 
payload 
Complexity 
Exponential-Golomb 
code word mapping [XU11] 
Sensitive to all 
manipulations 
 NA NA 
Binary stream 
parsing 
Motion vector and 
macroblock mode LSB 
embedding [KIM12] 
Sensitive to all 
manipulations 
 PSNR = 40 dB NA 
Entropic 
decoding 
Changing the parity of the 
last nonzero coefficient 
[WAN10] 
Sensitive to all 
manipulations 
 NA NA 
Entropic 
decoding 
Modifying the nonzero 
quantized coefficients 
[ZAN06] 
Sensitive to all 
manipulations 
 PSNR > 35 dB NA 
Entropic 
decoding 
Imposing local intensity 
relations into a group of 
adjacent blocks [CHE08] 
Temporal 
alterations 
Frame-level 
JPEG(QF=30) 
Median filetring 
PSNR = 40 dB NA 
Uncompressed 
domain 
Enforcing DCT coefficients 
relations [THI06] 
Sensitive to all 
manipulations 
Frame-level 
JPEG(QF=50) 
NA NA 
Entropic 
decoding 
Reactivating skipped 
macroblocks [PRO05] 
Sensitive to all 
manipulations 
 PSNR > 50 dB NA 
Entropic 
decoding 
Modifying the number of 
quantized nonzero AC 
coefficients [WAN08] 
Sensitive to all 
manipulations 
NA NA NA 
Entropic 
decoding 
 
T. Kim et al. [KIM12] embed the watermark bits in the motion vectors of the inter blocks or in the intra 
mode number of the intra blocks. The advanced method features a high data payload with small image 
quality degradation (a PSNR = 40 dB is reported). Nevertheless, a large sensitivity to transcoding is 
featured.  
C. C. Wang and Y. C. Hsu [WAN10] present a fragile watermarking algorithm to authenticate MPEG-4 AVC 
stream. The mark is computed as the MD5 (message digest algorithm) hash function of a random 
generated binary sequence and embedded by changing the parity of the high-frequency quantized DCT 
coefficients of I frames. While such a technique provides the ideal case of fragility and features low 
complexity (only the MPEG-4 AVC entropic decoding being required), it is conceptually unable to make 
any distinction between mundane and malicious attacks. 
J. Zang and A. T. S. Ho [ZAN06] adopt the same principles and insert the mark in the P frames. The overall 
results show good transparency (PSNR > 35 dB), a very good sensitivity to spatio-temporal alterations, 
low complexity but no robustness to content preserving attacks (e.g. transcoding). 
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S. Chen and H. Leung present a semi-fragile watermarking scheme based on chaotic systems for the 
authentication of individual frames in the MPEG-4 AVC stream [CHE08]. The authentication information 
is represented by both the GOP index and the frame index in that GOP. This information is modulated in 
a chaotic signal and inserted in the DCT transformed blocks of each frame by imposing local intensity 
relationships into a group of adjacent blocks. The insertion requires the entropic decoding, the de-
quantizing and the reverse of the prediction operations, thus becoming computationally complex. 
Experiments carried out on a 795 frames video sequence proved a transparency expressed by a PSNR = 
40 dB and robustness against JPEG compression (quality factor QF of 30) and median filtering. This 
method also detects the temporal modifications (with one frame accuracy) but the spatial modification 
properties were not assessed. 
S. Thiemert et al. [THI06] advance a semi-fragile watermarking system devoted to the MPEG-1/2 video 
sequences. The mark computation is based on the properties of the entropy computed at the 8x8 block 
levels. The mark is embedded by enforcing relationship between the DCT coefficients of some blocks. 
The experiments are run on one sequence (whose length is not précised) encoded at 1125 kbps. The 
method proved both robustness (against JPEG compression with QF=50) and fragility against temporal 
(with 2 frame accuracy) and spatial (with a non-assessed accuracy) content changing. However, the main 
drawback of this method remains its inner computation complexity: beyond the complete MPEG 
decoding/encoding, it also requires sophisticated entropy estimation at frame levels. 
Proforck et al. [PRO05] propose an integrity authentication schema of MPEG-4 AVC. The authentication 
information which consists of the encrypted hash value and a certificate with public key is embedded by 
reactivating some skipped macroblocks. The advantage of the method is the possibility of erasing the 
watermark, but the considered hash algorithm increases the computation cost of the scheme. The 
transparency was evaluated at a PSNR > 50 dB.  
Chen, Chen and Wang [WAN08] compute the authentication data as the block sub-index. Then, the 
obtained signature is embedded by modifying the number of nonzero DCT AC coefficients of I frames. 
The experimental results show that the proposed system can detect the illegally altered area. However, 
neither the transparency nor the robustness against non malicious alteration has been evaluated. 

Figure I-14: Encoding/decoding chain and related semi-fragile watermarking studies. 
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As it can be seen, Table I-3, the trade-off among fragility, robustness and complexity is not yet achieved. 
Moreover, the studies related to semi-fragile and robust watermarking are divergent in their concept 
and approach.  
I.2.3.  Conclusion 
Tables I-1, I-2 and I-3 show that the large variety of state of the art methods allow each particular 
constraint (transparency, robustness, data payload, computational cost) to be individually reached for 
particular applications. However, none of these studies is able to jointly reach these four requirements.  
For instance, for robust watermarking, the method in [BEL10], based on binary QIM, seems to provide 
the best robustness, transparency and computational trade off but leaves room for data payload 
improvement. 
For semi-fragile watermarking, the trade-off between fragility, robustness, and complexity is not yet 
reached in the compressed domain. Even though some studies seem able to reach a certain functional 
balance between the fragility and robustness such as [TEI06] and [CHE08], the authentication signature 
generation/insertion is still performed in the uncompressed domain and subsequently increase the 
watermarking computational cost. Moreover, the signature is heuristically generated, without any 
theoretical support. 
Furthermore, to the best of our knowledge, no watermarking method is able today to serve both the 
purposes of robust and semi-fragile watermarking. 
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I.3. Thesis overview 
This chapter will be structured into three parts devoted to the challenges, the main contributions and 
the thesis structure, respectively. 
I.3.1.  Challenges 
The present thesis deals with theoretical and methodological issues related to the MPEG-4 AVC 
watermarking for ownership protection and video integrity verification.  
From the theoretical point of view, the thesis main challenge is to develop a unitary watermarking 
framework (insertion/detection) able to serve the two above mentioned applications. From the 
methodological point of view, the challenge is to instantiate this theoretical framework for serving the 
targeted applications. 
The ownership protection is considered under a VoD (Video on Demand) framework, cf. the MEDIEVALS 
project. The objective is the increase of the data payload for pre-established robustness and 
transparency levels. The robustness should be evaluated against noise addition, transcoding, and 
Stirmark random bending attacks. The transparency should correspond to the humanly imperceptible 
artifacts. The advanced watermarking method should not require any additional decoding/encoding 
operation.  
The video integrity verification is considered under a mobile video surveillance system, cf. the SPY 
project. The challenge is to extract from the video stream an authentication signature which is 
subsequently inserted so as to ensure the video integrity. This signature should be robust to content 
preserving attacks and fragile to content alteration attacks. The accuracy of the content altered regions 
should be evaluated both spatially and temporally. 
I.3.2.  Contributions  
The present thesis tackles the above mentioned challenges by the following theoretical and 
methodological contributions, see Figure I-15. 
Multi symbol quantization index modulation watermarking (m-QIM) 
The thesis first contribution consists in building the theoretical framework for the multi-symbol 
watermarking based on quantization index modulation (m-QIM). The insertion rule is analytically 
designed by extending the binary QIM insertion rule. The detection rule is optimized so as to ensure 
minimal probability of error under additive white Gaussian noise distributed attacks. It is thus 
demonstrated that the data payload can be increased by a factor of log2m, for prescribed transparency 
and additive Gaussian noise power. 
The m-QIM framework is first deployed for ensuring the VoD (Video on Demand) ownership protection. 
The main benefit is the increase of data payload by a factor of log2m for a prescribed robustness of 0.1 of 
BER (variations lower than 3% of the bit error rate after additive noise, transcoding and Stirmark random 
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bending attacks) and transparency (set to average PSNR = 45dB and 65dB for SD and HD encoded 
content, respectively). Actually, the experiments considered 4 values of  , namely    ,    ,     and    ; just for illustration, for    , a data payload of 150 bits per minute, i.e. about 20 
times larger than the limit imposed by the DCI (Digital Cinema Initiatives) standard, is obtained. The 
processed corpus sums up to 1 h of video content granted by the MEDIEVALS industrial partners. 
The second m-QIM application consists in designing a semi-fragile watermarking method for video 
integrity verification in compressed stream. In this respect, the MPEG-4 AVC syntax elements which can 
optimally (in the information theory sense) serve as authentication signature are identified. This 
authentication signature is further inserted by combining the m-QIM principle to an alteration detection 
strategy. The experiments results show fragility to content replacement (with an 1/81 frame and 3 
seconds spatial and temporal accuracy, respectively) and robustness against noise addition and 
transcoding (compression by a factor of 2). The m-QIM framework main advantage is this time a relative 
gain factor of 0.11 of PSNR for fixed robustness (against noise addition and transcoding), fragility (to 
content alteration) and the data payload. The processed corpus sums up 1h 20 minutes of 
heterogeneous video contents granted by the SPY industrial partners. 
The computational time required by each operation included in the watermarking chain is evaluated on 
the following PC configuration: a Core4 CPU at 2.8 GHz and with 12 GB of RAM and a 500 GB HDD. The 
signature generation and insertion consume 0.004 s, and 0.008 s respectively, for one second of video; 
this represents 0.28% and 0.55% respectively from the total embedding processing time. When 
compared to MPEG-4 AVC reference software (JM86), the mark generation and insertion is about 100 
times faster than entropic encoding/decoding and stream read/write. 
Drift-free watermarking 
The thesis second theoretical contribution consists in specifying a preprocessing MPEG-4 AVC shaping 
operation which can eliminate the intra-frame (spatial) drift effect. The drift represents the distortion 
spread in the compressed stream related to the MPEG encoding paradigm. In this respect, the drift 
distortion propagation problem in MPEG-4 AVC is algebraically expressed and the corresponding 
equations system is resolved under drift-free constraints.  
The experiments consider the same m-QIM semi-fragile watermarking method and the same SPY corpus. 
For prescribed data payload (100 bits/s), robustness (BER < 0.1 against transcoding at 50% in stream 
size), fragility (frame modification detection with accuracies of 1/81 from the frame size and 3 seconds) 
and complexity constraints, the drift-free shaping results in gains in transparency of 2 dB in PSNR, of 0.4 
in AAD, of 0.002 in IF, of 0.03 in SC, of 0.017 NCC and 22 in DVQ. 
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Properties Constraints Thesis contributions 
Data payload 
Compressed domain watermarking:  Compressed video stream leaves very 
little room space to hide data. 
 
m-QIM insertion rule  Theory: Increasing the data payload by a factor of log2m.  Practice: Inserting a data payload of 150 bits per minute for 
prescribed robustness and transparency, for VoD 
ownership protection. 
Robustness 
Ownership protection:  The embedded mark should be recovered 
after additive noise, transcoding, and 
Stirmark random bending attacks. 
m-QIM optimal decision rule  Theory: Minimize probability of error under additive white 
Gaussian noise distributed attacks.  Practice: Robustness of 0.1 of BER (variations lower than 
3% of the bit error rate after additive noise, transcoding 
and Stirmark random bending attacks). 
Fragility 
Mark semantic:  The embedded mark should reflect the 
semantic for the video content so as to 
distinguish between content changing 
and content preserving alterations. 
Integrity verification:  The mark should be robust against 
content preserving attacks while being 
fragile against content alteration attacks. 
MPEG-4 AVC Syntax element based signature   Theory: Identifying the syntax elements which can 
optimally (in the information theory sense) serve as 
authentication signature   Practice: Robustness against transcoding and Fragility to 
content replacement (with an 1/81 frame and 3 seconds 
spatial and temporal accuracy, respectively). 
Transparency 
Compressed domain watermarking:  Compressed stream processing leads to 
drift distortion propagation. 
Drift-free shaping for MPEG-4 AVC compressed stream 
watermarking.  Theory: Analytically expressing the drift distortion problem 
and resolving it under drift-free constraint.  Practice: Gains in transparency of 2 dB in PSNR, of 0.4 in 
AAD, of 0.002 in IF, of 0.03 in SC, of 0.017 NCC and 22 in 
DVQ. for prescribed data payload (100 bit/s), robustness 
(BER < 0.1 against transcoding at 50% in stream size). 
Complexity 
Compressed domain watermarking:  Mark embedding should not increase the 
computational cost of the watermarking 
application. 
MPEG-4 AVC compressed domain watermarking  Practice: The mark generation, selection, insertion and 
detection for one second of video are 10 times and 8 times 
faster than the MPEG-4 AVC entropic encoding/decoding 
and the stream read/write operations, respectively. 
Figure I-15: Thesis contributions and results 
I.3.3.  Structure 
In order to reach the above detailed objectives, the thesis manuscript is structured into three Parts 
preceded by this Introduction and followed by three appendixes. 
Part II is structured into three chapters. Chapter II.1 is devoted to specifying the multi symbol m-QIM 
watermarking framework by generalizing the binary rule and optimizing the underlying detection rule 
with respect to the minimization of the average error probability, under the hypothesis of white, additive 
Gaussian behavior for the attacks. Chapter II.2 advances the robust m-QIM watermarking method for the 
ownership in the MPEG-4 AVC compressed domain and evaluates its performances under the MEDIVALS 
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corpus. The third chapter also exploits the m-QIM principles, this time in conjunction with authentication 
signature: an integrity verification system for MPEG-4 AVC video surveillance is thus designed and 
demonstrated under the SPY corpus. 
Part III tackles the transparency issue under drift constraints in the MPEG-4 AVC compressed stream. 
First, by considering the analytic expressions of the MPEG-4 AVC encoding operations, it algebraically 
models the drift distortion spread as an optimization problem. Second, it solves this problem under drift-
free constraints. Finally, the advanced solution is adapted so as to take into account the watermarking 
restrictions 
Conclusions are drawn and perspectives are opened in Part IV. 
The thesis has three Appendixes. Appendix A is devoted to MPEG-4 AVC encoding/decoding features. 
Appendix B presents the corpora processed in the experiments. Appendix C details a key issue related to 
the m-QIM framework, namely the probability of error at the detection as function of the Gaussian noise 
standard deviation  . 
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Abstract 
Part II contains three chapters. Chapter II-1 advances the m-QIM theoretical framework by generalizing the binary 
insertion rule and optimizing the underlying detection rule with respect to the minimization of the average error 
probability, under the hypothesis of white additive Gaussian behavior for the attacks. Chapter II-2 deploys the 
robust m-QIM watermarking method for the ownership protection in the MPEG-4 AVC compressed domain and 
evaluates its performances under the MEDIVALS corpus. Chapter II-3 conducts a theoretical investigation on the 
syntax elements based authentication signature and advances a semi –fragile watermarking method for MPEG-4 
AVC compressed domain integrity verification and evaluates its performances on the SPY corpus. 
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II.1. Theoretical contribution: m-QIM watermarking 
framework  
The efficiency of any noisy channel coding (modulation) technique is ultimately evaluated by its bit-rate 
i.e. by the quantity of information which is transmitted through that channel. In this respect, while the 
binary modulation solutions are the most popular, m-ary solution are very appealing for increasing the 
bit rate [PRO01]. 
From the conceptual point of view, the increase of the alphabet size from 2 to   would result in an 
increase of the bit rate by a factor of      . However, the larger the size of the alphabet, the closer the 
amplitude level of the symbol carriers. Hence, in the presence of noise, it will be a priori difficult at the 
receiver to discriminate between two symbols [PRO01].   
Consequently, the practical impact of  -ary modulation should be evaluated according to the targeted 
application. For instance in [FIT00], a comparison is conducted among 7 types of modulation (BPSK, 
BFSK, 4QAM, 4PSK, 8PSK, 16QAM, 16PSK). Table II-1 illustrates the obtained bandwidth efficiency ratio 
(Capacity/Bandwidth) and the error free ratio (Binary error/Noise). By analyzing these results, the 
following discussions are raised:  Quadratic amplitude modulation (4QAM) features a gain factor of 2 in bandwidth efficiency with 
respect to the binary frequency shift keying (BFSK) at the same error free ratio (around 10dB); 
hence, the hypothesis of a gain of       holds in this case.   Phase shift keying multi modulation (8PSK) offers a gain factor of 3 in bandwidth efficiency with 
respect to the binary frequency shift keying (BFSK) modulation at the expense of increasing the 
error free ratio by 1.5 dB; hence the gain of       is here an approximation. 
Similar types of result are reported in [JAC67] for BPSK, 4PSK and 8PSK, in [YAN02] for BPSK, 4PSK and 
8PSK and in [DES12] for 4PSK, 16 QAM and 64QAM.  
Table II- 1: m-ary modulation performances comparison. 
 Bandwidth efficiency 
(Capacity/Bandwidth) 
Error free 
(Binary error/Noise) 
16PSK (16 Phase Shift Keying) 4 18dB 
16QAM (16 Quadratic Amplitude 
Modulation) 
4 15dB 
8PSK (8 Phase Shift Keying) 3 14.5dB 
4PSK (4 Phase Shift Keying) 2 10.1dB 
4QAM (4 Quadratic Amplitude 
modulation) 
2 10.1dB 
BFSK (Binary Frequency Shift Keying) 1 13dB 
BPSK (Binary Phase Shift Keying) 1 10.5dB 
 
Our study follows the same approach: first, it theoretically investigates the m-QIM multi symbol 
quantization index modulation then its effectiveness for watermarking applications. 
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As the state of the art of watermarking in compressed domain brought to light that the requirements of 
transparency and robustness could be reached by spread transform and quantization index modulation 
based methods [BEL10], the present chapter takes the challenge to increase the data payload 
performances while keeping the transparency and robustness features. To this aim, an extension to multi 
symbol insertion has been targeted.  
The main contribution consist in advancing the theoretical framework allowing for the binary 
Quantization Index Modulation (QIM) embedding techniques to be extended towards multiple-symbol 
QIM (m-QIM, where   stands for the number of symbols on which the mark is encoded prior to its 
embedding). The underlying detection method is optimized with respect to the minimization of the 
average error probability, under the hypothesis of white, additive Gaussian behavior for the attacks. This 
way, for prescribed transparency and robustness constraints, the data payload is increased by a factor of      .  
II.1.1. m-QIM insertion rule  
II.1.1.1. Binary QIM 
Consider the case in which some binary information   is to be inserted in some (floating point) original 
data   by means of binary QIM methods [GOL07], [BEL10]. To do so,   is quantized using multiple 
quantizers whose indexes are chosen based on the message to be embedded [CHE98].  
To implement such quantizers, dither modulation (DM) can be used [CHE98], thus obtaining the 
watermarked signal  : 
                                       (II-1) 
where   is a fixed quantization step size,   a random key (sampled from a white, uniform noise, 
0     ) and   a fixed parameter, 0     .  
The quantizer   is defined as follows:                    (II-2) 
where         is the approximation to the closest integer. 
The practical balance between the transparency and the robustness can be reached by adjusting the   
and   parameters: the lower the   and   values, the lower the difference between   and   and, 
consequently, the greater the transparency but the worse the robustness.  
At the decoder, the embedded message bits are recovered by a scalar quantization of the received signal 
sample r which represents the   signal after its corruption by attacks.  
The      decision variable is computed as follows [CHE98], [BEL10]: 
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                   (II-3) 
The aim is to decide whether the inserted bit was     or    . The optimal decision rule, assuming 
the attacks are modelled by additive white Gaussian noise is (see Figure II-1) [CHE98]: 
                                                   (II-4) 
 
Figure II-1: Decision regions for binary QIM. 
II.1.1.2. Spread transform dither modulation  
ST-DM is a particular form of QIM. The watermark is not directly embedded into the original signal   but 
into the projection  ’ of   onto a randomly generated vector  . This technique is called Spread 
Transform as proposed by Chen and Wornell in [CHE98]. The resulting scalar value is then quantized 
before being added in the component of the signal: 
                                               (II-5) 
The corresponding detection is given by equation (II-4) where the detection function Y (b) is:                        (II-6) 
ST-DM is more robust to re-quantization (e.g. JPEG compression) than regular DM [CHE98]. However, ST-
DM introduces relatively higher perceptual distortions. To reduce perceptual distortion, perceptual 
models can be considered [WAT01], [NOO05], [BEL10]. 
II.1.1.3. m-QIM insertion  
In order to generalize the insertion technique, be there the same binary message   to be inserted in the 
same original data  .  
Prior to its insertion, the message   is encoded into a message   belonging to an m-ary alphabet  ; 
assuming  is an odd value:                                  . 
On average, each   symbol corresponds to       bits from the message   [PRO01].  
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By following the principles above, the m-QIM insertion can be expressed as: 
                                        (II-7) 
As in the binary case, the lower the   and the  , the lower the difference between   and   and the 
greater the transparency but the worse the robustness. However, this time, each   sample bears one   
m-ary symbol, thus increasing the data payload by a factor of      , with respect to the binary case. 
II.1.2. m-QIM detection rule  
While keeping practically the same insertion rule, see (II-1) vs. (II-7), the multi-symbol generalisation 
requires the modification of the decision rule. In the present paper, a decision rule minimising the 
probability error in mark detection under the white additive Gaussian noise hypothesis is derived.  
Let us consider first the case in which no attack occurs. The decision is based on the value of the      
variable:                             (II-8)      is a quantization error belonging to the          interval. Hence, specifying a decision rule means to 
divide the decision region          into m non-overlapping intervals. These intervals are computed based 
on a three-steps development presented below. First, the      expression is reformulated so as to no 
longer depend on the original data  . Secondly, the decision intervals are computed by expressing the 
quantization error as a function of  ,  ,   and  . Finally, the value of the   parameter ensuring non-
overlapping intervals is computed. 
Step 1:      reformulation: 
We denote:              and         .  
The expression of   as a function of   is obtained as follows: 
                                                                                                                                                                                                                                       
(II-9) 
Then,      can be written as follows:                                                                                                  
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As    is by its definition a multiple of  ,      can be simplified as follows:                                   
Let                  then:                     (II-10) 
Note that while (II-8) and (II-10) are equivalent from the mathematical point of view, the right-hand term 
of (II-10) does no longer depend on the original (unmarked) data  .  
Step 2: Decision intervals as a function of  ,  ,  and  : 
We have           and      ; this implies:                                      (II-11) 
Be there:  
  
                                                   (II-12) 
From equations (II-10) and (II-11) we obtain:                                              (II-13)          is the quantized value of      with quantization step  ; hence: 
                                                   (II-14) 
Equations (II-11) and (II-14) imply: 
  
                                                     (II-15) 
As   is a symbol from the m-ary alphabet D, we have:              
Hence, equations (II-15) gives: 
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                (II-16) 
Then:     and consequently            . According to (II-10) we get:                              (II-17) 
Eq. (II-17) demonstrates that the insertion of the   symbol results in      values belonging to the                              interval.       depends on  ,  , and : while   and  are fixed for 
an application,   is a parameter which can be chosen so as to ensure non-overleaping decision intervals.  
Step 3: Computing the optimal   value: 
For a fixed value of   parameter,       and       defined in equation (II-12) are positive slope affine 
functions, i.e. increasing functions of  . Hence, if each two successive symbols (d, d+1) have 
nonoverlapping decision intervals, then we will have  nonoverlapping decision intervals:                           
This yields to:                                     (II-18) 
Equation (II-18) implies that the condition for obtaining non-overleaping       intervals is        ; be        . The influence of   on the       intervals is illustrated in Figure II-2 for     (hence,       ) and     . Three particular cases are considered, namely           (see Fig II-2 up-left),          (see Figure II-2 up-right) and           (see Figure II-2 bottom). In these three plots, 
the abscissa corresponds to the value of  , while the ordinate stands for the       (in blue diamond) and       (in red square).  
The    can be considered as the optimal   value for computing the decision intervals: it ensures non 
overlapping intervals (hence ideal robustness, assuming no attack occurs) and the best transparency (the 
minimal differences between the host and the marked signals). Consequently, the optimal decision rule 
associates to each inserted   symbol a detection interval                                . In 
other words, when a particular      value is computed at the watermarking detection side, we decide 
that the inserted symbol was   , where:                       (II-19) 
Assume now the case in which the attacks are present: the insertion of a   symbol can result now in a 
value      outside the     interval. Intuitively, in order to decrease the errors induced by such a 
situation, a value      should be considered at insertion/detection, i.e. a lower transparency should 
be accepted in order to grant some additional robustness against attacks, see Figure II-2. The     and    
obtained for m = 5 (hence        ),        and      are illustrated in Figure II-3.  
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Figure II-2:       and        as a function of  , illustrated for   ,     and three values of  :           (up-left),          (up-right) and           (bottom). 
 
 
Figure II-3: Decision regions for m=5,      and               . 
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As usual in the watermarking studies [EGG03], we shall assume that the attacks are independent with 
respect to the inserted symbol and that they can be modelled by a white, Gaussian noise which is added 
to the      value computed for a fixed      parameter; the       variable becomes:                      can fall between two       decision regions or even outside the          interval. Consequently, 
the optimal decision rule defined in equations (8) and (19) should be extended so as to cope with such a 
situation, as follows. First, although the insertion is performed for an      value, the decision regions 
will be computed on the     basis: this way, all the values inside the          are considered. Moreover, 
in order to avoid the cases in which       would fall outside the          interval, a modulo operator is 
applied prior to the detection. The corresponding decision variable        and the underlying decision 
rule are:                                                  (II-20) 
The error probability associated to the decision rule in equation (II-20) and its optimality are discussed in 
the following chapter. 
II.1.3. Optimal decision rule  
II.1.3.1. Computing the probability density functions for decision variables 
In the sequel, we shall incrementally express the probability density function for the     ,       and        decision variables. 
The      variable is computed as the result of a quantization error and belongs to the                             intervals, cf. (II-8) and (II-19). Consequently, the probability density function 
of the      variable conditioned on the insertion of the   symbol is denoted by         and can be 
modelled by a uniform law in that interval [PRO01]: 
                                      
The noise probability density function, denoted by      , is assumed to follow a normal (Gaussian) law 
of     mean and   standard deviation: 
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As             , its probability density function conditioned on the insertion of the   symbol can be 
expressed as the convolution between the         and      : 
                                                                           
Thus,          can be expressed by using the      function:                                                                (II-21) 
where         is the complementary error function function defined by: 
                      
As                         , its conditional probability on the insertion of the   symbol was 
computed in our study from the         , by following basic principles in non-linear random variable 
filtering:                                       (II-22) 
Equations (II-21) and (II-22) show that irrespective to the   symbol,           has a maximal value 
corresponding the centre of the       and symmetrically decreases from that point, as illustrated in 
Figure II-4 for   ,      and       .  
 
Figure II-4: Received signal distribution: illustration for   ,      and       . 
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II.1.3.2. The optimal decision rule  
In its widest acceptation, specifying a decision rule means to define a partition of the interval in which 
the detection variable takes values [EGG03]. In the m-QIM case, this means to define a partition   ,               of the            interval:                 and      (II-23) 
Consider now the case in which a symbol    is inserted. A correct decision is made when the         
variable belongs to the    interval. On the contrarily, an error occurs when the attacks act in such a way 
that the         variable belongs to a   , with    ;                . 
Table II-2 illustrates the correct/erred decisions for   : the rows correspond to the inserted symbols, 
while the columns to the decision; C stands for a correct decision while E stands for an erred decision. 
Table II-2: Detection matrix. 
  detected symbol 
  -2 -1 0 1 2 
in
se
rt
e
d
 
sy
m
b
o
l 
-2 C E E E E 
-1 E C E E E 
0 E E C E E 
1 E E E C E 
2 E E E E C 
The probability of the correct decision when inserting the    symbol is denoted by      ) and can be 
computed as follows: 
                        (II-24) 
The average probability of a correct decision is denoted by    and can be computed by averaging the        values:                   (II-25) 
The optimal detection rule should ensure the maximal    value over all possible    partitions of the            interval. 
For watermarking applications, the inserted symbols are equally likely:            ,                . Hence, at the detection side, the probabilities of correct detection of the inserted 
symbols should also be equal:              ,                 (II-26) 
Equations (II-24) and (II-26) yield to: 
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                                  (II-27) 
where                . 
Equation (II-27) demonstrates that the optimal decision rule should ensure at the same time maximal 
and equal                  values over all possible    partitions.  
When coming now back to the expression of          , see equation (II-22), it can be stated that: 
1) equal values for the left and right side expressions in (II-27) can be obtained when the the    
intervals have the same length (i.e. a fifth of the   value); 
2) for a given length of a decision interval   ,              , a maximal value for                          is obtained when            is centred within the    interval. 
The two observations above demonstrate that the decision rule in (II-20) is an optimal decision rule, in 
the sense of maximizing the probability of correct decision, hence of minimizing the probability of error.  
II.1.3.3. Computing the probability of error  
Assume now the case in which a    symbol is inserted and a wrong decision    (       is made. The 
probability of such an error, denoted by         ), can be computed as: 
                                      
The average error probability, when considering all the possible symbols to be inserted and all the 
possible errors in detection can be computed as the sum of the individual error probabilities:                                         (II-28) 
The error probability expressed by equation (II-28) corresponds to the error in detecting a symbol   from 
an m-ary alphabet. Should we be interested in the error of detecting a symbol from the initial binary 
message  , the general conversion formula can be applied [SPA87]:               (II-29) 
Figures II-5 to II-8 illustrate the average probability error expressed by equation (II-28) as a function of 
the Gaussian noise standard deviation   (presented on the abscissa), for     . Four alphabet sizes 
have been considered, namely    ,    ,     and    . In each case, 11 values for the   
parameter are illustrated; these values are evenly distributed with a step 0.02 and are centered on the 
corresponding    value; the case of    is plotted in red. 
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By analyzing these plots, the following conclusions are brought to light:   when     ,      even in the absence of attacks (i.e. even when    ); this is a 
consequence of the overlapping between the decision intervals, see Figures II-5 to II-8;  when      and in the absence of attacks (i.e.    ),     ; this result derives from the fact 
that in the absence of attacks, the decision rule in (II-19) is deterministic and      ensures the 
best robustness–transparency trade-off;  if      and    , then     ; consequently, the    value ensuring the best transparency 
cannot be exploited in practical applications: in order to grant some robustness to the attacks, 
an      should be considered, thus impacting in the transparency;  if the practical application requires a value        for           (i.e. for a Gaussian noise 
covering at 95% a particular decision interval       , see Figure II-9), then values           
should be considered. This lower limit           will be further considered for the 
theoretical investigation of the    variation as a function of   (see Figure II-10 to II-13) and for 
the experimental validations in Chapter II.2 and II.3;  all the    plots converge towards        , when       (i.e. in the case of a very strong 
Gaussian noise, covering practically all the          interval), see Figure II-9.  
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Figure II-5:    as a function of  , for 11 values of  , for four values of    and for a fixed value     . 
     
Figure II-6:   as a function of  , for 11 values of  , for four values of    and for a fixed value     . 
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Figure II- 7:    as a function of  , for 11 values of  , for four values of    and for a fixed value     . 
     
Figure II-8:   as a function of  , for 11 values of  , for four values of    and for a fixed value     . 
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The experiments reported in Figure II-5 to II-8 are resumed in Figure C-1 to C-4 and Figure C-5 to C-8 (cf. 
Appendix C) for for two different   values, namely      and     , respectively. 
 
Figure II-9: Gaussian noise for         (i.e. a noise covering only one decision interval) and for      (i.e. a very 
strong noise, covering all the          interval). 
Figures II-10 to II-13 illustrates the average probability error expressed by equation (II-28) as a function 
of the Gaussian noise standard deviation   (represented on the abscissa), for          ; the same 
four values for   have been investigated:    ,    ,     and    . In each case, seven   
values are illustrated, namely     ,                    ,     , and      . By 
analyzing these plots, we can see that    is a decreasing function of  , at a fixed value of  . Hence, the 
increase of   means a priori a stronger robustness, obtained at the expense of a weaker transparency. In 
the sequel, we shall consider   values between 50 and 90 and we shall discuss their practical relevance.  
The experiments reported in Figure II-9 to II-12 are resumed in Figure C-9 to C-12 and Figure C-13 to C-16 
(cf. Appendix C) for two different   values, namely           and     , respectively. 
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Figure II-10:    as a function of  , for                          ,    and          . 
                    
Figure II-11:    as a function of  , for                          ,    and          . 
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Figure II-12:    as a function of  , for                          ,     and          . 
                    
Figure II-13:    as a function of  , for                          ,    and          . 
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II.1.3.4. Computing the probability of error at constant distortion  
While searching for the optimal parameters configuration and/or detection rule under the m-QIM 
framework, the previous sections considered as optimization criteria (1) the tradeoff between 
transparency and robustness and (2) the minimum probability of error.  
Such an approach considers that the   parameter is fixed, that a single   MPEG-4 AVC stream element is 
watermarked and the    value was computed. Moreover, it was implicitly assumed that the original 
MPEG-4 AVC stream stands for an infinite insertion space.  
The present section considers an application-oriented approach: the condition of fixed distortion is 
imposed as constraint, the   parameter is fixed and the relationship between  ,   and the number of 
the stream syntax element which can be watermarked is investigated.       
Relationship between   and  
Be there a binary message   of size   . This message is embedded by a binary modulation into a vector                 composed by    elements is constructed from the MPEG-4 AVC stream. The 
obtained watermarked vector is denoted by                . 
The same message   can alternatively encoded into an  -airy massage  , prior to its insertion. The 
multi-symbol message size   is obtained by (II-30).              (II-30) 
Hence, the m-airy message   will be inserted into a vector                . The watermarked signal 
vector                 is obtained according to the following equation (II-7):         
where                is quantization error vector by   quantization step.  
In the sequel, the watermarking distortion between will be expressed by the difference of the quadratic 
average errors of the   and   vectors (i.e. by the energy of the watermarked artifacts):                  
From the statistical point of view, the  ,   and   components can be considered as following the       
(independent and identically distributed) model (i.e. inside each  ,   and   vector, the component are 
independent and identically distributed). Be there  ,   and   the random variables modeling the values 
taken by   ,    and    components (note that a bold typeset was used for random variables) 
Hence,                                               (II-31) 
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According to (II-7)                       (II-32) 
On the one hand, as   represents the syntax element values, it is considered as being a zero-mean pdf 
(probability distribution function). On the other hand, as   represents a quantization error by step  , its 
pdf is uniform of zero-mean and 
     quadratic average value. 
Consequently,  
                 (II-33) 
 
Hence, the watermarking distortion (II-31) can be obtained according to (II-34):                              (II-34) 
For a fixed   value, in order to obtain the same distortion in the m-ary and binary case (i.e.      ), 
the   and  relationship should jointly fulfill the following equation (II-35):                   (II-35) 
Probability of error for constrained  and    
Assume we are interested in benchmarking the performances of m-QIM system for different   values, 
under the constraint of equal distortion. In this respect, the probability of error     expressed by (II-29) 
should computed by considering   and    values connected through (II-35); be      the binary 
probability error considering the adapted value   :              (II-36) 
In order to investigate the      behavior, a Gaussian noise modeling the attacks of standard deviation   
is considered; the same four values   have been investigated    ,    ,     and    ; the   
value is set to      , which corresponds to           for     (hence, in all cases, the non 
overlapping condition of decision intervals is satisfied); the    value is set to      ; hence,      ,       and      . 
Figure II-14 illustrates the average binary probability error      expressed by equation (II-36) as a 
function of the Gaussian noise standard deviation   (represented on the abscissa),  
By analyzing this plot, the following conclusions can be drawn:  
 if       the probability of error obtained in the binary case is lower than the probability error 
value obtained in all m-ary case (   ). 
 if       multi symbol modulation can show lower average binary error probability than the 
binary case. 
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These results confirm the state of the art, see Table II-1 and the discussion in Section II-1: the m-QIM 
practical impact depends on the actual applicative conditions.  
 
Figure II- 14:      as a function of  , for 4 values of , for        and fixed      . 
Probability of error for constrained  and    and for limited insertion space 
The present thesis deals with the practical case of compressed domain watermarking, where the 
insertion space is hence a priori limited: from the conceptual point of view, the better the compression 
efficiency, the smaller the insertion space. In other words, in practice it is expected that the maximum 
size of the   and   vectors would be limited at a value    representing the maximum number of syntax 
elements which can be watermarked.  
While the case       is already discussed above (Figure II- ϰͿ, let’s consider now the case in which       (that is, the case in which there is no enough room in the host signal for inserting the mark for 
a particular  value). 
In such a case, when detecting the mark,    symbols are recovered according to the m-QIM principles; 
hence, their binary probability of error can be computed according to (II-36). The rest of       are 
randomly detected; hence, their binary probability of error is 0.5. Consequently, when      , the 
binary probability of error can be computed as a weighted average between      in (II.36) and 0.5; be 
this probability of error under joint constraints of fixed distortion and limited insertion space denoted by      :                           (II-37) 
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Then:                                          (II-38) 
Let        (i.e.   quantifies the available insertion space with respect to the insertion space required for 
a binary insertion).  
Then:                                    (II-39) 
We shall investigate      as function of  , see Figure II-15 to (II-19). 
The same experiment conditions as in Figure II-14 are kept: the same four values   namely    ,    ,    and   ; the   value is set to      ;      . 
Figures II-15 to II-19 illustrate the average binary probability error       expressed by equation (II-39) as 
a function of the Gaussian noise standard deviation   (represented on the abscissa). Four   values have 
been considered, namely      ,      ,       and      . 
By analyzing these plots, we can notice that for    , multi symbol methods feature lower average 
binary error probability than the binary case and consequently outperforms it in term of robustness.  
This behaviour can be explained by the fact that the embedding space offered by the watermarking 
channel does not fit the binary information size. Consequently, reducing the required insertion space by 
considering higher alphabet size may feature lower probability error, at least for such a parameter 
configuration. 
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Figure II- 15:       as a function of  , for 4 values of , for       ,        and      . 
 
Figure II- 16:       as a function of  , for 4 values of , for       ,       and      . 0 2 4 6 8 10 12 14 16 18 20 
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Figure II- 17 :       as a function of  , for 4 values of , for       ,       and      . 
 
Figure II- 18 :       as a function of  , for 4 values of , for       ,       and      . 
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II.1.4. Conclusion  
This chapter presents the theoretical framework for the  -QIM watermarking. First, it generalizes the 
insertion rule, from the binary to -ary case, see equation (II-7). Secondly, it derives the optimal decision 
rule in the sense of minimizing the error probability of detection under an additive white Gaussian noise 
(II-20) and computes the underlying probability error (II-28). These results also identify optimal (in the 
error probability sense) parameters for the method and/or hinted to more suitable configurations to be 
considered in the practical validation. The way in which these theoretical issues are reflected in the 
practical data payload-robustness-transparency tradeoff is investigated in next chapters devoted to 
robust and semi-fragile applications. 
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II.2. Case study 1: MPEG-4 AVC robust watermarking for 
ownership protection 
This chapter demonstrates the m-QIM performances when integrated into an MPEG-4 AVC robust 
watermarking method. 
II.2.1. Advanced method  
The robust watermarking embedding process starts by following the principles detailed in Chapter II.1. 
The mark is inserted in the quantized AC luma residual coefficients; this way, the MPEG-4 AVC 
decoding/reencoding overhead is limited to the binary decoding/reencoding.  
The host vector   is obtained by zig-zag scanning the 15 components of a     AC luma residual 
coefficients.  
The watermark is not directly embedded into the original     block   but into the projection  ’ of   onto a perceptual mask, denoted by the       vector. 
The insertion/detection follows the equations (II-7) and (II-20).  
II.2.1.1. Block selection 
The mark is inserted after a block selection based on a criterion expressed by (II-40). Only in the blocks 
whose computed detection variables      after the insertion of   verify the condition in (II-30) will be 
selected for the final mark embedding: 
               (II-40) 
Where      represents the detection variable computed according to (II-8),   is the embedded symbol,   is the alphabet size and   is the quantization step. 
The watermarked block positions are recorded to be used at the insertion and the detection procedure. 
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PSEUDOCODE FOR THE SELECTION 
Begin video 
If the current frame is I then 
Begin frame 
1- Select randomly n nonzero blocks that are disjoints 
If the current block is selected then 
- Mark the block according to (II-7). 
- Compute the detection variable according to (II-8). 
- Compute the condition (II-30) 
- If the condition (II-30) is verified then the bloc is selected and its position is 
recorded. 
Else go to the next block 
End frame 
Else go to the next frame  
End video 
II.2.1.2. Embedding process  
The embedding process combines m-QIM and perceptual shaping. It is structured into three main 
modules as shown in Figure II-14: perceptual shaping, mark generation and mark embedding. 
 
Figure II-19: The embedding synopsis: three inputs (the message d, the host   and the key  ) and three parameters 
(the perceptual mask      , the quantization step   and the scaling factor  ) are considered to compute the 
marked data y.  is the number of symbols in the message alphabet. 
Perceptual shaping 
Mark generation 
           
                                      
Mark embedding             
 
Host block x 
       d, k 
Δ, α 
Marked block   
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Perceptual shaping: 
In order to match the watermarking method to the human visual system, a perceptual shaping 
mechanism is also considered. This means that the watermark is not directly embedded into the original 
vector   but into its projection onto a perceptual mask       . This mask is obtained by adapting and 
extending [BEL10] for MPEG-4 AVC the popular Watson model [WAT93] developed for still images. 
Mark generation: 
The mark to be inserted into the host   vector depends of the m-ary message, D = {-(m-1)/2, - (m-ϮͿ/Ϯ,… 
0, … ;m-2)/2, (m-1)/2}, and of the original vector itself:  
                                                
Embedding mark: 
This module generates the watermarked     MPEG-4 AVC block. It has as input the mark  , the 
original content and the perceptual mask      . In the present paper the insertion follows a simple 
additive rule as follows:              
PSEUDOCODE FOR THE INSERTION 
Begin video 
If the current frame is I then 
Begin frame 
If the current block is selected then 
for i=1 to 15 do                         // compute the projection  
Compute the mark w according (II-7)  
 for i=1 to 15 do 
                                                     
Else go to the next block 
End frame 
Else go to the next frame  
End video 
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II.2.1.3. Detection 
For each supposed marked block, the detector starts by projecting the vector of 15 AC coefficients of the     sub-macroblocks in the I frames onto the perceptual mask       . Then the detection is achieved 
by following the rule described in Chapter II.1. 
PSEUDOCODE FOR THE DETECTION 
Begin video 
 If the current frame is I then 
 Begin frame 
 If the current block is selected then 
for i=1 to 15 do                         // compute the projection  
- Compute the decision value      of the block according to (II-8). 
- Detect the mark using the detection rule (II-20) 
        Else go to the next block  
End frame 
 Else go to the next frame  
End video 
II.2.2. Functional evaluation 
The m-QIM parameters are chosen so as to serve the practical purpose of the robust watermarking 
application and are guided by the theoretical demonstration in Chapter II.1. Four   values and three 
quantization steps   are compared all through the study, namely             and             . 
Regardless the particular  and   values, we set           (see the discussion in Chapter II.1.3.3).  
Experimental evaluations are carried under MEDIEVALS corpus (cf. Appendix B) consisting of 4 video 
sequences of 15 minutes each. They were encoded in MPEG-4 AVC Baseline Profile (no B frames, CAVLC 
entropy encoder) at 512 kb/s (SD) and 2Mbps (HD). The GOP size is set to 10. 
The experiments are conducted at three successive levels, so as to investigate the three-folded data 
payload-robustness-transparency watermarking challenge.  
First (Chapter II.2.2.1), the data payload is estimated for different m values while keeping fixed values for 
transparency (average PSNR of 45 dB and of 65 dB, for SD and HD respectively) and robustness (maximal 
BER of 0.1± 0.03 against bipolar additive noise, transcoding and geometric random bending attacks).  
Secondly (Chapter II.2.2.2), the robustness against the same three types of attacks is investigated at fixed 
data payload (150 bits per minute) and transparency (PSNR of 45 dB and of 65 dB, for SD and HD 
respectively) constraints.  
Part II: Multi symbol QIM watermarking 
                                                                                                                            61 
Finally (Chapter II.2.2.3), the transparency (expressed by five subjective metrics) is assessed at fixed data 
payload (150 bits per minute) and robustness (maximal BER of 0.1 ± 0.03 against additive noise, 
transcoding and geometric random bending attacks).  
II.2.2.1. Data payload  
As the m-QIM is intrinsically a side-information method [CHE98], [EGG03] the data payload depends on 
the particular video sequence and cannot be a priori predicted.  
Consequently, our experiments consider for each value   an incremental approach: we start from the 
value reported in [BEL10] for    and SD (namely 56 bits/minute), and we gradually increase it up to 
the limit allowing prescribed average values for transparency and robustness. On the one hand, the 
average transparency is set at a PSNR = 45dB in the SD case and at a PSNR = 65 dB in the HD case (with 
minimal/maximal limits of 43/47 dB and 63/67 dB, respectively). On the other hand, for both the SD and 
the HD corpora, the robustness is set at an average BER of 0.1 (with minimal/maximal limits of 
0.07/0.13) after noise addition, transcoding and geometric random bending attacks
2
. A      has been 
considered. The values thus obtained for the data payload are plotted in Figure II-15 in blue diamonds.  
However, with respect to the binary QIM, the m-QIM insertion is theoretically expected to increase the 
data payload by a factor of       [PRO01]. Consequently, we consider the data payload value obtained 
for     and we also plot the corresponding theoretical logarithmic function, see the red squares in 
Figure II-15.  
Figure II-15 shows a good concordance between the theoretical and the experimental plot, the relative 
average differences being lower than 0.02 in the SD case and lower than 0.06 in the HD case. These 
average differences are computed by averaging the relative differences obtained on the corresponding 
corpora, for all the considered  values. 
                                                          
 
2 All through the manuscript the geometric attack is ensured by the Stirmark random bending [PET98]; the terms random geometric and Stirmark 
attacks will be alternatively employed. 
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SD HD 
Figure II-20: Data payload as a function of m, for      and for SD (left) and HD (right) content. Fixed 
transparency and robustness constraints are kept. 
The experiments reported in Figure II-15 are resumed, in Table II-3 and Figure II-16, for          , 
for    but for two different   values, namely      and     . With respect to the reference case    70, when keeping the same transparency/robustness constraints, it can be noticed that:       ensures relative increases of the data payload by factor of 0.1 and 0.07 in the SD and HD 
cases, respectively.       ensures relative decreases of the data payload by factor of 0.13 and 0.11 in the SD and 
HD cases, respectively. 
 
 
Figure II-21: Data payload as function of  ,   . 
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Table II-3: Data payload behavior as function of  , the relative gain are computed according to (II-41). 
 SD HD         90       90 
Data payload (per minute) 165 150 139 225 222 198 
Relative gain   0.10 0 -0.13 0.07 0 -0.11 
The relative gain   represented in the paragraph above is computed according to the formula: 
                                         (II-41) 
II.2.2.2. Robustness  
While the theoretical demonstration presented in Chapter II.1 considered the case of the attacks 
modelled by additive white Gaussian noise, the present section goes outside this hypothesis, by 
experimentally investigating attacks which cannot be modelled by the Gaussian laws [MIT07]: bipolar -
1/1 white noise added in the     MPEG-4 AVC coefficient domain, MPEG-4 AVC transcoding (down to 
25% from the original stream bit rate) and Stirmark geometric random bending attacks.  
The data payload is set at 150 bits per minute while the transparency is set at 45dB (with       maximal 
variation) in the SD case and at 65dB (with       maximal variation) in the HD case. The   parameter is 
set at     . The same four values for  are investigated:           . 
The robustness is investigated by computing the BER, see Figure II-17: the case of bipolar additive noise 
is represented in blue diamonds, the case of transcoding in red squares while the random geometric 
attacks in green triangles. The values reported in Figure II-17 are obtained by averaging the BER obtained 
at the frame level. The following conclusions can be drawn:  the -1/1 bipolar noise addition results in perturbations described by a unitary standard deviation; 
as this value is very small compared to the   (see discussion in Chapter II.1.3), the choice of           ensured a BER = 0, although the law of such perturbation is not Gaussian;  the MPEG-4 AVC transcoding resulted in average3 BER of 0.05 and 0.06, for the SD and HD 
content, respectively; it can be noticed that BER is quite constant with respect to  , the 
corresponding variances (over the four investigated   values) being 2.2 10-4 and 1.7 10-4, 
respectively;  
                                                          
 
3 Averaged over the four considered m values. 
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 the standard deviation of the noise induced by the transcoding attacks is estimated in our 
experiments at 3.2 and 2.8, for SD and HD, respectively; the theoretical error obtained by 
equation (II-29) for these sigma values are 0.07 and 0.06; while a slight difference between the 
practice and the theory is identified in the SD case (0.05 vs. 0.07), the two values are identical in 
the HD case;  the geometric random bending attacks also result in quite constant averaged BER as a function 
of : average values of 0.105 and 0.090 and variances of 5.7 10-4 and 4.4 10-4 are obtained for 
the SD and HD content, respectively;   the standard deviation of the noise corresponding to these attacks is estimated at 5.3 and 4.5, 
respectively; the theoretical average error computed with (II-29) are 0.12 and 0.11; we can see a 
lower concordance between the theoretical and experimental results than in the case of 
transcoding; this is the consequence of the fact that the geometrical attacks do not follow a 
Gaussian law;  the numerical values reported in this section are statistical relevant, in the sense that the 95% 
confidence intervals [WAL02] computed for the BER after the transcoding and the random 
bending attacks resulted in relative errors lower than 5 10-3 (the BER in the bipolar noise 
addition was constantly equal to 0; hence, no confidence interval has been computed). 
 
                          SD HD 
Figure II-22: BER as a function of m, for SD (left) and HD (right) content. Fixed data payload and transparency 
performances are kept,     . 
The overall BER results prove the robustness of the m-QIM watermarking method against the 
investigated attacks. In order to illustrate the practical impact of these attacks for SD content, Figure II-
18 presents the case in which the ARTEMIS logo is considered as the mark. The experiments in Figure II-
18 considered the same context as above: a data payload of 150 bit/minute,          ,   70. 
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Figure II-23: The original ARTEMIS (left) and reconstructed ARTEMIS after additive noise, transcoding and geometric 
random bending attacks, respectively. 
The experiments reported in Figure II-17 are resumed in Table II-4 and Figure II-19 for the same          , for     but for two different   values, namely      and     . With respect to 
the case    70, when keeping the same data payload/transparency constraints, it can be noticed that:        ensures relative increases of the BER by a factor of 0.5 and 0.27 for transcoding and 
Stirmark random bending, respectively in the SD case and by a factor of 0.28 and 0.2 for 
transcoding and Stirmark random bending, respectively in the HD case.       results in relative decreases of the BER by a factor of 0.33 and 0.09 for transcoding and 
Stirmark random bending, respectively in the SD case and by a factor of 0.28 and 0.1 for 
transcoding and Stirmark random bending, respectively in the HD case. 
Note: the relative increases/decreases in the BER are computed according to (II-41). 
 
                                     SD         HD 
Figure II-24: Robustness as function of  .,   . 
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Table II-4: Robustness behavior as function of  ,   . 
 SD HD         90       90 
Transcoding (BER) 0.09 0.06 0.04 0.09 0.07 0.05 
Relative gain     0.50 0 -0.33 0.28 0 -0.28 
Stirmark (BER) 0.14 0.12 0.10 0.12 0.10 0.09 
Relative gain (   0.27 0 -0.09 0.2 0 -0.1 
II.2.2.3. Transparency  
In order to evaluate the transparency of the watermarking method, three types of metrics have been 
considered: pixel difference-based measures (peak signal to noise ratio – PSNR and absolute average 
difference – AAD), correlation based measures (structural continent – SC and normalized cross 
correlation - NCC), and psycho-visual measures (digital video quality - DVQ). These metrics are computed 
at the frame level according to their definitions presented in Chapter I.1.1, then averaged over the video 
corpus.  
A fixed data payload of 150 bits per minute and robustness (expressed by average maximal BER of 0.1 ± 
0.03 against the three above-mentioned attacks) are considered. 
Figures II-20, II-21 and II-22 display the average values of these metrics alongside with their 95% 
confidence intervals computed according to [WAL02]. 
PSNR (dB) AAD (x10
-3
) 
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Figure II-25: PSNR and AAD as a function of  (     ): average values and 95% confidence limits. 
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SC NCC 
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Figure II-26: SC and NCC as a function of  (     ): average values and 95% confidence limits. 
DVQ 
 
SD                                                HD 
Figure II-27: DVQ as a function of  (     ): average values and 95% confidence limits. 
As an overall trend, we can see that the transparency improves with increasing the alphabet size m. This 
can be explained by the fact that, for a fixed data payload, increasing m decreases the number of MPEG-
4 AVC blocks needed for embedding the mark and thus reduces the drift artefacts inner to compressed 
domain watermarking. However, an in-depth analysis of the different variations of the quality metrics, 
with respect to  , brings to light that the variation of the quality metrics is stronger in the case of SD 
content than in the case of HD content. In order to objectively asses this behavior, we consider the 
average relative variation between two successive  values, denoted by  : 
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                                           (II-42) 
where          {PSNR, AAD, SC, NCC and DVQ} and   is the index of the deployed   value belonging to 
the set          . The   values are presented in Table II-5. 
 
Table II-5: Variation of the quality metric with respect to . 
 SD HD 
 PSNR AAD SC NCC DVQ PSNR AAD SC NCC DVQ    0.1 -0.5 0.01 0.06 -0.23 0.012 -0.21 0 0 -0.16 
 
The experiments reported in Figure II-20 to Figure II-22 are resumed in Table II-6 and Figure II-23 to 
Figure II-25 for the same          , for     and for two different   values, namely      and     . With respect to the case   70, when keeping the same data payload/robustness constraints, 
we note that      ensures:  Relative increases by a factor of 0.06 and 0.04 for PSNR in the SD case and HD case, respectively.  Relative decreases by a factor 0.2 and 0.33 for DVQ, in the SD case and in the HD case, 
respectively. 
Similarly, with respect to the case    70, when keeping the same data payload/robustness constraints, 
we note that      ensures:  Relative decreases by a factor of 0.07 and 0.06 for PSNR, in the SD case and in the HD case, 
respectively.  Relative increases by a factor of 0.4 and 0.33 for DVQ in the SD case and in the HD case, 
respectively. 
The relative gains are computed according to (II-41). 
Part II: Multi symbol QIM watermarking 
                                                                                                                            69 
  
PSNR AAD 
Figure II-28: PSNR and AAD as function of  ,   . 
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Figure II-29: SC and NCC as function of  ,   . 
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DVQ 
Figure II-30: DVQ as function of  ,   . 
 
Table II-6: Transparency behavior as function of  ,   . 
 SD HD         90       90 
PSNR 62 59 54 67 65 61 
Relative gain (   0.06 0 -0.07 0.04 0 -0.06 
AAD 0.38 0.47 0.61 0.018 0.021 0.026 
Relative gain (   -0.23 0 0.28 -0.18 0 0.23 
SC 0.98 0.97 0.96 0.99 0.99 0.98 
Relative gain (   0.01 0 -0.02 0.01 0 -0.01 
NCC 0.99 0.98 0.96 0.99 0.99 0.99 
Relative gain (   0.01 0 -0.02 0.00 0 -0.00 
DVQ  0.04 0.05 0.07 0.02 0.03 0.04 
Relative gain (   -0.20 0 0.4 -0.33 0 0.33 
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II.2.2.4. Computational cost 
The execution time required by each operation included in the watermarking chain is evaluated on the 
following configuration: a PC with the following configuration: a Core4 CPU at 2.8 GHz and with 12 GB of 
RAM and a 500 GB HDD. 
The values reported in this chapter are obtained on a corpus 60 min of video (MEDIVALS SD corpus 
Appendix B). 
Figures II-26 and II-27 illustrate the allocation time and the time consuming during the embedding 
process for one second of video. It is noticed that the inner watermarking operations (selection and 
insertion) consume 0.045 s and 0.008 s respectively, i.e. 3.32% and 0.22% respectively of the total 
embedding processing time.  
 
Figure II-31: Sharing time for the embedding process for one second of video. 
 
Figure II-32: Time consuming (in seconds) during the mark embedding for one second of video. 
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Figures II-28 and II-29 illustrate the allocation time and the time consuming during the mark detection 
process for one second of video. It is noticed that the detection consume 0.005 s for one second of video 
which presents 0.88% of the total embedding processing time. 
 
Figure II-33: Sharing time for the detection process for one second of video. 
 
Figure II-34: Time consuming (in seconds) during the mark detection for one second of video. 
The complexity analysis of the method shows that it is compatible with the real time (although its 
current implementation it is not): 
x The operations intrinsically related to the mark selection, insertion and detection are less 
complex (and, implicitly, faster) than the MPEG-4 AVC entropic encoding/decoding and the 
stream read/write. For instance, in the current implementation, for protecting 1s of video, the 
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selection, insertion and detection sums up to 0.08s while the entropic decoding/encoding and 
the video stream read/ write operations reach 1.061s and 0.808s, respectively;  The operations intrinsically related to the mark selection, insertion and detection are also much 
faster than the entropic decoding/encoding and the video stream read/write from the hard disk. 
When considering the same example as above (protecting 1s of video), the entropic 
decoding/encoding and the read/write operations are about 13 and 10 times slower than the 
mark selection/insertion/detection, respectively. 
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II.2.3. Conclusion  
This chapter stands for the applicative validation of the m-QIM insertion/detection under the framework 
of the robust watermarking. The experimental investigation was conducted at three levels and 
considered          (according the a priori hints discussed in Chapter II.1.3). 
First, for fixed transparency and robustness, an overall       gain in data payload has been obtained.  
Secondly, for fixed data payload and transparency constraints, no practical loss in robustness has been 
encountered, the variance of the BER with respect to   value being lower than 6 10-4; such a result 
holds for both SD and HD corpora. 
Finally, an average relative increase by a factor of 0.1 and 0.01 of PSNR and an average relative decrease 
by a factor of 0.23 and 0.16 of DVQ are obtained for fixed data payload and robustness in the SD case 
and HD case, respectively; the correlation based measures are quite constant with respect to  . This 
slight increase in transparency is the consequence of the decrease of the number of MPEG-4 AVC blocks 
needed for embedding when the alphabet size is increased and of the subsequent drift effect 
attenuation. 
The experiments also investigated the impact of the   parameter in the overall results (the larger the  , 
the better the robustness but the worse the transparency). They also brought to light that a quite large 
interval of   values (from 50 to 90) can be considered for robust watermarking purposes. 
Concerning the complexity cost, the evaluation shows that the selection/insertion/detection of the 
method are much faster than the MPEG-4 AVC entropic decoding/encoding and the video stream 
read/write from the hard disk which are 13 times and 10 times slower for one second of video. 
In order to allow an overall comparison between our m-QIM framework and state-of-the-art binary QIM 
approaches, we also implemented the method in [GOL07]. We resumed the previous experiments while 
keeping the data payload – robustness – transparency constraints the same. 
The data payload experiments (cf. Chapter II.2.2.1) demonstrated that the method in [GOL07] cannot 
allow even 1 bit per minute to be inserted. 
The robustness experiments (cf. Chapter II.2.2.2) brought to light that the QIM method in [GOL07] 
resulted in:  BER=0, after additive noise (for both SD and HD original content);  BER = 0.17 and 0.15 after transcoding attacks, for SD and HD content, respectively; the 
underlying 95% relative errors were 0.02 and 0.019, respectively; these BER values are about 3 
times larger than the average values corresponding to the m-QIM;  BER = 0.45 and 0.43 after the Stirmark random bending attack, for SD and HD content, 
respectively; the underlying 95% relative errors were 0.025; these BER values are about 4 times 
larger than the average values corresponding to the m-QIM. 
A synoptic view on these robustness results is provided by Figure II-30 which is analogous to Figure II-18. 
It illustrates the ARTEMIS logo recovered by using the method in [GOL07], after bipolar additive noise, 
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transcoding and Stirmark random bending attacks. It can be noticed that the Stirmark random bending 
attacks completely destroy the meaning of the recovered logo. 
As the method in [GOL07] cannot provide the expected data payload and robustness constraints, the 
transparency experiments in Chapter II.2.2.3 were not resumed. 
 Original Additive noise Transcoding Stirmark 
    
    
Figure II-35: The original ARTEMIS logo (left) and reconstructed ARTEMIS logo after additive noise, transcoding and 
geometric random bending attacks, respectively. These experiments correspond to the method in [GOL07]. 
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II.3. Case study 2: MPEG-4 AVC semi-fragile 
watermarking for video surveillance application  
In this chapter, we focus on the MPEG-4 AVC (Advanced Video Coding) [RIC03] integrity verification. 
First, the MPEG-4 AVC syntax elements that jointly reflect the semantic content and ensure the semi-
fragility propriety are identified. The theoretical supported is granted by information theory tools. 
Secondly, the m-QIM (multiple symbols Quantization Index Modulation) insertion technique (whose 
optimality in proved in Chapter II.1) is considered in order to insert the mark. The experiments are 
carried out on 1 hour of video surveillance content and show that the proposed video watermarking 
based video integrity verification system is able to distinguish between content preserving and video 
content changing alterations. 
II.3.1. Problem statement 
Today, video-surveillance systems have become ubiquitous. The need to feel safe despite the high crime 
rate, the low cost compared to a human surveillance and the social acceptance enacted the intensive use 
of video-surveillance despite its intrinsic privacy intrusive character. Video surveillance can be found 
today not only in particularly sensitive areas such as banks, airports and government buildings but also in 
public places (stadiums, parks and residential areas). For instance, more than 9400 cameras are deployed 
in the London public transportation [DUR05]. 
This expansion of video-surveillance usage comes across with new challenges for the underlying video 
processing systems: ensuring methodological support for video surveillance content authenticity is the 
main deadlock for its consideration as evidence in justice courts. 
Two approaches can be considered in order to ensure video authenticity, namely data and content 
based. The former considers the data (binary) representation of the video and extracts an authentication 
signature (e.g. a hash function) which meets the uniqueness and sensitivity (fragility) requirements. This 
signature is further stored as metadata. The latter no longer targets the binary representation of the 
video but its visual/semantic content. In order to be effective, such a signature should be robust to 
content preserving alterations and sensitive to content changing alterations. Consider the example in 
Figure II-31. Figure II-31.a represents an original content while Figure II-31.b shows its JPEG compressed 
version at quality factor   = 70; Figure II-31.c gives a content-modified version of the image in Figure II-
31.b in which a person has been added. From the binary representation point of view, the three images 
in Figure II-31.a, Figure II-31.b and Figure II-31.c are completely different; hence their data-based 
signatures should be different. However, from the semantic content point of view, Figure II-31.a and 
Figure II-31.b are identical while differing from Figure II-31.c. Consequently, the content-based 
signatures corresponding to Figure II-31.a and Figure II-31.b should be identical while differing from the 
signature extracted from Figure II-31.c.  
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(a) (b) (c) (d) 
Figure II-36: The original frame (a) suffers a content preserving attack (a compression) (b) then a content alteration 
attack (the insertion of a person) (c). Signature based integrity verification should discriminate between the 
legal/fake areas (d). 
Content-based authentication methods can be classified as passive or active [UPA11].  
Passive authentication, also called forensic analysis [GER99] attempts to verify whether the content has 
been altered or not by using a direct statistical analysis. This way, no a priori processing/storing 
operation is required for the original content. While very appealing by its functional principle, passive 
authentication is not always possible and doubts about its reliability and security are raised for some 
applications [GER99].  
This is not the case of the active approach, where the integrity of digital content is ensured by the 
embedding of an authentication signal (or signature) in the content itself, before its sharing/distribution. 
The active authentication is also called watermarking based authentication. Consider again the example 
in Figure II-31 and assume that Figure II-31.a carries (in a visual imperceptible way) a content 
authentication signature. On the one hand, this signature should be robust to compression; hence it 
should be recovered from the unaltered content areas in Figure II-31.c. On the other hand, it should be 
fragile against content-modifications; hence, it should no longer be recovered from the areas where the 
person was inserted. This way, the legal/faked areas can be discriminated into a same video frame (see 
Figure II-31.d).  
From the applicative point of view, the main semi-fragile watermarking difficulties are the choice of the 
signature and of the embedding technique. The signature must ensure the semi-fragility property by 
being both sensitive to content changing alterations (frame cropping, object removing, …Ϳ aŶd robust to 
content preserving alterations (transcoding, resizing, ...). As video sequences are preponderantly stored 
and distributed in compressed format, the signature should be both generated and inserted directly 
from/in the compressed domain, thus avoiding the computational overhead required by the 
decompression/compression. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Legal 
Fake  
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II.3.2. Theoretical investigation on the authentication signature 
In order to minimize the overhead induced by the decoding/encoding operations, the present study 
generates the signature directly from the MPEG-4 AVC syntax elements. The optimal syntax elements are 
identified by a study carried out on the basis of information theory, in order to build a syntax element 
based signature. The targeted signature must meet the trade-off between the robustness against 
content preserving and the sensitivity to content changing alterations at a low level of complexity. 
II.3.2.1. Syntax elements identification  
MPEG-4 AVC video sequences are structured into group of pictures (GOP) (cf. Appendix A.1). A GOP is 
constructed by fixed number of successive images of three main types (I, P, and B). 
An I frame describes a full image coded independently, containing only references to itself. Secondly, the 
unidirectional predicted frames P use one or more previously encoded/decoded frames as reference for 
picture encoding/decoding. Finally, bidirectional predicted frames B consider in their computation both 
forward and backward reference frames. According to the coding principles, I frames preserve more 
information and require more bits for encoding than the other two types.  
Our study focuses on the I frames. The I frames contain the salient visual/semantic information which is 
also exploited by the P and B frames in that GOP. Consequently, extracting the signature from the I 
frames has two main a priori advantages: the signature can be related to the video semantic and 
represent the whole GOP. Figure II-32 details the I frame encoding block diagram. MPEG-4 AVC 
transforms the uncompressed data in a classical compression chain: prediction P, transformation T, 
quantization Q and entropic coding E. 
 
Figure II-37: Intra frame coding diagram. 
I frames are encoded according to Intra prediction modes which exploit the spatial redundancy to 
enhance the compression efficiency. The MPEG-4 AVC standard offers 13 directional intra prediction 
modes (cf. Appendix A.2). For each current block, a predicted block is constructed from the boundary 
pixels of the neighboring blocks which are previously encoded. MPEG-4 AVC offers two intra prediction 
modes classes: I16×16  (with four prediction modes) for smoothed regions and I4x4 (with 9 prediction 
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modes) for the textured regions. For each block, the prediction mode minimizing the rate-distortion cost 
is selected. 
The residual block computing the difference between the current block and the predicted block is 
transformed by using a DCT and a quantizer. Each quantized transformed residual block is further 
mapped into a 15 coefficients vector. In the baseline profile, the resulting vector is encoded by the 
CAVLC (Context Adaptive Variable Coding Length) encoder (cf. Appendix A. 2):   CAVLC uses the run-level entropic encoding to represent compact zero sequences.  The non-zero values taken by coefficients are often expressed in ± 1 sequences. CAVLC encodes 
the ±1 number of the large compact succession of ±1 (Trailing-Ones).  The number of non-zero coefficients (NNZ) is encoded using a lock-up table. The encoding table is 
determined based on the NNZ of neighboring blocks.  Levels values of nonzero coefficients in low frequencies are larger than those in high frequencies. 
CAVLC takes advantage of this behavior by adapting the choice of the encoding table (VLC look-up 
table). The standard provides four encoding tables, depending on the NNZ value, see Table II-7. 
The I frames contain four main syntax elements per intra block: mb_type, TO (Trailing Ones), NNZ and 
run-level. The extraction of these elements is performed through a syntax parser. This study will not 
consider the run-level. In fact, to be effective, the signature should have a limited alphabet size; this is 
not the case of run-level element. Table II-7 illustrates the syntax elements that will be investigated in 
this study. 
Table II-7: MPEG-4AVC syntax elements. 
Syntax elements Description 
mb_type Intra prediction mode class type: (I4x4 or I16×16 ). 
TO (Trailing Ones) It takes a value from 0 to 3. If there is a succession of 
more than three ±1, only the last three are considered. 
NNZ (Number of Non Zero 
coefficients) 
NNZ encoded according to 4 tables are considered based 
on its value: Table 1 (0, 1), Table 2 (2, 3), Table 3 (4, 5, 6, 
7) and Table 4 (8 or more). 
II.3.2.2. Syntax elements behavior to content preserving attacks  
II.3.2.2.1. Experimental protocol  
This section investigates the possibility of building an authentication signature from the 3 syntax 
elements identified above (mb_type, TO, NNZ). To do this, the behavior of each of these elements to 
content preserving attacks (transcoding, Gaussian filtering, sharpening and scaling) is first investigated. 
Then, the considered attacks are applied according to two scenarios: (S1) the MPEG-4 AVC encoder is 
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allowed to choose the quantization parameter Qp, and (S2) the quantization parameter Qp is set to 31. 
Table II-8 shows the steps involved in both scenarios. 
Table II-8: Test scenarios. 
S1 S2 
(1) Encode the video at variable Qp 
(2) Extract the syntax elements and store them 
(3) Attack the video and re-encode it according to (1) 
(4) Extract the syntax elements and compare them to 
those extracted at (2) 
(1) Encode the video at Qp = 31 
(2) Extract the syntax elements and store them 
(3) Attack the video and re-encode it according to (1) 
(4) Extract the syntax elements and compare them to 
those extracted at (2) 
First, the syntax elements (mb_type, TO, NNZ) are extracted using a syntax parser and stored as 
sigŶatuƌes. “eĐoŶdlǇ, the ǀideo seƋueŶĐe is attaĐked ;tƌaŶsĐoded, filteƌed, sĐaled, …Ϳ aŶd fuƌtheƌ ƌe-
encoded according to the same initial configuration. Finally, the syntax elements are extracted from the 
attacked video and compared to those extracted previously from the original video. The syntax elements 
extracted from each 4x4 block intra are coded as follows:                                                        
                                                                   
II.3.2.2.2. Corpus  
The experiments were carried out on a video surveillance corpus composed of 8 sequences of 10 
minutes each, downloaded from internet [WEB01] or recorded under the framework of the SPY project 
(cf. Appendix B). This corpus is encoded in MPEG-4 AVC in Baseline Profile at 512 kbps, 640x480 pixel 
frames; the GOP size is set to 8. 
II.3.2.2.3. Robustness against content preserving attacks  
The initial value of a syntax element is likely to change after an attack on a random basis, given by both 
the attack and the content itself; hence we can investigate these modifications by modeling the attack 
with noise matrices. In such a matrix, the lines correspond to the values of original elements, while the 
columns to the values after attacks. An element in a matrix is the corresponding conditional probability, 
estimated on the corpus. These noise matrices are estimated by successively applying four content 
preserving attacks (transcoding, sharpening, Gaussian filtering and scaling) according to the two 
scenarios presented above. The size of the corpus was large enough so as to ensure the statistical 
relevance of the results: for each syntax element, 95% confidence limits are computed with relative error           . 
By further computing the probability of correct detection      and the mutual information     the 
related decision can be made on the optimal syntax element.  
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                                               (II-43) 
where     presents the noise matrix element of coordinates i and j,    is the average probability that the 
syntax element takes the value   in the original video and    is the average probability that the syntax 
element takes the value   in the attacked video.   is the size of the corresponding alphabet (i.e.     
for mb_type and    for NNZ and TO ).  
Table II-9, Table II-11 and Table II-13 illustrate the distribution probability for mb_type, NNZ and TO 
respectively.  
Table II-10, Table II-12 and Table II-14 illustrate the computed noise matrix for mb_type, NNZ and TO 
respectively.  
The obtained probability of correct detection and mutual information values for each syntax element 
and for each tested attack according to the two scenarios are plotted in Figure II-33 and Figure II-34, 
respectively. The analysis of these results brings to light two main conclusions:  The probability of correct detection and the mutual information values show that the syntax 
element (mb_type) remains more robust than the two other syntax elements (TO and NNZ) 
against all the investigated attacks. The obtained averaged Pc over the 4 attacks and the 2 
scenarios are 0.92, 0.76, and 0.47 for mb_type, NNZ and TO, respectively.   values feature an 
average of 0.55, 0.44, and 0.15 for mb_type, NNZ and TO, respectively.  A better robustness is achieved for (S2). A fixed quantization step increases the mb_type correct 
detection probability by 0.06, 0.02, 0.04 and 0.03 and the mb_type mutual information by 0.21, 
0.13, 0.01 and 0.02 for transcoding, sharpening, Gaussian filtering and scaling, respectively 
Table II-9:mb_type distribution probability. 
 S1 S2 
 0 1 0 1 
P 0.62 0.38 0.54 0.46 
Table II-10: mb_type transition matrix. 
 
Transcoding Sharpening 
 
S1 S2 S1 S2 
 
0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 
0 0.95 0.04 0.98 0.02 0.78 0.22 0.82 0.18 
1 0.11 0.88 0.03 0.96 0.06 0.94 0.03 0.96 
 
Gaussian filtering Scaling 
 
S1 S2 S1 S2 
 
0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 
0 0.94 0.06 0.95 0.05 0.92 0.08 0.93 0.07 
1 0.15 0.85 0.05 0.94 0.12 0.88 0.07 0.93 
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Table II-11: NNZ distribution probability. 
 S1 S2 
 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 
P  0.68 0.21 0.09 0.02 0.74 0.17 0.08 0.01 
Table II-12: NNZ transaction matrix. 
 
Transcoding Sharpening 
 
S1 S2 S1 S2 
 
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 
0 0.97 0.02 0.01 0.00 0.97 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.68 0.22 0.09 0.01 0.69 0.20 0.09 0.01 
1 0.45 0.52 0.02 0.01 0.33 0.64 0.02 0.01 0.16 0.24 0.50 0.10 0.08 0.28 0.51 0.13 
2 0.05 0.38 0.50 0.07 0.02 0.34 0.63 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.38 0.55 0.02 0.02 0.35 0.61 
3 0.06 0.02 0.61 0.31 0.01 0.01 0.62 0.36 0.01 0.01 0.02 0.96 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.97 
 
Gaussian filtering Scaling 
 
S1 S2 S1 S2 
 
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 
0 0.90 0.09 0.01 0.00 0.95 0.04 0.00 0.01 0.94 0.06 0.00 0.00 0.95 0.03 0.01 0.01 
1 0.45 0.49 0.05 0.01 0.47 0.50 0.02 0.01 0.43 0.51 0.05 0.00 0.48 0.48 0.03 0.01 
2 0.10 0.46 0.43 0.01 0.11 0.53 0.34 0.02 0.08 0.50 0.41 0.01 0.11 0.55 0.34 0.00 
3 0.02 0.09 0.83 0.06 0.02 0.13 0.83 0.02 0.02 0.11 0.82 0.05 0.01 0.13 0.83 0.03 
Table II-13: TO distribution probability. 
 S1 S2 
 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 
P  0.41 0.3 0.16 0.13 0.49 0.27 0.13 0.1 
Table II-14: TO transaction matrix. 
 
Transcoding Sharpening 
 
S1 S2 S1 S2 
 
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 
0 0.84 0.11 0.03 0.02 0.82 0.13 0.02 0.01 0.47 0.22 0.17 0.14 0.50 0.25 0.12 0.13 
1 0.68 0.22 0.06 0.04 0.39 0.46 0.09 0.04 0.40 0.24 0.16 0.20 0.32 0.30 0.18 0.20 
2 0.60 0.18 0.14 0.08 0.14 0.33 0.39 0.14 0.40 0.21 0.16 0.23 0.28 0.27 0.20 0.25 
3 0.52 0.14 0.13 0.21 0.07 0.15 0.26 0.52 0.34 0.24 0.18 0.24 0.29 0.26 0.20 0.25 
 
Gaussian filtering Scaling 
 
S1 S2 S1 S2 
 
0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 0 1 2 3 
0 0.57 0.26 0.10 0.07 0.65 0.23 0.07 0.05 0.65 0.21 0.09 0.05 0.72 0.18 0.06 0.04 
1 0.42 0.33 0.15 0.10 0.38 0.40 0.14 0.08 0.45 0.33 0.15 0.07 0.42 0.38 0.14 0.06 
2 0.36 0.29 0.21 0.14 0.26 0.35 0.26 0.13 0.33 0.31 0.24 0.12 0.27 0.36 0.25 0.12 
3 0.25 0.27 0.24 0.24 0.21 0.28 0.26 0.25 0.27 0.28 0.23 0.20 0.20 0.29 0.26 0.25 
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Figure II-38: Probability of correct detection, for (S1) – left and (S2) - right. 
 
 
Figure II-39: Mutual information, for (S1) – left and (S2) - right. 
These results prove that the mb_type is the single element able to satisfy the constraint of robustness 
over the three investigated syntax elements and that the Second scenario (the quantization parameter is 
fixed at 31) features better robustness performances. Thus, the rest of the study will concern only the 
mb_type elements and Second scenario (S2) conditions are kept. 
II.3.2.2.4. Sensitivity to content changing alterations  
This section investigates the sensitivity of mb_type syntax element to content changing alterations. In 
this study, the content changing alteration attack is performed by removing a person as illustrated in 
Figure II-35-a and Figure II-35-b. Just for illustration, such an attack can be performed by any non-
professional user on a home PC, with software available on Internet; it takes about 10 minutes to 
process 1 second of video. 
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First I frame of original video (a) First I frame of attacked video (b) Content alterations detection (c) 
Figure II-40: Content changing alterations. 
In order to spatially localize the content manipulations, an alteration detection image is generated. 
When the mb_type is detected as changed, the pixel value corresponding to it is set to red. The resulting 
detection image is illustrated in Figure II-36. To spatially locate alterations, positions reported as 
manipulated by the detection matrix are further projected onto the inspected image, see Figure II-36-c. 
It can be noticed the presence of false alarms and that the red block are denser in the altered area than 
other areas. To enhance the alteration detection and avoid the false alarms, the following filter is applied 
to the detection image: 
                                                                                               (44) 
where  is the alteration detection image,     presents neighborhood window filter size and   is the 
decision threshold.    and    present the line/column indexes in the filter window. Figure II-36 illustrates 
the evolution of the detection image as function of the decision threshold and Figure II-37 reports the 
obtained false alarm probability as a function of  . We note that from a given threshold (  = 3 in our 
case) false alarms disappear and the altered area is surrounded. We also notice that the optimization of 
the parameter   may be mandatory to improve the spatial accuracy of the alteration detection according 
to the targeted application. 
      for   = 0 (a)   for   = 1 (b)   for   = 2 (b)   for   = 3 (c) 
Figure II-41: Alteration detection matrix. 
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Figure II-42: False alarm as function of  . 
II.3.2.3. Conclusion 
This section investigates the MPEG-4 AVC syntax elements with respect to their potential usage as 
authentication signature robust to content preserving attacks and sensitive to content changing. After an 
a prior study, 3 syntax elements (mb_type, NNZ, and TO) are identified and tested by using information 
theory based entities. First, noise matrices,    and   demonstrate that mb_type is the optimal choice for 
content preserving attacks. Secondly, mb_type proved to be able to result into probability of false alarms 
equal to zero under content changing attacks. The next section will present a video integrity verification 
system whose inserted signature is based on mb_type syntax element. 
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II.3.3. Video integrity verification method  
This section details SPYART, the advanced video integrity verification system, further referred to as 
SPYART. The mb_type based signature is deployed jointly with the m-QIM watermarking technique (cf. 
Chapter II.1) to build the video integrity verification system.  
While the same insertion/detection rule as in the case of robust watermarking is basically kept the semi-
fragile watermarking application comes with particular constraints on (1) the mark semantics and (2) the 
data payload. 
First, from the semantic point of view, the mark no longer relates to the intellectual property rights 
information but to an authentication signature of the content itself. The low complexity requirement is 
met when such a signature is extracted and inserted directly from/in the MPEG-4 AVC syntax elements, 
with minimal decoding/reencoding operations.  
Secondly, from the data payload point of view, such an authentication signature results in about 4.5 kbits 
per minute (assuming SD corpus with frame size of 640x480). As such a data payload is 30 times larger 
than the one investigated in Chapter II.2 for robust watermarking purposes, the robustness and 
transparency investigation should be resumed accordingly. 
To meet this requirement, SPAYRT considers individual groups of i successive I frames (further referred 
to as I-Group) sampled from an MPEG-4 AVC video sequence, see Figure II-38. The mb_type based 
signature is computed from the first frame    in such an I-Group and further embedded into the rest of i-
1 frames by means of the m-QIM watermarking technique. The shorter the I-Group, the more accurate 
the temporal localization of the altered content. 
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Figure II-43: Semi-fragile watermarking system. 
II.3.3.1. Signature generation  
Signature generation is structured into three modules as shown in Figure II-39: feature extraction, binary 
mask generation and signature encoding. 
 
 
Figure II-44: Mark generation ࢃ ൌ ሼ࢝૚ǡ ࢝૛ǡ ǥ ǡ࢝࢑ሽ based on syntax element. 
 
 
 
 
 
w division in ݓଵ …  ݓ௞ 
Features extraction 
Binary mask generation 
Signature encoding 
Insertion of  ݓଵ in ܫଵ 
Insertion of ݓଶ in ܫଶ 
Insertion of  ݓ௜ିଵ in ܫ௜ିଵ ڭ ܫ଴ 
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PSEUDOCODE FOR THE SIGNTATURE GENERATION 
Begin video 
If the current frame is I then 
Begin frame 
Begin Macroblock 
- Decode_One_Macroblock () 
- Read_On_Macroblock () 
- Read_ipread_modes() 
- Assign one bit of signature according to the prediction mode. 
End Macroblock 
End frame 
 Else go to the next frame  
End video 
 
II.3.3.1.1. Feature extraction  
The mb_type syntax element has proven its relevance to generate an authentication signature conveying 
information about the content and allowing its authentication (cf. Chapter II.3.2.2).  
When encoding the I frames, the MPEG-4 AVC standard can consider two types of blocks, referred to us 
as mb_type: 16×16  pixel blocks for smoothed regions (corresponding to the 4 ways of achieving the 
I16MB prediction modes) and 4x4 pixel blocks for textured areas (corresponding to the 9 ways of 
achieving the I4MB prediction modes).   
In this study the mb_type syntax element will be considered as the feature generating the authentication 
signature. On the one hand, according to the MPEG-4 AVC coding principles, any alteration that changes 
the texture of the content will a priori change the prediction modes, thus allowing content integrity 
verification (related to the fragility property). On the other hand, there is a priori hint about the 
robustness of this signature against content preserving attacks. Hence, a statistical investigation on the 
behavior of the mb_type sythaxe element under different attacks was conducted and described in 
Chapter II.3.2.  
For each I-Group, the mb_type syntax element of the first I frame    will be extracted according to an 
MPEG-4 AVC syntax element parser (cf. Appendix A.4). 
II.3.3.1.2. Binary mask generation  
For the first frame from an I-Group (the    frame in Figure II-39), a binary mask is generated by assigning 
one bit for each macroblock        based on its extracted feature:                                 , 
where   and   represent positions of the   macroblock within the frame    and    is the generated 
binary mask. 
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II.3.3.1.3. Signature encoding  
In order to cope with the m-QIM (multi symbol Quantizing Index Modulation) principles, the BM binary 
mask should be encoded into an m-arry alphabet; as in the SPYART case   , the encoding alphabet is              . For real life watermarking applications, this encoding procedure should also ensure 
limited error propagation: hence, a fixed-length encoding is preferred instead of an optimal (minimal 
aǀeƌage leŶgthͿ oŶe. Note that aĐĐoƌdiŶg to the “haŶŶoŶ’s fiƌst theoƌeŵ, the optiŵal eŶĐodiŶg aǀeƌage 
length between a binary and an m-ary alphabet is      ; in our case,           . Hence, we 
considered an encoding scheme based on 3 bit overlapping blocks (with the overlap of 1 bit). The binary 
value of such a block gives information about the sign and the parity of the 5ary alphabet, Table II-15 and 
Figure II-40. 
Table II-15: Encoding table. 
000 001 010 011 110 101 100 111 
0 -1 -1 -2 1 1 2 2 
 
 
Figure II-45: Signature encoding. 
In order to illustrate this principle, consider the encoding of the 101001110 bit string. This bit string 
results into 4 overlapping groups of 3 bits: 101, 100, 011 and 110. Hence, it will be encoded as -1, -2, 2, -
1; notice that both 101 and 110 are encoded as -1. The decoding procedure is applied at two levels: first, 
the signs of the 5ary symbol alphabet are converted into the corresponding bits and then the parity 
information is considered to decode the remaining sequences. In order to illustrate the decoding, 
reconsider the example above; we have to decode the string -1, -2, 2, -1. First, we decode the bits placed 
at the odd position in the bit string, by considering the signs of the 5ary symbols: 1x1x0x1x (by x we 
denoted the bits unknown at this stage). Further on, the encoding dictionary in Table II-15 gives the 
following sequence: 110100111x. In order to decode the last bit, a new symbol should be received (this 
is achieved by always padding the useful information with two fixed bits). 
The encoding performance has been evaluated with respect to the binary encoding in terms of 
efficiency, according to the Shannon definition [SHA48]:          
where      is the ŵiŶiŵuŵ possiďle Đode leŶgth ;aĐĐoƌdiŶg to the “haŶŶoŶ’s fiƌst theoƌeŵͿ and    is the 
average code length. 
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In the binary case, the distribution probabilities of the symbols {0, 1} are {0.54, 0.46}, resulting an 
efficiency           . Concerning the 5-ary encoding, the distribution probability of the symbols {-2,-1, 
0, 1, 2} are {0.19, 0.21, 0.23, 0.19, 0.18}, resulting an efficiency           . Consequently, we notice 
that the binary and 5-ary encoding have quite the same efficiency (differences of 0.002 in favor of the 5-
ary code).  
 
II.3.3.2. Mark embedding  
For each I-Group, the signature generated from the first frame (   in Figure II-41) is shuffled (according to 
a private key) and divided into     sub-marks  . Each sub-mark is inserted into one of the    frames of 
that I-Group, Figure II-41. The insertion is performed within the 15 AC coefficients of 4x4 blocks of I 
frame by m-QIM techniques (cf. Chapter II.1 and Chapter II.2). 
 
Figure II-46: Mark embedding. 
II.3.3.3. Mark detection and integrity verification  
Consider now the watermarked and potentially corrupted video sequence, see Figure II-42.  
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Figure II-47: Integrity verification. 
This sequence is first re-encoding with the original encoder parameters and then divided into I-Groups. 
The ݓෝ௞ sub-marks are individually extracted according to the m-QIM principles from each ܫ௞ǡ ݇ ൌͳǡǥ ǡ ݅ െ ͳ frames; be there ݓෝ  the vector obtained by concatenating these extracted sub-marks.  
In parallel, the signature corresponding to the first ܫ଴ frame is extracted and the corresponding would-be 
mark ݓ௔ is computing. 
As ݓෝ  conveys information about the original I-Group features and ݓ௔ about its attacked replica, by 
comparing these two watermarks, a decision concerning the integrity of the video content can be made. 
SPYART considers that an area in a frame was modified when at least 50% of the ݓෝ  elements extracted 
from that area do not match the corresponding ݓෝ௔ elements, see Figure II-43. Consequently, SPYART has 
a temporal precision given by the duration of the I-Group and a spatial accuracy given by the size of the 
area on which the alteration is investigated. 
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Figure II-48: Spatial alterations detection. 
From the result interpretation point of view, feed-back provided by professional under the framework of 
the SPY project brought to light that when an I-Group is maliciously altered, it is very likely to have other 
successive blocks altered. Consequently, the decision according to equation (II-20) is followed by a post-
processing rule of the type: one I-Group is considered as altered if at least two I-Groups that succeed it or 
precede it are detected as altered.  
II.3.4. Functional evaluation  
The experiments investigate the robustness, fragility and transparency properties, for a prescribed data 
payload value, set by the size of the authentication signature (i.e. 4.5 kbits per min in the case of the 
tested SPY corpus).  
First, under the semi-fragile watermarking framework, transcoding and additive noise are the most 
harmless authorized attacks. Consequently, Chapter II.3.4.1 investigates the BER after these attacks, for 
prescribed transparency (average PSNR = 32 dB). 
Secondly, the fragility is investigated in Chapter II.3.4.2 by computing the Precision and Recall rates when 
identifying the content altered blocks at fixed robustness (maximal BER of 0.1± 0.03 after transcoding). 
The same transparency constraint is kept (average PSNR = 32 dB). 
Finally, the transparency is assessed in Chapter II.3.4.3 for prescribed robustness/fragility limits (maximal 
BER of 0.1± 0.03 and minimal Precision and Recall of 0.9). 
Note that current day video surveillance cameras are mainly IP-based and generate SD content; hence 
our study considers only an SD corpus. The experiments were carried out on a video surveillance corpus 
composed of 8 sequences of 10 minutes each, downloaded from internet [WEB01] or recorded under 
the framework of the SPY project. Their content is heterogeneous, combining city streets, highways, 
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iŶdustƌial oďjeĐtiǀes, shoppiŶg ĐeŶteƌs, … This Đoƌpus is eŶĐoded iŶ MPEG-4 AVC in Baseline Profile (no B 
frames, CAVLC entropy encoder) at 512 kbps, 640x480 pixel frames; the GOP size is set to 8. 
Four   values and three quantization steps   are compared all through the study, namely             
and             . Each and every time,         , see the discussion in Chapter II.1.3.3. 
II.3.4.1. Robustness  
This section investigates the robustness of the semi-fragile watermarking method based on m-QIM 
against transcoding (down to 25% from the original stream bit rate) and bipolar noise addition, for a data 
payload of 4.5 kbits per minutes. The average transparency is set to PSNR = 32 dB. Figure II-44 illustrates 
the BER as a function of , when           ,      and          . 
 
 
Figure II-49: BER as a function of  for     . 
The BER values reported in Figure II-44 prove the robustness of the semi-fragile method against the 
investigated attacks: average BER of 0.08 and 0 against transcoding and additive noise are obtained, 
respectively. It can also be noticed that the BER is quite constant with respect to  , its variance being 
lower than 4 10-4. These numerical values are statistical relevant, in the sense that the 95% confidence 
intervals [WAL02] computed for the BER after the transcoding resulted in relative errors lower than 
5 10-3 (the BER in the bipolar noise addition was constantly equal to 0; hence, no confidence interval 
has been computed). 
The experiments are resumed so as to investigate the robustness behavior as a function of  . This time,     and          , see Table II-16 and Figure II-45. 
When keeping the same transparency constraints,      results in relative decreases of the BER by a 
factor of 0.14, while      results in a relative increase of the BER by a factor of 1.28; these relative 
gains are computed by (41). Table II-16 demonstrates that, at least from the robustness point of view, a 
value      is no longer of practical relevance. Note that these results confirm the theoretical ground 
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as well as the behaviour which was experimentally identified in Chapter II.2.2.2: the larger the   value, 
the better the robustness. 
 
 
Figure II-50: Robustness as function of  ,   . 
Table II-16: Robustness behavior as function of  ,   .         90 
Transcoding (BER) 0.16 0.07 0.06 
Relative gain (   1.28 0 -0.14 
II.3.4.2. Fragility evaluation 
The video content is considered as being altered when one object is removed, inserted or substituted. To 
simulate this attack, we wrote a piece of code that tampers the marked video by arbitrarily changing 
1/81 areas of the frame.  
From the fragility point of view, an ideal watermarking method should fail in detecting the mark from 
each and every area which was subject to content alterations, thus detecting the altered area. While 
such a behavior can be also expressed in terms of probability of missed detection and false alarm, the 
literature brings to light two more detailed measures, namely the Precision and the Recall ratios, defined 
as follows [BUC94].                     ,                    
where    is the number of true positive (i.e. the number of content modified areas which do not allow 
the mark to be recovered),    is the false positive (i.e. the number of content preserved areas which do 
not allow the mark to be recovered) and    is the false negative number (i.e. the number of content 
modified areas which allow the mark to be detected).  
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Figure II-46 illustrates the obtained Precision and Recall values as a function of m, for     . 
 
Figure II-51: Precision and Recall as a function of  (    ). 
Figure II-46 shows average values for Precision and Recall of 0.92 and 0.95, respectively. The Precision 
and Recall value are quite constant with respect to  , the relative variances being of of 6 10-5 and 
9 10-5, respectively. 
The above fragility experiments are resumed for      and     ; this time    , see Table II-17 
and Figure II-47. With respect to the case     ,      results in a quite constant Precision and Recall 
values. However,      results in important relative decrease by a factor of 0.4 and 0.29, respectively. 
The relative gains are computed according to (41). Hence, the fragility property also refutes the      
value (see Chapter II.3.4.1). 
 
Figure II-52: Fragility as function of  ,   . 
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Table II-17: Fragility behavior as function of  ,   . 
 Precision Recall         90 50 70 90 
Value 0.55 0.92 0.9 0.68 0.97 0.95 
Relative gain (   -0.4 0 -0.02 -0.29 0 -0.02 
II.3.4.3. Transparency  
The transparency of the semi-fragile watermarking method is assessed considering the same three types 
of metrics as in Chapter II.2.2.3.  
Here again, the data-payload is set at 4.5 kbits per min. The robustness expressed by a BER = 0.1±0.03 
against transcoding while the fragility is kept at Precision and Recall rates larger than 0.9. The same four   value are investigated, namely    {2, 3, 5, 7}. 
The experimental results are reported in Figures II-48 to Figure II-50
4
. These numeric values meet the 
a priori expectancies: the transparency increases with  . This behavior is assessed by computing the   
coefficient defined by (II-42), see Table II-18.  
 
PSNR (dB) AAD (x10
-3
) 
  
Figure II-53: PSNR and AAD as a function of  (    ): average values and 95% confidence limits. 
                                                          
 
4 In order to allow a synoptic comparison with robust watermarking, the same axe ranges as in Figures II-31 to II-33 are kept. 
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SC NCC 
  
Figure II-54: SC and NCC as a function of  (    ): average values and 95% confidence limits. 
DVQ 
 
Figure II-55: DVQ as a function of  (     ): average values and 95% confidence limits. 
Table II-18: Variation of the quality metric with respect to ,     . 
 PSNR AAD SC NCC DVQ   0.1 -0.5 0.01 0.06 -0.23 
The transparency investigation is resumed in Table II-19 for      and    . Note that 
Chapter II.3.4.1 and Chapter II.3.4.2 demonstrate that      is unable to meet the robustness/fragility 
requirements. With respect to the case     ,      results in a significantly depreciated 
transparency see Table II-19 where the relative gains, computed according to (II-41), are reported. 
Consequently,      is no longer of practical relevance. 
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Table II-19: Quality metric behavior as function of  ,   . 
 PSNR AAD SC NCC DVQ      42 1.42 0.98 0.97 0.07      35 2.41 0.96 0.95 0.10 
Relative gain (   -0.15 0.7 -0.02 -0.02 -0.42 
II.3.4.4. Computational cost 
The execution time required by each operation included in the watermarking chain is evaluated on the 
following configuration: a PC with the following configuration: a Core4 CPU at 2.8 GHz and with 12 GB of 
RAM and a 500 GB HDD. 
The values reported in this section are obtained on a corpus 80 min of video (SPY corpus Appendix B). 
Figures II-51 and II-52 illustrate the allocation time and the time consuming during the embedding 
process for one second of video. It is noticed that the inner watermarking operations (selection, 
signature generation, and insertion) consume 0.078 s, 0.004 s and 0.009 s respectively for one second of 
video which present 5.58%, 0.29% and 0.64% respectively of the total embedding processing time. 
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Figure II-56: Sharing time for the embedding process for one second of video. 
 
Figure II-57: Time consuming (in seconds) during the mark embedding for one second of video. 
Figures II-53 and II-54 illustrate the allocation time and the time consuming during the mark detection 
process for one second of video. It is noticed that the signature generation and the detection consume 
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0.004s and 0.01s respectively for one second of video which presents 0.70 % and 1.74% respectively of 
the total embedding processing time. 
 
Figure II-58: Sharing time for the detection process for one second of video. 
 
Figure II-59: Time consuming (in seconds) during the mark detection for one second of video. 
The complexity analysis of the method shows that it is compatible with the real time (although its 
current implementation it is not): x The operations intrinsically related to the mark generation, selection, insertion and detection are 
less complex (and, implicitly, faster) than the stream read/write and the MPEG-4 AVC entropic 
encoding/decoding; for instance, in the current implementation, for protecting 1s of video, the 
signature generation, selection, insertion and detection sums up to 0.105 s while the entropic 
decoding/encoding and the stream read/write operations reach 1.061s and 0.808s, respectively. x The operations intrinsically related to the mark generation, selection, insertion and detection are 
also much faster than the entropic decoding/encoding and the video stream read/write from the 
hard disk. When considering the same example as above (protecting 1s of video), the entropic 
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decoding/encoding and the read/write operations are about 10 and 8 times slower than the 
mark selection/insertion/detection, respectively.  The signature generation does not increase the complexity of the watermarking algorithm, for 
one second of video; it consumes 0.004 s and presents 0.29% and 0.70% of the time embedding 
and detection processing, respectively.  
II.3.5. Conclusion 
This chapter advances SPAYART, a novel video integrity verification system for MPEG-4 AVC. The 
advanced system makes an accurate usage of Intra modes which are extracted directly from the 
compressed stream to generate the authentication signature. This signature is further embedded by an 
m-QIM technique.  
The new method was evaluated under the framework of a videosurveillance application; the results 
exhibit fragility to content replacement (with an 1/81 frame and 3s spatial and temporal accuracy, 
respectively) and robustness against transcoding (MPEG-4 AVC compression by a factor of 4). As both the 
signature extraction and mark embedding take place at the MPEG-4 AVC syntax element level, the 
method also features low complexity.  
In order to also allow an overall comparison between our m-QIM framework and state of the art binary 
QIM approaches, we resumed the experiment for the method in [GOL07]. The robustness experiments 
(cf. Chapter II.3.4.1) brought to light average BER values of 0 and 0.25, after the additive noise and 
transcoding attacks, respectively. As the latter BER value, computed with a 95% relative error of 0.011 is 
that high, we can state that the method in [GOL07] does not meet our targeted semi-fragile 
watermarking requirements. Consequently, the fragility (cf. Chapter II.3.4.2) and transparency (cf. 
Chapter II.3.4.3) were not performed for the method in [GOL07]. 
To conclude with, the usefulness of the m-QIM technique for semi-fragile MPEG-4 AVC video 
watermarking was demosntrated. Such an application requires a data payload 30 times larger than in the 
robust watermarking case. It was experimentally demonstrated that the robustness and fragility 
property be properly achieved while having as main benefit an increase of the transparency by a factor 
of 0.1 in PSNR, 0.06 in NCC and 0.23 in DVQ. However, this application is more restrictive than the robust 
watermarking with respect to interval to which the   value belongs. 
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II.4. Conclusion  
The study presented in Part II generalizes the QIM watermarking techniques from binary to the m-ary 
case. From the theoretical point of view, the insertion/detection rules are paired derived so as to 
minimize the probability of error under white Gaussian noise attacks.  
While the m-QIM can be potentially applied to any insertion domain, our experimental study considers 
the quantized residual coefficients of the MPEG-4 AVC stream, and investigates the possibility of 
designing both robust and semi-fragile applications. 
First, the robust watermarking investigation is carried out on 1 hour of video content encoded at two 
resolutions (SD and HD). It is thus demonstrated that:  while keeping fixed robustness and transparency, the data payload is increased by a factor of 
log2m;  while imposing fixed transparency and data payload, the robustness is quite constant with 
respect to ;  while setting a prescribed data robustness and data payload, an average relative increase by a 
factor of 0.1 and 0.01 of PSNR and an average relative decrease by a factor of 0.23 and 0.16 of 
DVQ are achieved in the SD case and HD case. 
Such results are brought to light for     {2, 3, 5, 7} and for a quite broad interval of   values, ranging 
from 50 to 90. 
Secondly, a syntax element based authentication signature is identified by making an accurate usage of 
Intra prediction modes. The obtained signature and the m-QIM framework are jointly used to design the 
SPYART integrity verification system.  
SPYART was evaluated under the framework of a videosurveillance application; the results exhibit 
fragility to content replacement (with an 1/81 frame and 3s spatial and temporal accuracy, respectively) 
and robustness against transcoding (MPEG-4 AVC compression by a factor of 2). As both the signature 
extraction and mark embedding take place at the MPEG-4 AVC syntax element level, the method also 
features low complexity.  
According to the integrity verification context, the experiments consider a strong data payload constraint 
(4.5 kbits per min) imposed by the signature size. It is demonstrated that:   while imposing a prescribed transparency, the robustness and the fragility are quite constant 
with respect to ;  while keeping fixed robustness/fragility constraints, the transparency is increased by 0.1 in PSNR, 
0.06 in NCC and 0.23 in DVQ. 
These results are obtained at the expense of restricting the   parameter to a quite narrow interval 
centered on 70. 
Note that the MPEG-4 AVC watermarking by means of m-QIM technique avoids complex operations by 
requiring just binary MPEG-4 AVC encoding/decoding and m-QIM quantization operations. The mark 
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generation, selection, insertion and detection for one second of video are 10 times and 8 times faster 
than the MPEG-4 AVC entropic encoding/decoding and the stream read/write operations, respectively. 
Note that, although not discussed before, the impact of the inserted signature on the file size has also 
been evaluated as a function of the alphabet size and the quantization step.  
Table II-20 illustrates the obtained average relative differences between the watermarked video and the 
original video sizes corresponding to the SPY corpus. Four alphabet sizes namely    ,    ,     and     and three quantization steps namely     ,      and      have been considered;          . The 
results reported in Table II-20 are computed according to:                                                               
The analysis demonstrates that:    for a fixed quantization step, the larger the   value, the less file size impact; hence, in this 
respect,    is the worst case as it induces the largest increase in the file size;  for a fixed value , the larger the   value, the larger the impact on the file size.  
However, in all investigated cases, this variation is insignificant: its relative values are of 10
-4
. 
Table II- 20 : Impact of the inserted signature on the size of the original video. 
 2 3 5 7      6.2 10-4 4.8 10-4 4.1 10-4 3.5 10-4      7.6 10-4 5.8 10-4 5.5 10-4 4.9 10-4      8.9 10-4 8.1 10-4 7.3 10-4 6.5 10-4 
 
These overall results demonstrate that the m-QIM watermarking technique outperforms the state-of-the 
art studies presented in Chapters I.2.1 and I.2.2. Hence, we can state that m-QIM technique is an unitary 
theoretical framework jointly reaching functional equilibrium for both robust and semi-fragile 
watermarking applications. 
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Abstract 
Our study aims at avoiding the intra-frame (spatial) drift effect for MPEG-4 AVC watermarking. First, by 
considering the analytic expressions of the MPEG-4 AVC encoding operations, it algebraically models the 
drift distortion spread as an optimization problem. Second, it solves this problem under drift-free 
constraints. Finally, the advanced solution is adapted to take into account the watermarking restrictions. 
The experiments consider an m-QIM semi-fragile watermarking method. 
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III.1. Problem statement  
Intra-frame (spatial) drift is a major concern for all types of MPEG-4 AVC compressed-domain video 
processing applications: due to the MPEG-4 AVC intra prediction paradigm, the modification of one block 
generally results in the alteration of the neighboring blocks. Moreover, such an effect can be propagated 
several times (according to the visual content, encoding configuration, etc), in an uncontrolled way. This 
drift effect is of particular importance in watermarking applications, where it can depreciate the 
performances of all the three watermarking properties: data payload, transparency and robustness. 
In this context, several research works have been proposed in order to avoid intra drift distortion in 
MPEG-4 AVC watermarking. 
Ma et al. [MA09] suggested the use of DCT coefficients for embedding the mark and compensated the 
intra frame distortion by adjusting the DCT coefficients already altered by the drift mechanism. The 
experimental results show that the advanced scheme can ameliorate the visual quality of the 
watermarked video. However, the intra frame drift distortion compensation requires additional 
computational operations to be integrated to the mark embedding process. 
In their subsequent study [MA10], Ma et al. employed the directions of intra prediction modes to define 
a block set able to avert the drift distortion. The method exploits several paired-coefficients of 4X4 DCT 
residual block to embed the mark. The experimental results show that the proposed method enhances 
the visual quality compared to methods that have not considered the intra-frame distortion drift. 
Nerveless, intra prediction mode direction based selection may reduce the number of the watermarking 
candidate blocks and consequently the watermarking data-payload. 
A controllable error-drift compensation scheme is advanced by Huo, Zhu and Chen [HUO11]. In order to 
reduce the compensation computational complexity, the advanced scheme considers that the error 
propagation is caused by different DCT coefficients but only some of them need to be compensated. 
Achieved results demonstrated that the advanced scheme reduce the compensation cost while keeping 
the same performances in terms of data-payload and transparency compared to the method proposed 
by Gong and Lu [GON08], where only the DC coefficients are involved. 
A compensation method proposed by Zhang et al. [ZHA10] eliminates the intra frame drift distortion by 
considering the difference between the original and watermarked reconstructed samples and further 
compensate it over all the DCT coefficients. The experimental results show that the proposed scheme 
achieves a PSNR (Peak Signal to Noise Ratio) average of 38 dB with little increase in the bit rate. However 
the compensation procedure increases the computational complexity of the watermarking algorithm. 
To conclude with, in order to avoid the drift drawbacks, two classes of solutions are currently considered 
in the literature, see Figure III-1: compensation and selection-based. The former consists in inserting the 
mark in the compressed domain, estimating the sub-sequent drift distortions and in compensating them 
by decoding/re-encoding operations. This way, the side effects can be completely avoided at the 
expense of increasing the computational complexity and of modifying the compressed stream 
parameters (hence, of implicitly adding some involuntary attacks). The latter consists in restricting the 
insertion domain: only the blocks which are not involved in the prediction process can be considered for 
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the mark insertion. This way, no drift effects occur, the computational complexity is kept constant but 
the data payload is drastically reduced; moreover, the security of the system is also implicitly reduced, 
making it easier for a brute force attack to be performed. 
 
Compensation-based [MA09], [HU11], [GON08] and [ZHA10] 
 xCompensate the drift 
distortions by 
decoding/re-encoding 
operations. xIncrease the 
computational cost.
Selection-based [MA10] 
 
 
x Restricts the insertion 
domain. xReduces the data 
payload and the 
security features 
Drift-free watermarking advanced solution 
 
x Free-drift based 
watermarking x Keep s the same data 
payload and 
computational cost 
Figure III-1: Drift distortion avoiding solutions. 
In order to achieve drift-free watermarking insertion, while keeping the same data payload, robustness, 
computational complexity, and security constraints, the solution presented in this chapter follows a 
different approach, see Figure III-1. It algebraically models the drift behavior and allows the insertion 
procedure to be customized so as to get rid of this undesired effect.  
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III.2. Theoretical contribution: Algebraic-based drift 
cancelation  
When trying to avoid the drift distortions for MPEG-4 AVC watermarking, a two-folded difficulty is 
encountered. On the one hand, the mark is inserted in the compressed domain; in this respect, several 
studies demonstrated that the quantized DCT-transformed prediction residuals ensure an optimal trade-
off among the watermarking functional properties. On the other hand, the prediction modes are 
established and the prediction itself is performed in the pixel domain. Hence, the dual compressed-
uncompressed representations should be considered when eliminating the drift undesired effects. 
In order to avoid any decoding – reencoding operation for each watermarked block and for all of its 
neighbors, our study starts by investigating the analytic expressions of the MPEG-4 AVC encoding 
operations. This will led to algebraically formulate the drift problem and subsequently solve it under the 
drift-free constraints. 
III.2.1. Algebraic models for intra-frame prediction 
I frames are encoded according to Intra prediction modes which exploit the spatial redundancy to 
enhance the compression efficiency. The MPEG-4 AVC standard features 13 prediction modes; despite 
their peculiarities, all of them act in the pixel domain and compute the predicted blocks based only on 
the most right column and bottom row of the reference blocks. 
For each current block, the prediction mode minimizing the rate-distortion cost is selected and the 
predicted block is constructed from the boundary pixels of the neighboring blocks which are previously 
encoded. 
Figure III-2 illustrates the intra prediction process for 4x4 block. For more details, we can refer to 
Appendix A. 
 
Figure III-2: Intra-frame prediction process. 
As illustrated in Figure III-2, the predicted samples (from   to  ) of the current block are computed from 
the adjacent samples (from   to  ) of the neighboring blocks using a prediction formula   according to a 
selected prediction mode.  
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The residual block computing the difference between the current block and the predicted block is further 
transformed by using a DCT and a quantizer. Each quantized transformed residual block is further 
mapped into a 16 coefficients vector by a zig-zag scanning and encoded using an entropic encoding. 
III.2.2. Intra frame drift elimination 
Since the watermarking takes place in the MPEG-4 AVC compressed domain, the distortion is induced in 
the     residual block of quantized coefficients. We suppose that a distortion vector   is induced into 
a given quantized transformed residual block   . As any distortion can be modeled by additive operation, 
the altered block     is obtained according to (III-1):          (III-1) 
At the decoder side, after applying the inverse    , the altered quantized residual block    is obtained 
according to (III-2):               (III-2) 
where      is the MPEG-4 AVC inverse    transformation. 
The linearity of the      function leads to:        (III-3) 
where   is the residual block and  presents the pixel domain mark. 
The predicted block   is computed according Chapter III.2.1 and added to the watermarked residual 
block to obtain the watermarked pixel domain block   :                (III-4)   and  can be expressed in matrix from according to (III-5): 
                                                    ,   
                                                  (III-5) 
Figure III-3 illustrates the intra frame drift distortions principal. The drift distortion occurs when a given 
altered pixel block is further used to compute the prediction block for some neighboring blocks and 
subsequently propagates the distortion to these blocks.  
For a given current block     , the set of the neighboring blocks that may be use this block in the 
prediction are defined as following (see Figure III-3):   The right-block (      ): the block on the right of the current block; 
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 The under-block (      ): the block under the current block;  The under-left-block (        ): the block on the left of the under-block;  The under-right-block (        ): the block on the right of the under-block. 
For instance, given an altered block      (see Figure III-3), its most-right column samples that are marked 
in red in Figure III-3 may be used to predict the        and           block samples and its bottom line 
samples that are marked in green in Figure III-3 may be used to predict the         ,        and          
block samples, according to the MPEG-4 AVC intra-frame prediction principle (see Figure III-1). Like this, 
the distortion will spread to affect other neighboring blocks, see Figure III-4. 
 
Figure III-3: Intra-frame drift principle. 
In this sense, drift based distortion spread takes place once the pixel sample values at the bottom line 
and the most right column of the altered block are deviated from their original pixel values. 
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Figure III-4: Drift distorsion propagation. 
MPEG-4 AVC has 13 predictions modes: 9      intra prediction modes devoted for textured areas and 
4        prediction modes devoted for smoothed areas. Despite their peculiarities, all these 
predictions modes act only on the same specific samples of the pixel domain. 
Consequently, to prevent drift distortion, the bottom line and most-right column pixel values of the 
altered block should not be modified. Hence, we shall achieve drift-free insertion by constraining the 
insertion procedure to not change the most right column and bottom row of the host block in the pixel 
domain.  
Consequently, the block distortion system considering the drift-free condition in the compressed domain 
can be formulated according to (III-6): 
   
                                                          (III-6) 
For all  belonging to the pixel domain solutions space (denoted by   ) of the system described by the 
equation (III-6),  may be expressed as matrix multiplication (III-7): 
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                                       (III-7) 
As the distortion is performed in the compressed domain, in order to avoid any increase of the 
computational complexity, the compressed domain solution space (denote by further   ) should be 
defined.  
Equations (III-6) and (III-7) imply:                        (III-8) 
Knowing that     transformation is defined as:                                 can be expressed: 
                                                                                                                                                    
Therefore, the compressed domain solution space    can be defined according to (III-9): 
                                                             (III-9) 
In other words, in order to prevent the drift problem, the distortion induced in the compressed domain 
at the     block should be before and after multiplied by the Drift-free shaped mask       before 
being induced to the host quantized transformed residual block. 
The MPEG-4 AVC standard way of computing the integer    transformation is given by (III-10):                (III-10) 
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                           ,     
                                                                      
Where:    is an original 4x4 matrix, while   is the transform matrix,      is the matrix product,      is the element-wise product (Hadamard product). 
Thus, the numerical expression of the   can be obtained: 
                                                                                                      (III-11) 
By combining (III-9) and (III-11), the compressed domain space solutions    can be expressed, (III-12): 
                                                                                                                             (III-12) 
This generic solution to avoid the intra-frame drift distortion will be considered in the following section 
and adapted to take into account the restrictions required by watermarking embedding methods for 
MPEG-4 AVC compressed domain. 
III.2.3. Drift-free for watermarking 
Commonly, in order to enhance the transparency feature of the watermarked MPEG-4 AVC videos, mark 
embedding procedure takes into account tow main restrictions. The first restriction is related to the 
human visual perception and is considered by the deployment of a perceptual mask. The second 
restriction is set by the DCT transformation properties and is considered by not involving the DC 
coefficient in the watermarking. 
III.2.3.1.  Perceptual masking  
Watermarking techniques deploy a perceptual mask based on the human visual perception model to 
enhance the transparency of the watermarked MPEG-4 AVC videos. Beside the human visual perception 
model, the exploited mask does not take into account the drift distortion problem. Our purpose is to 
adapt the advanced Drift-free shaped mask (cf. Chapter III.2.2) to consider the human perceptual model. 
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The perceptual mask    (III-13) was obtained by first sub-sampling the Noorkami [NOO05] matrix and 
further adapted to take into consideration the amendments introduced in MPEG-4 AVC integer    
transformation. 
                                                                                 (III-13) 
A value in the   matrix represents the visibility threshold, i.e. the maximal value of a distortion added 
on a pixel (classical)    coefficient which is still transparent (imperceptible) for a human observer. 
The embedded mark   is computed according to (III-14):            (III-14) 
where  is a scalar value and      is the norm of  . 
As 
      is a scalar and   is belonging to    , the multiplication of  by   belongs to   . 
Like this, the new perceptual     mask avoiding the drift distortion can be obtained (III-15): 
                                                                                                 (III-15) 
III.2.3.2. DC coefficient  
In the compressed domain watermarking embedding case, another constraint should be taken into 
account. In fact, only the 15 AC coefficients are commonly involved in the mark embedding. 
Consequently, the induced mark may be modeled as follow:  
                                                                                          
While applying the      to the inserted mark , we obtain: 
                                                                                                         
Here, we note that the obtained mark no longer belongs to the pixel domain solutions space   , as its 
resulting pixel samples of the most right column and the bottom row are not null.  
In order to handle this additional constraint a new equations system is formulated (III-16):  
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                        (III-16) 
 
The setting of        to zero can be achieved if the sum of the      pixel domain samples is equal to 
zero. This condition can be met by computing an adapted drift free perceptual mask      according to 
(III-17): 
                                         (III-17) 
where:  
                                                                           
where                      and: 
                                    and     
                                                                               
We obtain: 
                                                                (III-18) 
 
When applying the    to    , we obtain: 
                                                                                        (III-19) 
 
Equations (III-18) and (III-19) show that the adapted mask      can meet the condition imposed by the 
system (III-16). Like this,       adapts the drift-free shaping mask to consider the human visual 
perception model and the non-involvement of the   coefficient during the mark embedding. 
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III.3. Case study: Drift-free m-QIM semi-fragile 
watermarking   
In this chapter, the m-QIM (multiple-symbols Quantizing Index Modulation) insertion method (cf. 
chapter II.2) is adapted by considering advanced perceptual drift-free solution. The experiments are first 
devoted to the evaluation of the impact of the new masking model in the m-QIM watermarking 
transparency. Then, the performances of the advanced drift-free solution will be compared to the 
selection based method proposed in [MA10] which features the same complexity level as our advanced 
solution compared to the other state of the art method. 
III.3.1. Advanced method  
The m-QIM method inserts the mark in the AC quantized residual coefficients of intra frame     luma 
blocks, hence the host vector stands for 15 component vector obtained by the zig-zag scanning such a 
block. The embedding process combines multi symbol quantization indexing and perceptual drift-free 
shaping: 
The watermark is not directly embedded into the original signal   but into the projection    of   onto 
the perceptual drift-free mask    . 
Figure III-5 illustrates the flowchart of the embedding watermarking method. 
For each supposed marked block  , the detector starts by projecting the vector obtained by zig-zag 
scanning the 15 AC coefficients of     I frame blocks onto the perceptual drift-free mask    . Then, 
the resulting scalar is used to compute a detection variable . 
The corresponding detection is given by locating the decision interval in which belongs the detection 
variable , as expressed in (III-20): 
   
                                                                                 (III-20) 
where   is the received block,  presents the alphabet size and    is the detected symbol. 
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Figure III-5: The embedding synopsis: three inputs (the message  , the host block   and the key  ) and four 
parameters (the perceptual drift-free mask    , the quantization step   and the alphabet size ) are considered  
III.3.2. Experimental evaluations 
III.3.2.1. Corpus  
The experiments were carried out on a video corpus composed of 8 sequences of about 10 minutes 
each, downloaded from internet [WEB01] or recorded under the framework of the SPY project, cf 
Appendix B. Their content is heterogeneous, combining city streets, highways, industrial objectives, 
shopping centers, ect. 
This corpus is encoded in MPEG-4 AVC in Baseline Profile (no B frames, CAVLC entropy encoder) at 512 
kbps, 640x480 pixel frames; the GOP size is set to 8. 
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III.3.2.2. Performances evaluation  
The watermarking method presented in Chapter III.3.1 was applied by considering two perceptual 
masks: (1) the perceptual mask    expressed by (III-13) and (2) the perceptual mask considering the 
intra-frame drift     expressed by (III-20). The experiment was devoted to the evaluation of the impact 
of the new masking model in the watermarking transparency. In this respect, a fixed data payload (100 
bit/s), robustness (BER < 0.1 against transcoding at 50% in stream size) and fragility (frame modification 
detection with accuracies of 1/81 from the frame size and 3s) are imposed.  
The corresponding transparency was evaluated according to three types of metrics (cf. Chapter I.1)  
Figure III-6 to Figure III-12 reports the results for PSNR, AAD, IF, SC, NCC, and DVQ, respectively for the 
two masks: (1) the perceptual mask and (2) the perceptual drift-free mask. The analysis of these plots 
shows a gain in the transparency feature when the perceptual drift-free mask is deployed. This gain is 
expressed by average gains of 2 dB in PSNR, of 0.4 in AAD, of 0.002 in IF, of 0.03 in SC, of 0.017 NCC and 
22 in DVQ. 
We note that the m-QIM parameters are fixed at   ,        and     . 
 
Figure III-6: PSNR results: (1) perceptual mask is used and (2) the perceptual drift-free mask is used. 
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Figure III-7: AAD results: (1) perceptual mask is used and (2) the perceptual drift-free mask is used. 
 
Figure III-8: IF results: (1) perceptual mask is used and (2) the perceptual drift-free mask is used. 
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Figure III-9: SC results: (1) perceptual mask is used and (2) the perceptual drift-free mask is used. 
 
Figure III-10: NCC results: (1) perceptual mask is used and (2) the perceptual drift-free mask is used. 
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Figure III-11: DVQ results: (1) perceptual mask is used and (2) the perceptual drift-free mask is used. 
 
In order to evaluate the performances of the advanced drift-free shaping solution, we also implemented 
a selection-based state of the art method, featuring the same level of complexity as our method, namely 
[MA10]. According to [MA10], only blocks with specific characteristics are selected to embed the mark. 
Therefore, the current selected block for watermarking in [MA10] must meet three conditions as 
illustrated in Figure III-12: 
1) The right-block prediction mode belongs to             or to           (cf. Appendix A). 
2) The under-left-block prediction mode belongs to                     or to                 and 
the under-block prediction mode belongs to           or to          . 
3) The under-right-block prediction mode belongs to                   or to                . 
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Figure III-12: Drift prevention conditions in [MA10]. 
Table III-1 compares the performances of the proposed perceptual drift-free shaping solution in terms of 
transparency and robustness/fragility with those of the selective based method in [MA10] and with 
those obtained in the case where the drift-free is not considered.  
Table III-1: Performances evaluation. 
 Transparency Robustness Fragility 
Method PSNR DVQ SC Transcoding (50%) Additive noise Recall Precision 
Perceptual shaping 41.7 1.44 0.97 7% 0% 0.91 0.92 
Drift-free shaping 44 1.26 0.99 8% 0% 0.89 0.91 
Selective [MA10] 46 1.05 0.99 40% 0% 0.07 0.05 
 
The analysis of the results reported in Table III-1 shows that the proposed drift-free shaping based 
method features better performances in terms of reaching the functional balance between 
transparency, robustness and fragility. Also, it is noticed that the selective based method features better 
transparency results while remaining fragile against transcoding attack and unable to detect content 
changing alterations. This weakness in terms of robustness/fragility performances of the selective based 
method [MA10] can be explained by the reducing of the insertion space. In fact, the drift avoiding 
selection step leaves few blocks potentially suitable for conveying the mark.  
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III.5. Conclusion  
The present study deals with drift-free semi-fragile watermarking. First, by considering the analytic 
expressions of the MPEG-4 AVC encoding operations, it algebraically models the drift distortion problem. 
Second, it solves this problem under drift-free constraints. This way, the    = [0 -0.24 1.18 2.36; -0.24 -
0.12 1.15 1.67; 1.18 1.15 3.10 4.47; 2.36 1.67 4.47 7.46] matrix which should multiply the mark prior to 
its insertion is computed.  
The experiments consider an m-QIM semi-fragile watermarking method and a video surveillance corpus 
of 120 minutes. For prescribed data payload (100 bit/s), robustness (BER < 0.1 against transcoding at 
50% in stream size), fragility (frame modification detection with accuracies of 1/81 from the frame size 
and 3s) and complexity constraints, the modified insertion results in gains in transparency of 2 dB in 
PSNR, of 0.01 in IF and NCC and 22 in DVQ. 
Note that the     matrix is independent with respect to the video content and/or encoding; hence, its 
use does not represent an additional attack and does not increase the computational complexity.  
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IV.1. Conclusion  
In this thesis, the issues related to watermark-based ownership protection and watermark-based video 
integrity verification in the field of MPEG-4 AVC compressed stream have been investigated. 
Despite preliminary results published in the literature inserting some extra information into a 
compressed stream remains a challenging research topic, mainly because of its underlying conceptual 
contradiction. On the one hand, the compression goal is to eliminate the redundancy from the visual 
content. On the other hand, the watermarking exploits the visual redundancy to hide the mark.  
Our study aims at (1) enhancing the performances of compressed domain robust watermarking for 
MPEG-4 AVC video stream and (2) designing a compressed stream watermark-based video 
authentication for video surveillance application.  
The present thesis tackles this challenges by providing the following main results (see Figure IV-1):  By advancing the m-QIM theoretical framework, this thesis extends the QIM watermark principle 
beyond the binary case. In this respect, the research was structured at two levels: (1) extending 
the insertion rule from the binary to m-ary case and (2) computing the optimal detection rule, in 
sense of average probability error minimization under the condition of Gaussian noise 
constraints. Thus, the size of the inserted mark is increased by a factor log2m.   The theoretical framework m-QIM was deployed so as to advance a robust compressed domain 
watermarking method for MPEG-4 AVC ownership protection. While applied to the MEDIEVALS 
corpus (one hour of heterogeneous video content), the method demonstrated that the trade-off 
transparency-robustness-data payload can be reached. The main benefit is the increase of data 
payload by a factor of log2m while keeping fixed robustness (variations lower than 3% of the bit 
error rate after additive noise, transcoding and Stirmark random bending attacks) and 
transparency (set to average PSNR = 45dB and 65dB for SD and HD encoded content, 
respectively). The data payload averaged 150 bits per minute, i.e. about 20 times larger than the 
limit imposed by the DCI (Digital Cinema Initiatives) standard.  A semi-fragile watermarking method for video integrity verification in compressed stream was 
designed. The research was structured at two levels. First, the possibility of identifying MPEG-4 
AVC stream syntax elements describing the semantic content was investigated. Thus, we make 
an accurate usage of Intra prediction mode to generate the authentication signature. The 
signature generation block is first built by an empirical approach and subsequently validated by 
information theory tools. Secondly, the embedding strategy was specified. The designed system 
considers individual groups of k successive I frames (referred to as I-Group) sampled from an 
MPEG-4 AVC video sequence. Within such an I-Group, an authentication signature is extracted 
from the first I frame (thus ensuring fragility) and inserted into the rest of k-1 I frames by means 
of the m-QIM watermarking technique. The low complexity requirement can be met when the 
signature is extracted and inserted directly from/in the MPEG-4 AVC syntax elements, with 
minimal decoding/re-encoding operations. This method was evaluated for videosurveillance 
applications, under the framework of the SPY project. The results exhibit fragility to content 
replacement (with an 1/81 frame and 3s spatial and temporal accuracy, respectively) and 
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robustness against transcoding (compression by a factor of 2). The m-QIM framework main 
advantage is a relative gain factor of 0.11 of PSNR for fixed robustness (against transcoding), 
fragility (to content alteration) and the data payload. The experiments consider 1h 20min of 
video content.  The intra-frame drift error propagation problem related to the compressed MPEG-4 AVC 
encoding features is solved by considering the analytic (algebraic) expressions of the MPEG-4 
AVC encoding operations. The experiments consider an m-QIM semi-fragile watermarking 
method and a video surveillance corpus of 1 hour and 20 minutes. For prescribed data payload 
(100 bits per second), robustness (BER < 0.1 against transcoding at 50% in stream size), fragility 
(frame modification detection with accuracies of 1/81 from the frame size and 3s) and 
complexity constraints, the modified insertion results in gains in transparency of 2 dB in PSNR, of 
0.4 in AAD, of 0.002 in IF, of 0.03 in SC, of 0.017 NCC and 22 in DVQ. 
We note that the detailed contributions met the low level of complexity required by acting directly on 
the compressed domain, thus avoiding unnecessary additional encoding/decoding operation. 
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Figure IV-1: Synopsis of the results. 
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 Theory: Minimize probability of error under additive white 
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the bit error rate after additive noise, transcoding and Stirmark 
random bending attacks). 
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 Practice: The mark generation, selection, insertion and detection for one second of video are 10 times and 8 
times faster than the MPEG-4 AVC entropic encoding/decoding and the stream read/write operations, 
respectively. 
Drift-free shaping for MPEG-4 AVC compressed stream 
watermarking 
 Theory: Analytically expressing the drift distortion problem and 
resolving it under drift-free constraint.  Practice: Gains in transparency of 2 dB in PSNR, of 0.4 in AAD, 
of 0.002 in IF, of 0.03 in SC, of 0.017 NCC and 22 in DVQ. for 
prescribed data payload (100 bit/s), robustness (BER < 0.1 
against transcoding at 50% in stream size). 
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IV.2. Future work 
The perspectives of our future work are illustrated in Figure IV-2; they are structured on three directions, 
related to robust and semi-fragile watermarking as well as to drift effect cancelation. 
Compressed domain robust watermarking  From the theoretical point of view, work will be done in order to optimize the alphabet size m as 
a function of the quantization step and to estimate the channel capacity as a function of m and 
the quantization step.  From the applicative point of view, we project to exploit the m-QIM for another type of content 
(e.g. 3DTV), to investigate the possibility to watermark other MPEG-4 AVC syntax elements and 
to evaluate the performances of the system against other attacks.  Applying the m-QIM framework for protecting the MPEG-4 HEVC/H265 standard is also part of 
our future work. 
Compressed domain semi-fragile watermarking  From both theoretical and applicative points of view, a study on the usefulness of the other 
MPEG-4 AVC syntax elements for authentication applications will be carried out.  The extensions towards MPEG-4 HEVC stream authentication will be investigated. 
Drift free watermarking  Work is already started in order to compensate the inter-frame (temporal) drift effect.  The MPEG-4 HEVC standard imposes two challenges to the drift-free compensation, related to 
both perceptual shaping and drift per-se. 
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Figure IV-2: Perspectives. 
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Drift free shaping for compressed stream watermarking  
x Adapt the drift-free solution under the new MPEG-4 HEVC standard features. 
x Evaluate performances of the system against other attacks x Implementation optimization for mobile embedded systems 
                                                                                                                             131 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendixes 
  
M. Hasnaoui MPEG-4 AVC stream watermarking  
132                                                                                                                                                              
A. MPEG-4 AVC overview  
MPEG-4 AVC (Advanced Video Coding Standard) is a video coding standard, elaborated by the ITU-T 
Coding Video Expert Group (VEG) together with the ISO/IEC Moving Picture expert Group (MPEG) as the 
product of collective partnership effort known as the Joint Video Team (JVT). This standard is especially 
suitable for low rate video applications. It provides substantial better video at those same data rates 
compared to previous standard (MPEG-2, MPEG-4 Part 2, H.263) with only a moderate increase of 
complexity [RIC03]. Used in a wide range of applications, from mobile phones to High Definition TV, it 
helped to revolutionize the quality of the video image operating over several types of networks and 
systems. 
The MPEG-4 AVC standard has a number of advantages that distinguish it from existing standards, while 
at the same time, sharing common features within other existing standards [RIC03]. 
The following are some of the key advantages of MPEG-4 AVC standard:  Up to 50% in bit rate saving: compared to MPEG-2 or MPEG-4 Part 2, MPEG-4 AVC allows a 
reduction in bit rate by up to 50% for a similar degree of encoder optimization at most bit rates.  High quality video: MPEG-4 AVC offers consistently good video quality at high and low bit rates.  Error resilience: MPEG-4 AVC provides necessary tools to deal with packet loss in packet 
networks and bit errors in wireless networks.  Network friendliness: MPEG-4 AVC bit stream can be easily transported over different networks 
through the Network Adaptation Layer. 
The MPEG-4 AVC standard does not defines a new encoder. However, it defines new encoding syntax 
elements and refines the principal encoding functions. 
The purpose of this Appendix is to outline the concept of the MPEG-4 AVC encoding standard and its 
advantages with respect to previous standards. 
A.1. Structure 
The MPEG-4 AVC architecture is designed based on two main layers: The Video Coding Layer (VLC) which 
is constructed to efficiently represent the video contents and the Network Abstraction Layer (NAL) which 
encapsulates the content represented by the VCL and provides header information in an appropriate 
way for conveyance by a variety of transport layer or storage media. 
Figure A-1 shows the structure of the MPEG-4 AVC video encoder which will be explained later [RIC03]. 
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Figure A-1: MPEG-4 AVC architecture. 
Network abstraction layer  
NAL layer is specified to standardize a data encapsulation and to provide header information in an 
appropriate way for conveyance by the transport layers or storage media. All data are contained in NAL 
units, each of which contains effectively a packet with an integer number of bytes; the first byte belongs 
to the header. A NAL unit specifies a generic format to be used in both packet-oriented and bitstream 
systems. The format of NAL units for both packet-oriented transport and bitstream is identical, except 
that each NAL unit can be preceded by a start code prefix to identify beginning of NAL unit in a 
bitstream-oriented transport layer.  
The NAL facilitates the ability to map MPEG-4 AVC VCL data to transport layers such as: x RTP/IP: Real-time internet services; x File format: e.g., ISO MP4 for storage and multimedia services; x H.32X: wired and wireless conversational services; x MPEG-2: broadcasting. 
NAL units are classified into VCL and non-VCL units. VCL units contain the data that represents the values 
of samples in the video pictures and the non-VCL units contain any associated additional information 
such as parameter sets and supplemental enhancement information. 
Video coding layer 
The video coding layer of MPEG-4 AVC is similar in spirit to other standards. It consists on hybrid of 
temporal and spatial prediction, in conjunction with integer transform and entropic coding. The VCL 
working process consists of the four main stages: x Dividing each video frame into blocks of pixels so that the video frame processing can be 
conducted at the block level. 
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 Exploiting the spatial redundancies that exist within the video frame by coding the original blocks 
through spatial prediction, transform, quantization and entropy coding (or variable-length 
coding).  Exploiting the temporal redundancies that exist between blocks in successive frames, so that 
only changes between successive frames need to be encoded. This is achieved according to 
motion estimation and compensation. For a given block, a block search is performed in the 
previously coded frames (one or more) to obtain the motion vectors that will be used further by 
the encoder/decoder to predict the subject block. 
Figure A-2 shows a block diagram of the MPEG-4 AVC encoding; this figure is kept unchanged from 
its reference [RIC03] 
 
Figure A-2: Block diagram of the MPEG-4 AVC encoder [RIC03]. 
The VCL is structured into five layers: GOP (Group Of Picture), picture, slice, macroblock and block. 
Headers of each layer provide information on the encoding/decoding order for the lower layers. 
   Appendixes 
                                                                                                                            135 
A GOP consists of a number of images that can be 3 types, grouped according to predetermined 
decoding order:   The I frames correspond to a coded image independently; note that only one field I can be at the 
beginning of a GOP, as it serves as a starting point for coding images of two other types;  The P frames are associated with the a motion compensated image, predicted either from an I or 
from other frame;  The B frames refer to any image being double (forward and backward) motion compensated. 
 
Block dividing 
Each video image is partitioned into       macroblocks. Each macroblock consists of       
luminance samples   of     samples for each of two chrominance components    and   . These 
blocks are encoded/decoded with respect to the order described in the Figure A-3. 
 
Figure A-3: Y, Cb and Cr encoding/decoding order. 
A.2. Encoding  
Prediction 
Each frame of a video sequence is processed in units of macroblock (corresponding to       pixels). 
Each macroblock is encoded in intra or inter mode. In intra mode, the block   is constructed by samples 
in the current frame that have previously been encoded/decoded. In inter mode, the Block   is 
constructed by motion compensation from one or more reference frames. 
Intra prediction 
In MPEG-4 AVC, two different types of intra prediction: intra     and intra       can be considered. 
On the one hand, the intra     mode is based on predicting each     block separately and is well 
suited for encoding the textured frame area. On the other hand, the intra       mode performs the 
prediction of the whole       macroblocks and is more suited for encoding smoothed frame area. 
In order to perform the intra prediction mentioned above, MPEG-4 AVC offers nine modes for the 
prediction of     luminance blocks [RIC03], including DC prediction (Mode 2) and eight directional 
modes, namely 0, 1, 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8 , see Figures A-4 and A-5; these figures are kept unchanged from 
their reference [RIC03]. 
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Figure A-4: Intra prediction. 
 
 
Figure A-5: Intra prediction modes for     luminance blocks [RIC03]. 
The predicted block is obtained by using the already encoded samples (from A to M) from neighboring 
blocks.  
For instance, if the vertical prediction mode (mode 0) is selected in the prediction, then the samples of 
the predicted block (from a to p) are obtained as follows:  a, e, I and m are set to A,  b, f, j and n are set to B,  c, g, k and o are set to C, and   d, h, l and p are set to D. 
For smoothed regions (with less spatial detail), MPEG-4 AVC consider       intra prediction mode. 
One of four prediction modes (DC, Vertical, Horizontal and Planar) may be chosen for computing the 
luminance predicted macroblock.  
In addition, MPEG-4 AVC supports intra prediction for     chrominance blocks by also using four 
prediction modes (DC, Vertical, Horizontal and Planar). Finally, the prediction mode for each block is 
efficiently coded by assigning shorter symbol to more likely modes, where the probability of each mode 
is determined based on the modes used for coding the surrounding blocks. 
Inter prediction 
Inter prediction is based on using motion estimation and compensation to take advantage of the 
temporal redundancies that exist between successive frames, hence, providing very efficient coding. 
Motion estimation in MPEG-4 AVC supports most of the key features adopted in earlier video standards, 
but its efficiency is improved through added flexibility and functionality. 
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Compared to previous video coding standard which support only       and     block sizes for 
motion estimation, MPEG-4 AVC supports a block sizes ranging from       to    . Motion 
compensation for each block       can be performed according to different block sizes and shapes.  
Partitions with luma block size of       ,     ,     , and     samples are initially supported by 
the syntax. In case partitions with     samples are chosen, one additional syntax element specifies 
whether the corresponding     partition is further partitioned into partitions of    ,     or     
luma samples and corresponding chroma samples. Figure 6-A illustrates the partitioning principal. 
 
Figure A-6: Different modes of dividing a macroblock for motion estimation in MPEG-4 AVC. 
The availability of smaller motion compensation blocks improves the prediction in general, and in 
particular, the small blocks improves the ability of the model to handle fine motion detail and result a 
better subjective viewing quality because they do not produce large blocking artifacts. 
MPEG-4 AVC allows the motion vector to be determined at higher levels of spatial accuracy with respect 
to the existing standards. Quarter pixel accuracy is deployed in MPEG-4 AVC motion compensation, in 
contrast with prior standards based primarily on half-pixel accuracy.  A more detailed investigation of 
fractional sample accuracy is presented in [WED03].  
The MPEG-4 AVC standard offers the option of having multiple reference frames in inter picture coding, 
resulting in better subjective video quality and more efficient video coding. Moreover, from the 
implementation point of view, there would be additional processing delays and higher memory at both 
the encoder and the decoder.  
Each partition or sub-partition in an inter macroblock a motion vector is estimated from an area of the 
same size in a reference picture. The motion compensated vector is obtained by computing the 
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displacement between the current area and the reference area. The difference between the current 
motion vector and the predicted motion vector and the prediction mode are encoded.  
Compared to anterior standards, MPEG-4 AVC has brought a new innovation by introducing the kipped 
macroblock type. For macroblock encoded according to this type, neither prediction residual 
information, nor motion information or reference index is transmitted for the decoder side. The 
advantage of this induced type is that large area with no change such as background can be represented 
with very few bits. 
Regardless the type of prediction, the pixel values are subtracted from the corresponding predicted 
values to obtain the residual macroblock. Each residual macroblock is transformed, quantized and binary 
encoded. 
Transformation  
Following the prediction, the transformation is applied with the view of representing the data as 
uncorrelated (separate components with a minimum interdependence) and compacted (the energy is 
concentrated in a small number of frequencies) [HAL02].  
Compared to previous standards which use the     Discrete Cosine Transform (DCT) as the basic 
transformation, MPEG-4 AVC uses three transformations depending on the type of the data that is to be 
encoded:  An integer DCT transformation which is applied to all     blocks of luminance and 
chrominance components in the residual data.  A Hadamard transformation applied to     blocks constructed of luma dc coefficients in intra 
macroblocks predicted according to the       mode.  A Hadamard transformation applied to     blocks constructed of chroma dc coefficients in any 
macroblock. 
One of the main improvements of this standard is the using of smaller     block transformation. In 
fact, the smaller shape transformation has visual benefits resulting in reducing blocking and ringing 
(noise around edges) artifacts. Also, the smaller transformation requires less computations and 
subsequently less energy consuming. 
Instead of a classical     discrete cosine transform, a separable integer transform with similar 
properties as a     DCT is used. The new advanced transform approaching the     DCT has several 
advantages:  The core part of the transformation can be implemented using additions and shifts, resulting less 
level of computation complexity.   The precise integer specification eliminates any mismatch issues between the encoder and 
decoder in the inverse transform (this has been a problem with earlier standards). 
For instance, given a     residual block  , the transformed block   is obtained according to the 
following matrix operations: 
   Appendixes 
                                                                                                                            139 
         
                           ,       
                                                  
    ;     ;       
 
 
where    is the transposed matrix of   and the operator   denote the element per element 
multiplication between two matrices. 
The     Hadamard transformation is performed according to the following equation: 
                                
                        
 
The     Hadamard transformation is performed according to the following equation:  
                        
Where      represents a DC block and    denotes the Hadamard transformed block. 
Figure A-7 illustrates the way in which the data is structured and transmitted within a macroblock. If the 
macroblock is coded in       intra mode, then the block containing the DC coefficient of each     
luma block (labeled -1 in Figure A-7) is transmitted first. Secondly, the luma residual blocks ranging from 
0 to 15 are transmitted in the order shown in Figure A-7 where the DC coefficients are set to zero. Blocks 
16 and 17 contain a     array of chroma coefficients are transformed and sent. Finally, chroma 
residual blocks ranging from 18 to 25 (with DC coefficient set to 0) are sent. 
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Figure A-7: Block construction for DCT and Hadamard transformations. 
Quantization  
The quantization step is where a significant portion of data compression takes place and is the phase 
where information is lost in the compression chain [HAL02]. In MPEG-4 AVC, the transformed 
coefficients are quantized using a scalar quantization. The basic forward quantization operation is 
performed as follows:                        
where     is a coefficient of the transformed     block described above,      is the quantization step 
size and     is the quantized coefficient.  
The MPEG-4 AVC supports a total of 52 of quantization step value which are indexed by a quantization 
parameter   as illustrated in Table A-1. 
Table A-1: Quantization steps.    0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 …       0.625 0.6875 0.8125 0.875 1 1.125 1.25 1.375 1.625 1.75 2 2.25 2.5 …    … 18 … 24 … 30 … 36 … 42 … 48 … 51        5  10  20  40  80  160  224 
The quantizers are arranged so that an increase of 1 in quantization parameter means an increase of 
quantization step size by approximately 12% (an increase of 6 means an increase of quantization step 
size by exactly a factor of 2). 
To circumvent the disadvantages of the entire division, the MPEG-4 AVC standard offers another form of 
quantization performing, this time is involving right shift:  
0 1 4 5 
2 3 6 7 
8 9 12 13 
10 11 14 15 
18 19 
20 21 
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16x16 Intra mode 16 17 
Luma 
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Where  and      are association of the quantization parameter,   is the bit length parameter for the 
encoding process. 
Entropy coding  
The quantized transformed coefficients are generally scanned in a zig-zag manner and transmitted to be 
encoded. The zig-zag scan illustrated in Figure A-8 is used in all frame coding cases and it is identical to 
the conventional scan used in earlier video coding standards. The zig-zag scan arranges the coefficient in 
an ascending order of the corresponding frequencies.  
 
Figure A-8: Zig-zag scanning. 
Entropy coding is the last step in video coding process. Its paradigm consists in assigning shorter 
codewords to symbol with higher occurrence probability and longer codewords to symbol with less 
occurrences probability. Two types of entropy coding have been adopted by the MPEG-4 AVC standard. 
The first category represents a combination of Universal Variable Length Coding (UVLC) and Context 
Adaptive Variable Length Coding (CAVLC). The second method is represented by Context-Based Adaptive 
Binary Arithmetic Coding (CABAC).  
UVLC/CAVLC 
In anterior video coding standards, symbols the associated codewords are organized in a look-up tables, 
referred to as variable length coding (VLC) tables which are stored at both the encoder and the decoder. 
In MPEG-2, a number of VLC tables are used, depending on the type of encoded data (e.g., transformed 
coeffiĐieŶt, ŵotioŶ ǀeĐtoƌ, …Ϳ. 
In contrast with the previous standards, MPEG-4 AVC offers a single Universal VLC (UVLC) table that is 
used in entropy coding of all symbols in the encoder except the transform coefficients. Despite the fact 
that the use of a single table is simple, a major disadvantage is introduced, a single table may ignore the 
correlation between the encoder symbols. 
In MPEG-4 AVC, the residual transformed coefficients are encoded using a Context Adaptive Variable 
Length Coding (CAVLC). CAVLC is designed to take advantage of several features of the zig-zag scanning 
of     blocks:  Non-zero coefficients at the end of the zig-zag scanning are often equal to +/-1. CAVLC encodes 
the Ŷuŵďeƌ of these ĐoeffiĐieŶts ;͞tƌailiŶg  s͟Ϳ iŶ a ĐoŵpaĐt ǁaǇ. 
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 CAVLC employs run-level coding to represent the string of zero in a quantized     block. 
Furthermore, the numbers of non-zero coefficients in neighboring blocks are usually correlated. 
Consequently, the number of non-zero coefficients is encoded according to a look-up table that 
depends on the number of non-zero coefficients in neighboring blocks.   The level of non-zero coefficients tends to be higher at the start of the     zig-zag scanned 
block (near the DC coefficient) and lower towards the higher frequencies. CAVLC takes 
advantage of this by adapting the choice of the VLC look-up table for the level encoding 
depending on recently encoded level magnitude. 
CAVLC is supported in all MPEG-4 AVC profiles [WEI03]. 
CABAC 
CABAC (Context-Adaptive Binary Arithmetic Coding) is used in MPEG-4 AVC to encode quantized 
coefficients, based on arithmetic coding [MAR01]. The main difference between CABAC and CAVLC is 
that CABAC has the feature to adapt to the context: coding table change according to symbols already 
transmitted. CABAC is more efficient than CAVLC but has a higher computational complexity. 
On the one hand, the usage of arithmetic coding allows the assignment of a non-integer number of bits 
to each symbol of an alphabet, which is extremely beneficial for symbol probabilities that are greater 
than 0.5. On the other hand, the usage of adaptive codes permits adaptation to non-stationary symbol 
statistics. Another important property of CABAC is its context modeling. The statistics of already coded 
syntax elements are used to estimate conditional probabilities. These conditional probabilities are used 
for switching several estimated probability models. In H.264/AVC, the arithmetic coding core engine and 
its associated probability estimation are specified as multiplication-free low-complexity methods using 
only shifts and table look-ups. Compared to CAVLC, CABAC typically provides a reduction in bit rate 
between 5-15%.The highest gains are typically obtained when coding interlaced TV signals. More details 
on CABAC can be found in [MAR03]. 
A.3. Profiles 
A profile defines a set of coding tools and features that can be used in generating a conforming stream. 
MPEG-4 AVC defines three popular profiles which are namely the Baseline, Main and extended profile. 
The Baseline profile allows the use of Arbitrary Slice Ordering (ASO) to ensure real time communication 
applications, as well as the use of Flexible Macroblock Ordering (FMO) to improve error resilience in the 
coded bit stream. The Baseline profile supports all features in the MPEG-4 AVC except the following two 
features sets [WEI 03]:   Set 1: B slices, weighted prediction, CABAC.  Set 2: redundant slice data partitioning. 
The Baseline profile is mainly deployed for real time applications such as video conferencing and mobile 
applications.  
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The first set of the additional feature is introduced by the Main profile. However, the Main profile does 
not support the FMO, ASO and redundant slice data partitioning which are supported by the Baseline 
profile. The Main profile is deployed for Broadcast application.  
The extended profile support all features of the Baseline profile, and both the sets of features detailed 
above except CABAC. The extended profile is mainly deployed for High Definition (HD) video encoding. 
A.4. MPEG-4 AVC parser  
In order to allow the modification of individual elements in an MPEG-4 AVC compressed stream while 
observing to the related syntax constraints, the following parser has been implemented, Figure A-9. 
 
Figure A-9: Parser of the MPEG-4 AVC bit stream. 
Our parser exploits the layer architecture of the MPEG-4 AVC Codec to separate the parsing and location 
process of MPEG-4 AVC syntax element. As shown in Figure A-10, two main layers exist: the video coding 
layer describes the chain compression while the network abstraction layer controls the package of the in 
NALU (Network Abstraction Layer Unit). After this second layer, the parser analyzes the stream and 
recovers the syntax elements according to the hierarchy shown in Figure A-10. 
Our parser, Figure A-10, performs a partial decoding of the AVC streams read from a file, changes its 
syntax elements according to the watermarking procedure, records it into new stream and then writes 
into another file. These operations are also performed into two levels architecture. 
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Figure A-10: Layer structure MPEG-4 AVC Decoder/Parser/Encoder. 
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B. Video corpus  
B.1. MPEG-4 AVC encoding parameters  
In generally the standard includes two different configuration of codec called profiles, each targeting a 
specific class of applications:   Baseline Profile (BP): Primarily for low-cost applications that use fewer resources, this profile is 
widely used in mobile applications and videoconferencing.  Main Profile: This profile is used for standard definition digital TV broadcasts that use the MPEG-
4 format as defined in the DVB standard. 
In the sequel, Table B-1 will provide details about the profile parameters considered in the corpus while 
Table B-2 provides the level parameter descriptions. 
Table B-1: MPEG-4 AVC profiles parameters. 
Compression Process Configuration Baseline Main 
 
 
Pre –processing 
4:2:0 format Yes Yes 
4:0:0 format No No 
4:2:2 format No No 
4:4:4 format No No 
Deblocking filter Yes Yes 
 
 
Prediction 
Slice I and P Yes Yes 
Slice B No Yes 
Slice SI ans SP No No 
Multiple Reference Yes Yes 
Redundant Slices (RS) Yes No 
Quantization Quantization Matrix No No 
 
Encoding 
CAVLC Yes Yes 
CABAC No Yes 
8 bits per pixel Yes Yes 
 
Table B-2: MPEG-4 AVC level parameters of our experimental corpus. 
Level 
Maximum bloc number 
per frame 
Maximum rate for Base Resolution & fps 
1 99 64  kbit/ s 128x96/ 30.9 
2.2 1620 256 kbit/ s 352x576/ 25.0 
3 1620 5 Mbit/s 720x576/ 25.0 
4 8192 10 Mbit/ s 1920x1080/ 30.1 
 
B.2. Corpus  
The experiments are carried out on large number of heterheneous video sequences, as illustraited 
bellow. Our expirements were conducted under two corpora the size and types of the various content 
are presendted in Table B-3 and Table B-4. 
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Table B-3: Experimental corpora (MEDIEVALS SD corpus). 
MEDIEVALS SD CORPUS 
 
 
 x 512 kbps  x Baseline profile x 640x480/ 25 fps x 15 minutes 
 
 
 x 512 kbps  x Baseline profile x 640x480/ 25 fps x 15 minutes 
 
 
 x 512 kbps  x Baseline profile x 640x480/ 25 fps x 15 minutes 
 
 
 x 512 kbps  x Baseline profile x 640x480/ 25 fps x 15 minutes 
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Table B-4: Experimental corpora (MEDIEVALS HD corpus). 
MEDIEVALS HD CORPUS 
 
 
 x 2024 kbps  x Baseline profile x 1920x1080/ 25 fps x 15 minutes 
 
 
 x 2024 kbps  x Baseline profile x 1920x1080/ 25 fps x 15 minutes 
 
 
 x 2024 kbps  x Baseline profile x 1920x1080/ 25 fps x 15 minutes 
 
 
 x 2024 kbps  x Baseline profile x 1920x1080/ 25 fps x 15 minutes 
 
 
 
 
 
M. (asnaoui MPEG-4 AVC stream watermarking
148                                                                                                                                                              
 
Table B-5: Experimental corpora (SPY corpus). 
SPY CORPUS 
 
 
 x 512 kbps  x Baseline profile x 640x480/ 25 fps x 10 minutes  
 
 
 x 512 kbps  x Baseline profile x 640x480/ 25 fps x 10 minutes 
 
 
 x 512 kbps  x Baseline profile x 640x480/ 25 fps x 10 minutes 
 
 
 x 512 kbps  x Baseline profile x 640x480/ 25 fps x 10 minutes 
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 x 512 kbps  x Baseline profile x 640x480/ 25 fps x 10 minutes 
 
 
 x 512 kbps  x Baseline profile x 640x480/ 25 fps x 10 minutes 
 
 
 x 512 kbps  x Baseline profile x 640x480/ 25 fps x 10 minutes 
 
 x 512 kbps  x Baseline profile x 640x480/ 25 fps x 10 minutes 
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C. Additional results related to the m-QIM probability 
of error 
 
     
Figure C-1:    as a function of  , for 11 values of  , for four values of    and for a fixed value     . 
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Figure C-2:    as a function of  , for 11 values of  , for four values of    and for a fixed value     . 
     
Figure C-3:    as a function of  , for 11 values of  , for four values of    and for a fixed value     . 
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Figure C-4:    as a function of  , for 11 values of  , for four values of    and for a fixed value     . 
     
Figure C-5:    as a function of  , for 11 values of  , for four values of    and for a fixed value     . 
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Figure C-6:    as a function of  , for 11 values of  , for four values of    and for a fixed value     . 
     
Figure C-7:    as a function of  , for 11 values of  , for four values of    and for a fixed value     . 
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Figure C-8:    as a function of  , for 11 values of  , for four values of    and for a fixed value     . 
              
Figure C-9:    as a function of  , for                          ,    and    . 
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Figure C-10:    as a function of  , for                          ,    and    . 
              
Figure C-11:    as a function of  , for                          ,    and    . 
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Figure C-12:    as a function of  , for                          ,    and    . 
                    
Figure C-13:    as a function of  , for                          ,    and         . 
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Figure C-14:    as a function of  , for                          ,    and         . 
                    
Figure C-15:    as a function of  , for                          ,    and    . 
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Figure C-16:    as a function of  , for                          ,    and         . 
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D. Related collaborative R&D Projects  
European project:  SPY (Surveillance imProved sYstem) project funded by ITEA2 [WEB02]: 
The aim of the SPY project is to design, develop and test a new automated and smart system 
architecture for assistance and surveillance, adapted to a mobile environment, see Figure D-1. This 
project optimises the use of mobile infrastructures (wireless communications network) and sensors 
(video cameras, microphones) to assist units in the field (police and fire services) with their day-to-day 
missions. The SPY project is based on applications such as advanced algorithms to provide users with the 
most pertinent possible representation of the situation and an automated decision-making help system 
in changing and unforeseeable contexts. All of this will contribute to improving the reactivity and 
effectiveness of security and emergency forces in their surveillance, intervention and control missions. 
Today, fixed video surveillance cameras are everywhere and police vehicles are increasingly equipped 
with these devices, however information is only processed at the control centre and is often underused. 
Understanding the situation is a critical factor, particularly in complex and fast-moving environments, 
while decisions must be taken rapidly, sometimes based on uncertain information. Security forces need 
to be able to access reliable and relevant information via optimized media such as video and the 
interactive display of data to assist them in their day-to-day missions. New solutions for the interactive 
display of information are made available in SPY, to provide users with an intuitive, understandable and 
adapted view of the situation. 
 
Figure D- 1: SPY system design. 
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French project: MEDIEVAL (waterMarking et Embrouillage pour la DIffusion et les Echanges Vidéos et 
Audios Legalisés) project funded by ANR: 
The main idea of this project (see Figure D-2) consists in associating an original technique of partial 
encryption to watermarking solutions for audio and video digital media, in order to ensure a high 
security end-to-end transmission. Compared to the watermarking-encryption schemes usually proposed 
in the state of art, the proposed solution presents several advantages. First, at the client side, the 
operations of decryption and the watermark insertion are performed in an absolutely inseparable way. 
Therefore, at no time, the only-watermarked or only-encrypted contents are available. Second, the most 
complex watermarking operations (computation of the watermark itself and of the way it is inserted) are 
carried out at the server side on a very small part of the digital content. Hence, very little resources are 
required at the client terminal. Third, the partial encryption associated to the watermarking allows 
personalizing a very small part of the media. The major part, common to all users, may then be diffused 
over super-distribution (or peer-to-peer) networks. 
That project objectives yield many technical challenges. Those related to transactional watermarking 
consist first in generating a specific watermark for every single transaction. This watermark has then to 
be inserted in the small part of the media that is partially encrypted. The different insertion ways are 
studied to select the most robust one ensuring the watermark invisibility. A particular effort is dedicated 
to the global system robustness against hacker attacks in order to jointly optimize the watermarking and 
the partial encryption. The researches and developments carried out during this project results into a 
prototype ready to be converted into an industrial product. 
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Figure D- 2 : MEDIEVAL architecture. 
 
Audiovisual 
content provider  
Distributed orignal 
content 
 
 
 
 
 
© 
Insecure data transmission 
Unreadable and scrambled part 
transmission 
© 
Scrambling 
+Watermarking 
Watermarked part transmission 
P
ro
te
ct
io
n
 m
o
d
u
le
 
Secure data transmission Streaming server on demand  
 
 
 
 
 
 
©
Marked content 
© 
Client 
Platform client distribution 
W
a
te
rm
a
rk
e
d
 a
u
d
io
v
is
u
a
l 
co
n
te
n
t 
re
co
n
st
ru
ct
io
n
 m
o
d
u
le
. 
   List of Publications 
                                                                                                                            162 
List of Publications 
Journals 
1 M. Hasnaoui, M. Mitƌea, ͞Multi-symbol video watermarking͟, Singal Processing: Image Comminucation, vol. 
29(1), pp. 107-127, 2013 (http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.image.2013.07.007). 
2 M. Mitrea, M. Hasnaoui, ͞Semi-fragile watermarking ďetǁeeŶ theoƌǇ aŶd pƌaĐtiĐe͟, PƌoĐeediŶg of the 
Romanian Academy, Series A, vol. 14, Special Issue on Criptology Science, pp. 328-337, 2013, 
(http://www.acad.ro/sectii2002/proceedings/doc2013-3s/06-MITREA.pdf) 
International conferences 
1 M. Hasnaoui, M. Mitƌea, ͞Dƌift-free MPEG-4 AVC semi-fƌagile ǁateƌŵaƌkiŶg͟, accepted for SPIE Electronic 
Imaging - Media Watermarking, Security, and Forensics, San Francisco, 2014; to be published in Proc SPIE vol. 
9028. 
2 M. Ammar, M. Mitrea, and M. Hasnaoui, ͞“alieŶĐǇ map computation in the MPEG-ϰ AVC Đoŵpƌessed stƌeaŵ͟, 
accepted for SPIE Electronic Imaging – Human Vision and Electronic Imaging XIX, San Francisco, 2014; to be 
published in Proc SPIE vol. 9014. 
3 M. Hasnaoui, M. Mitƌea, ͞“eŵi-fragile watermarking for video surveillance appliĐatioŶ͟, PƌoĐeediŶg of the 
European Signal Processing, pp. 1782–1786, Bucharest, 2012 
4 M. Hasnaoui, M. Belhaj, M. Mitrea, and F. Preteux, ͞MPEG-4 AVC stream watermarking by m-QIM technique͟, 
Proc. SPIE, vol. 7881, 2011. 
5 M. Hasnaoui, M. Belhaj, M. Mitrea, and F. Preteux, ͞MPEG-4 AVC stream watermarking by ST-mDM 
technique͟, IEEE International Conference on Electronic, Circuits, and Systems, pp. 487–490, Athens, 2011. 
6 M.Hasnaoui, M. Mitrea, ͞PƌoteĐtioŶ du ĐoŶteŶu de la ǀidĠo suƌǀeillaŶĐe paƌ tatouage seŵi-fƌagile͟, Proceeding 
of Ateliers de travail sur le traitement et l’aŶalǇse de l’iŶfoƌŵatioŶ, pp. 1-8, Hammamet, Tunisie, 2011. 
7 M. Hasnaoui, M. Mitƌea, M. Belhaj, aŶd F. Pƌeteuǆ, ͞Visual Quality assessment for motion vector watermarking 
in the MPEG-4 AVC domain͟, Fifth International Workshop on Video Processing and Quality Metrics , 
Scottsdale, U.S.A, 2010. (invited paper). 
Oral presentation 
1 M. Hasnaoui, M. Mitƌea, ͞VĠƌifiĐatioŶ d’iŶtĠgƌitĠ du flux MPEG-4 AVC pour des applications 
de ǀidĠosuƌǀeillaŶĐe͟, GDR I“I“, JouƌŶĠe eǆtƌaĐtioŶ de pƌeuǀes ŵultiŵĠdia: dĠteĐtioŶ de ŵaŶipulatioŶ- 
identification et authentification de contenus ou personnes, 2013. 
R&D projects deliverables (contribution under the supervision of M. Mitrea) 
 MEDIEVS French project 
1 D2.1.1.2- Technique pour la protection de copie: tatouage robuste (May 2010). 
2 D3.1- MEDIEVALS – Architecture logicielle et matérielle (October 2011).  SPY European project 
1 D5.1.1- Network management: state of the art (August 2011) 
2 D5.2.1- Network management: data coding: specification (January 2012) 
3 D5.4.3- Integrity techniques: Benchmarking Results (August 2013) 
   References 
                                                                                                                            163 
References 
[AIT10] K. Ait. Saadi, A. Bouridane, aŶd A. Guessouŵ, ͞CoŵďiŶed fƌagile ǁateƌŵaƌkiŶg aŶd digital sigŶatuƌe foƌ 
H.Ϯϲϰ/ AVC ǀideo autheŶtiĐatioŶ,͟PƌoĐ. EusipĐo, pp. Ϯϰ-28, Scotland, (Aug 2010). 
[ALA03] A. M. Alattaƌ, E. T. LiŶ, aŶd U. M. Celik, ͞WateƌŵaƌkiŶg loǁ ďit-rate advanced simple profile MPEG-4 
ďitstƌeaŵs͟, IEEE. Trans on Circuits and Systems for Video Technology, Vol. 13 (8), pp. 787-800, (Aug 
2003). 
[AVC01] I. AǀĐiďas, ͞Iŵage ƋualitǇ statisĐs aŶd theiƌ use iŶ stegaŶalǇsis aŶd ĐoŵpƌessioŶ,͟ PhD Thesis, BogaziĐi 
University, Turkey (2001). 
[BAS01] P. BA“, N. V. Boulgouƌis, F. D. Koƌaǀos, J. M. ChasseƌǇ, M. G. “tiŶtizis, aŶd B. MaĐƋ, ͞Roďust 
watermarking of video objects for MPEG-ϰ appliĐatioŶs,͟ PƌoĐ. “PIE, Vol. ϴϱ, ;Ϯ00 Ϳ. 
[BEL10] M. Belhaj, M.Mitƌea, “. Duta, aŶd F. Pƌġteuǆ, ͞MPEG-4 AVC robust video watermarking based on QIM 
aŶd peƌĐeptual ŵaskiŶg,͟ IEEE IŶteƌŶatioŶal CoŶfeƌeŶĐe oŶ CoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs, pp. ϰϳϳ–480, Bucharest, 
(Jun 2010). 
[BUC94] M. BuĐklaŶd, F. GeǇ, ͞The ƌelatioŶship ďetǁeeŶ ReĐall aŶd PƌeĐisioŶ,͟ JouƌŶal of the AŵeƌiĐaŶ Society 
for Information Science, Vol. 45 (1), pp. 12-19, (Jan 1994). 
[CRA98] S. Craver, N. Memon, B.-L. Yeo, aŶd M. YeuŶg. ͞ResolǀiŶg ƌightful oǁŶeƌships ǁith iŶǀisiďle 
ǁateƌŵaƌkiŶg teĐhŶiƋues: LiŵitatioŶs, attaĐks aŶd iŵpliĐatioŶs͟. IEEE TƌaŶs. oŶ “eleĐted Areas of 
Communications , Vol. 16(4), pp. 573–586, (1998). 
[CHA00] L. ChaŶg, D. Lou, aŶd T. CheŶ, ͞Iŵage autheŶtiĐatioŶ aŶd iŶtegƌitǇ ǀeƌifiĐatioŶ ǀia ĐoŶteŶt-based 
ǁateƌŵaƌks aŶd puďliĐ keǇ ĐƌǇptosǇsteŵ,͟ PƌoĐ. Iŵage PƌoĐessiŶg, ǀol. ϯ, pp. ϲϰϵ-697, (2000).  
[CHE98] B. CheŶ, G. W. WoƌŶell, ͞Digital ǁateƌŵaƌkiŶg aŶd iŶfoƌŵatioŶ eŵďeddiŶg usiŶg ditheƌ ŵodulatioŶ,͟ 
IEEE Workshop on Multimedia Signal Processing, pp. 273–278, CANADA, (1998). 
[CHE08] “. CheŶ, H. LeuŶg, ͞ChaotiĐ WateƌŵaƌkiŶg foƌ Video AutheŶtiĐatioŶ iŶ “uƌǀeillaŶĐe AppliĐatioŶs,͟ IEEE 
Trans on Circuits and Systems For Video Technology, Vol. 18 (5), pp. 704–709, (May 2008). 
[COS83] M. Costa, ͞WƌitiŶg oŶ diƌtǇ papeƌ, ͞IEEE TƌaŶsaĐtioŶs oŶ IŶfoƌŵatioŶ TheoƌǇ, Vol. IT-29, pp. 439 441 
(1983). 
[COX00] I.J. Coǆ, M.L. Milleƌ aŶd J.A. Blooŵ, ͞WateƌŵaƌkiŶg appliĐatioŶs aŶd theiƌ pƌopeƌties͟ PƌoĐ. 
Information Technology: Coding and Computing, pp. 6-10, (2000). 
[COX99] I. Coǆ, M. Milleƌ, J. Blooŵ, J. FƌidƌiĐh, aŶd T. Kalkeƌ, ͞Digital WateƌŵaƌkiŶg aŶd “tegaŶogƌaphǇ,͟ ϮNd 
Ed. ISBN: 978-0123725851 
[COX01] I.J. Cox, M.L. Miller and J.A. Bloom, Digital watermarking principles and practices, (2001) 
M. Hasnaoui MPEG-4 AVC stream watermarking  
164                                                                                                                                                              
[COX02] I.J. Coǆ, M.L. Milleƌ, aŶd J.A. Blooŵ, ͞Digital WateƌŵaƌkiŶg,͟ AĐadeŵiĐ Pƌess, ;Ϯ00ϮͿ. 
[COX07] I. Coǆ, M. Milleƌ, J. Blooŵ, J. FƌidƌiĐh, aŶd T. Kalkeƌ, ͞Digital WateƌŵaƌkiŶg aŶd “tegaŶogƌaphǇ,͟ 
Morgan Kaufmann, (2007). 
[COX08] I.J. Coǆ, M.L. Milleƌ, J.A. Blooŵ, J. FƌidƌiĐh, aŶd T. Kalkeƌ, ͞Digital WateƌŵaƌkiŶg aŶd “tegaŶogƌaphǇ,͟ 
Second edition, Morgan Kaufmann, Burlington, MA, (2008). 
[DES12] J. Desai, k. G. Maƌadia aŶd B. Gohli, ͞PeƌfoƌŵaŶĐe aŶalǇsis of ŵodulatioŶ teĐhŶiƋues iŶ GA assisted 
CDMA ǁiƌeless ĐoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶ sǇsteŵ ǁith AWGN RaǇleigh fadiŶg ĐhaŶŶel,͟ iŶteƌŶatioŶal jouƌŶal of 
scientific & technology research, vol. 1(4), pp. 59-62, (May 2012). 
[DIG03] Digimarc Corporation, "Digimarc Comments to USPTO Regarding Technological Protection Systemd for 
Digitized Copyrighted Works", (2003). 
[DUR05] J.Durand.http://www.liberation.fr/page.php?article=315627. La caméra, nouvelle arme des policiers 
européens, (2005). 
[EGG13] J. J. Eggeƌs, J. K. “u, aŶd B. Giƌod, ͞“Đalaƌ Đosta sĐheŵe foƌ iŶfoƌŵatioŶ eŵďeddiŶg,͟  IEEE Trans on 
Signal Processing, Vol. 51 (4), pp. 1003–1019, (2003). 
[ESK95] A. M. EskiĐioglu, “. P. Fisheƌ, ͞Iŵage QualitǇ Measuƌes aŶd theiƌ peƌfoƌŵaŶĐe,͟ IEEE TƌaŶs oŶ 
Communications, Vol. 43 (12), pp. 2959–2965, (1995) 
[EQU08] Equancy&Co, Impact économique de la copie illégale des biens numérisé en France, (2008). 
[FIL13] Filŵaŵakeƌ ŵagaziŶe, ͞Audio ǁateƌŵaƌks foƌ the seĐoŶd “ĐƌeeŶ,͟ ;Ϯ0 ϯͿ 
[FIT00] M. FittoŶ, ͞PƌiŶĐiples of digital ŵodulatioŶ,͟ TO“HIBA-TREL (berk.tc/combas/digital_mod.pdf). 
[GER99] ). J. Geƌadts, J. Bijhold, ͞FoƌeŶsiĐ Video iŶǀestigatioŶ ǁith ƌeal tiŵe digitized uŶĐoŵpƌessed ǀideo 
iŵage seƋueŶĐes,͟ PƌoĐ. “PIE, IŶǀestigatioŶ aŶd FoƌeŶsiĐ “ĐieŶĐe TeĐhŶologies, ǀol. ϯϱϳϲ, p.  ϱϰ-164, 
Boston, (Feb 1999). 
[GOL07] J. A. Golikeri. P. Nasiopoulos, aŶd ). J. WaŶg, ͞Roďust digital ǀideo ǁateƌŵaƌkiŶg sĐheŵe foƌ H.Ϯϲϰ 
adǀaŶĐed ǀideo ĐodiŶg “taŶdaƌd,͟ J. EleĐtƌoŶ. IŵagiŶg, Vol.  ϲ ;ϰͿ, ;JuŶ Ϯ00ϳͿ. 
[GON08] X. GoŶg, H. Lu, ͞Toǁaƌds fast aŶd ƌoďust ǁateƌŵaƌkiŶg sĐheŵe foƌ H.Ϯϲϰ ǀideo,͟ IEEE Symp on 
Multimedia, 649–653, (2008). 
[HAA98] G. HaaŶ, E. Belleƌs, ͞DeiŶteƌlaĐiŶg: aŶ oǀeƌǀieǁ,͟ PƌoĐ. IEEE, Vol. ϴϲ ;ϵͿ, pp.  ϴϯϵ-1857, (Jun 1998). 
[HUO11] W. Huo, Y. )hu, H. CheŶ, ͞A ĐoŶtƌollaďle eƌƌoƌ-drift elimination scheme for watermarking algorithm in 
H.Ϯϲϰ/AVC stƌeaŵ,͟ IEEE “igŶal PƌoĐessiŶg Letteƌs,  ϴ;ϵͿ, ϱϯϱ-538, (2011). 
[KAL99] T. Kalleƌ, J. Haitsŵa aŶd M. Maes, ͞The VIVA pƌojeĐt: digital ǁateƌŵaƌkiŶg foƌ ďƌoadĐast ŵoŶitoƌiŶg,͟ 
Proc. ICIP, Vol. 2, pp. 202-205, (1999). 
   References 
                                                                                                                            165 
[KAL01] T. Kalker, ͞CoŶsideƌatioŶs oŶ ǁateƌŵaƌkiŶg seĐuƌitǇ,͟ iŶ PƌoĐ. MM“P, pp. Ϯ0 –206, (2001). 
[KER83] A. Kerckhoffs, "La Cryptographie militaire," Journal des Sciences militaires, vol. IX, pp. 5–38, (1883). 
[KIM12] T. Kiŵ, K. Paƌk, aŶd Y. HoŶg, ͞Video ǁateƌŵaƌkiŶg teĐhŶiƋue foƌ H.Ϯϲϰ/AVC,͟ Opt. EŶg, Vol. ϱ  ;ϰͿ, 
(2012). 
[LAN98] G. LaŶgelaaƌ, R. LageŶdijk, aŶd J. BieŵoŶd, ͞Real-tiŵe laďeliŶg of MPEGϮ Đoŵpƌesseŵd ǀideo,͟ JouƌŶal 
of Visual Communication and Image Representation, Vol. 9, pp. 256-270, (Dec 1998). 
[LEV01] K. L. Levy, R. S. Hiatt, G. B. Rhoads, User-friendly rights management systems and methods, U.S. Patent 
Application 10/017,679 (2001). 
[LIN99] E.T. LiŶ, E.J. Delp, ͞A Reǀieǁ of Fƌagile Iŵage Wateƌŵaƌks,͟ PƌoĐ. ACM of the Multiŵedia aŶd “eĐuƌitǇ 
Workshop, pp. 25-29, Orlando, (Oct 1999). 
[MA09] X. Ma, ). Li, J. Lǀ, W. WaŶg, ͞Data hidiŶg iŶ H.Ϯϲϰ/AVC stƌeaŵs ǁith liŵited iŶtƌa-frame distortion 
dƌift,͟ Coŵputeƌ Netǁoƌk aŶd Multiŵedia TeĐhŶologǇ,  -5, (2009). 
[MA10] X. Ma, ). Li, H. Tu, B. )haŶg, ͞A data hiding algorithm for H.264/AVC video streams without intra-frame 
distoƌtioŶ dƌift,͟ IEEE TƌaŶs. CiƌĐuits aŶd “Ǉsteŵs foƌ Video TeĐhŶologǇ, Ϯ0; 0Ϳ,  ϯϮ0-1330, (2010). 
[MAN74] J. MaŶŶos, D. “akƌisoŶ, ͞The effeĐt of a ǀisual fidelitǇ ĐƌiteƌioŶ oŶ the eŶĐodiŶg of iŵages,͟ IEEE TƌaŶs 
on Information Theory, vol. 20 (4), pp. 525-536, (Jul 1974). 
[MAT13] B. MathoŶ, P. Bas, F. CaǇƌe aŶd B. MaĐƋ, ͞IŵpaĐts of ǁateƌŵaƌkiŶg seĐuƌitǇ oŶ taƌdos-based 
fiŶgeƌpƌiŶtiŶg,͟ IEEE. TƌaŶs oŶ iŶfoƌŵatioŶ foƌeŶsiĐs aŶd security, vol. 8 (6), pp. 1038-1050, (2013). 
[MEM98] N. MeŵoŶ aŶd P. W. WoŶg, ͞PƌoteĐtiŶg digital ŵedia ĐoŶteŶt,͟ CoŵŵuŶiĐatioŶs of the ACM, ǀol. 
41(7), (1998). 
[MIT07] M. Mitƌea, O. Duŵitƌu, F. Pƌġteuǆ, aŶd A. Vlad, ͞)eƌo ŵeŵoƌǇ iŶfoƌŵatioŶ souƌĐes appƌoximating to 
ǀideo ǁateƌŵaƌkiŶg attaĐks,͟ PƌoĐ. ICC“A, Vol. ϰϳ0ϳ, pp. ϰϰϱ–459, (2007). 
[MIT07] M. Mitƌea, F. Pƌġteuǆ, aŶd J. NuŶez, ;foƌ “FR aŶd GETͿ, ͞PƌoĐĠdĠ de tatouage d’uŶe sĠƋueŶĐe ǀideo͟, 
French patent no. 05 54132 (29/12/2005), and EU patent no. 1804213 (04/07/2007). 
[MOR77] H. P. MoƌaǀeĐ, ͞Toǁaƌds AutoŵatiĐ Visual OďstaĐle AǀoidaŶĐe,͟ PƌoĐ. IJCAI, Vol. Ϯ, pp. ϱϴϰ-590, San 
Francisco, (1977). 
[NOO05] M. Nooƌkaŵi, R. M. Meƌseƌeau, ͞Coŵpƌessed-doŵaiŶ ǀideo ǁateƌŵaƌkiŶg foƌ H.Ϯϲϰ,͟ PƌoĐ. ICIP, pp. 
890–893, Atlanta, (Sep 2005) 
[JAC67] I. JaĐoďs, ͞CoŵpaƌisoŶ of M-aƌǇ ŵodulatioŶ sǇsteŵs,͟ Bell “Ǉst. Tech. J., vol. 46, pp. 843-864, (Jun 
1967). 
M. Hasnaoui MPEG-4 AVC stream watermarking  
166                                                                                                                                                              
[PET98] F. PetiĐolas, R. AŶdeƌsoŶ, aŶd M. KuhŶ, ͞AttaĐks oŶ ĐopǇƌight ŵaƌkiŶg sǇsteŵs,͟ LNC“, Vol.  ϱϮϱ, pp. 
218-238, (1998). 
[PET00] F. PetiĐolas, ͞WateƌŵaƌkiŶg sĐheŵes eǀaluatioŶ,͟ IEEE “igŶal PƌoĐessiŶg MagaziŶe, ǀol.  ϳ ;ϱͿ, pp. ϱϴ-
64, (Sep 2000). 
[PRO01] G. J. Proakis, Digital Communications, 4th Ed., McGraw-Hill, (2001). 
[PRO05] D. Proforck, H. RiĐhteƌ, M. “Đhlauǁeg, aŶd E. Mulleƌ, ͞H.Ϯϲϰ/AVC ǀideo autheŶtiĐatioŶ usiŶg skipped 
ŵaĐƌoďloĐks foƌ aŶ eƌasaďle ǁateƌŵaƌk,͟ PƌoĐ. “PIE, Vol. ϱϵϲ0, pp. ϱϵ–60, China, (2005). 
[QUE98] P. M. Queue, ͞Toǁaƌd ƌoďust ĐoŶteŶt ďased teĐhŶiƋues foƌ iŵage autheŶtiĐatioŶ,͟ PƌoĐ. IEEE 
workshop on Multimedia signal processing, pp. 297-302, Redondo, (Dec 1998) 
[RIC03] I. Richardson, H.264 and MPEG-4 Video Compression, the Robert Gordon University, Aberdeen, (2003). 
[SAM09] R. “aŵtaŶi, ͞OŶgoiŶg iŶŶoǀatioŶ iŶ digital ǁateƌŵaƌkiŶg,͟ Computer, Vol. 42 (3), pp. 92-94, (2009). 
[SER02] S. V. Serdean, Spread Spectrum-Based Video Watermarking Algorithmsfor Copyright Protection, PhD 
thesis, university of Plymouth, (2002) 
[SHA48] C.E. Shannon, "A Mathematical Theory of Communication", Bell System Technical Journal, vol. 27, pp. 
379-423, July 1948. 
[SHA58] C. E. “haŶŶoŶ, ͞ChaŶŶels ǁith “ide IŶfoƌŵatioŶ at the TƌaŶsŵitteƌ͟, IBM JouƌŶal, pp. Ϯϴϵ Ϯϵϯ, ; ϵϱϴͿ. 
[SHA02] K. R. “haƌŵa, “. DeĐkeƌ, ͞PƌaĐtiĐal ĐhalleŶges foƌ digital ǁateƌŵaƌkiŶg appliĐatioŶs,͟ EURA“IP JouƌŶal 
on Applied Signal Processing, Vol. 2, pp. 133-139, (2002) 
[SON09] C. Song, S. Sudirman, and M. Merabti, Recent advances and classification of watermarking techniques 
in digital images, ISBN: 978-1-902560-22-9, (2009). 
[SPA87] Al. “pataƌu, FoŶdeŵeŶts de la thĠoƌie de la tƌaŶsŵissioŶ de l’iŶfoƌŵatioŶ, Pƌesse PolǇteĐhŶiƋue, 
Laussane, ISBN 2-88074-133-0, (1987). 
[THI05] “. Thieŵeƌt, H. “ahďi, aŶd M. “teiŶeďaĐh, ͞ApplǇiŶg iŶteƌest opeƌatoƌs iŶ seŵi-fragile video 
ǁateƌŵaƌkiŶg,͟ PƌoĐ. “PIE oŶ EleĐtƌoŶiĐ iŵagiŶg: “eĐuƌitǇ, “tegaŶogƌaphǇ, aŶd ǁateƌŵaƌkiŶg of 
Multimedia Contents, vol. 5681, pp. 353-362, San Jose, (Jan 2005).  
[THI06] “. Thieŵeƌt, H. “ahďi, aŶd M. “teiŶeďaĐh, ͞UsiŶg eŶtƌopǇ foƌ iŵage aŶd ǀideo authentication 
ǁateƌŵaƌks,͟ PƌoĐ. “PIE oŶ EleĐtƌoŶiĐ iŵagiŶg: “eĐuƌitǇ, “tegaŶogƌaphǇ, aŶd ǁateƌŵaƌkiŶg of 
Multimedia Contents, Vol. 6072, pp. 218–228, USA, (Jan 2006). 
[TIT99] J. TitŵaŶ, A. “teiŶŵetz, aŶd R. “teiŶŵetz, ͞CoŶteŶt ďased digital sigŶatuƌe for motion pictures 
autheŶtiĐatioŶ aŶd ĐoŶteŶt fƌagile ǁateƌŵaƌkiŶg,͟ IEEE IŶteƌŶatioŶal CoŶfeƌeŶĐe oŶ Multiŵedia 
computing and systems, vol. 2, pp. 209-213, Florence, (Jun 1999). 
   References 
                                                                                                                            167 
[UPA11] “. UpadhǇaǇ, K. “iŶgh, ͞Video AuthetiĐatioŶ – AŶ Oǀeƌǀieǁ,͟ IŶteƌŶational Journal of Computer Science 
& Engineering Survey (IJCSES), vol. 2, No. 4, (Nov 2011). 
[WAL02] E. R. Walpole, H. R. Myers, L. S. Myres, and k. Ye, Probability & Statistics for Engineers and Scientists, 
Pearson Educational International, (2002). 
[WAN04] ). WaŶg, C. A. Boǀik, R. H. “heikh, aŶd E. P. “iŵoŶĐelli, ͞Iŵage ƋualitǇ assessŵeŶt: fƌoŵ eƌƌoƌ ǀisiďilitǇ 
to stƌuĐtuƌal siŵilaƌitǇ,͟ TƌaŶs. IEEE oŶ Iŵage PƌoĐessiŶg, ǀol.  ϯ ;ϰͿ, pp. ϲ00–612, (Apr 2004). 
[WAN08] T-Y. Chen, T-H. Chen, and D-J. WaŶg, ͞H.264 Video Authentication Based on Semi-Fragile 
WateƌŵaƌkiŶg,͟ IŶteƌŶatioŶal CoŶfeƌeŶĐe oŶ IŶtelligeŶt IŶfoƌŵatioŶ HidiŶg aŶd Multiŵedia “igŶal 
Procession, pp. 659–662, Harbin, (Aug 2008). 
[WAN10] C. C. WaŶg, Y. C. Hsu, ͞Fƌagile ǁateƌŵaƌkiŶg sĐheŵe foƌ H.Ϯϲϰ ǀideo stƌeaŵ autheŶtiĐatioŶ,͟ Opt. EŶg. 
Vol. 49 (2), (2010). 
[WAT93] A. B. WatsoŶ, ͞DCT QuaŶtizatioŶ MatƌiĐes OptiŵizatioŶ foƌ iŶdiǀidual iŵages,͟ PƌoĐ. “PIE, Vol.  ϵ ϯ, 
pp. 202–216, (1993). 
[WAT01] A. WatsoŶ, J. Hu, aŶd J.F. MĐGoǁŵaŶ, ͞Digital ǀideo QualitǇ MetƌiĐ Based oŶ HuŵaŶ VisioŶ,͟ JouƌŶal 
of Electronic Imaging , Vol.10, pp. 20-29, (2001). 
[WEB01] www.webcamendirect.net  
[WEB02] www.ppsl.asso.fr/eng/spy.php 
[XU05] X. Xu, M. ToŵliŶsoŶ, M. Aŵďƌoze, aŶd M. Ahŵed, ͞TeĐhŶiƋues to pƌoǀide ƌoďust and high capacity 
data hidiŶg of id ďadges foƌ iŶĐƌeased seĐuƌitǇ ƌeƋuiƌeŵeŶt͟, PƌoĐ. “ETIT, pp.  -5, Tunisia, (2005). 
[YAN02] L. L. YaŶg, L. HaŶzo, ͞PeƌfoƌŵaŶĐes of geŶeƌalized ŵultiĐaƌƌieƌ D“-CDMA over Nakagmi-m fading 
ĐhaŶŶels,͟ IEEE. TƌaŶs oŶ ĐoŵŵuŶications, vol. 50(60), pp. 956-966, (Jun 2002).  
[ZAN06] J. )aŶg, A. T. “. Ho, ͞EffiĐieŶt Video AutheŶtiĐatioŶ foƌ H.Ϯϲϰ/AVC,͟ PƌoĐ. ICICIC. Vol. ϯ, pp.  ϱϳ-164, 
London, (2006). 
[ZHA10] L. Zhang, Y. Zhu, L.-M. Po, ͞A Ŷoǀel ǁateƌŵaƌkiŶg sĐheŵe ǁith compensation in bit-stream domain for 
H.Ϯϲϰ/AVC,͟ PƌoĐ IEEE. ICA““P,  ϳϱϴ–1761, (2010). 
[ZOU08] D. )ou, J. Blooŵ, ͞H.Ϯϲϰ/AVC stƌeaŵ ƌeplaĐeŵeŶt teĐhŶiƋue foƌ ǀideo ǁateƌŵaƌkiŶg,͟ PƌoĐ. ICA““P, 
pp. 1749–1752, Las Vegas, (2008). 
 
 
   List of Acronyms 
                                                                                                                            168 
List of Acronyms 
AAD Absolute Average Difference  
AVC Advanced Video Coding 
ASO Arbitrary Slice Ordering  
B Bidirectional 
BER Bit Error Rate 
bps bit per second 
CABAC Context Adaptive Binary Arithmetic Coding 
CPU Central Processing Unit 
CAVLC Context Adaptive Variable Length Coding 
DCT Discrete Cosine Transform 
DM Dither Modulation 
DFT Discrete Fourier Transform  
DRM Digital Rights Management  
DVQ Digital Video Quality 
FMO Flexible Macroblock Ordering 
GHz Giga Hirtz 
HD High Definition 
HDD Hard Disk Drive 
I Intra 
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